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The purpose of this study is to critically analyze the
role of the Organization of African Unity in finding a
peaceful settlement for intra-regional conflict using the
Republic of Chad as a case study. It is a truism that since
the Republic of Chad gained independence from France in 1960,
the Chadians have not witnessed any political stability.
This study is premised on the assumption that the root
cause of the conflict in Chad is due to French colonialism
and neo-colonialism that have continued to impinge upon the
Chadians even after political independence had been achieved;
that the inability of the OAU to find a solution to the
conflict is due to foreign intervention. Moreover, different
political ideologies that have divided the Organization of
African Unity into three groups, namely, the Monrovia, the
Casablanca and the Brazzaville Twelve have been an impediment
to the OAU in its efforts in effecting a peaceful settlement
for intra-regional conflict such as the Chadian conflict.
The two methodologies employed in this research are
descriptive and historical analyses.
The study maintains that it is because of the
historical subjugation and subordination of the Chadian
socio-economic formation by the French imperialists, that the
Republic of Chad has been made to serve the French interests
instead of serving the interests of the Chadians.
The study suggests that if the Republic of Chad is to
be successful in achieving political and economic independence,
it must wage war against neo-colonialism and petty-bourgeois
elements who are aligning themselves with the imperialists
to destabilize the political economy of the country.
Our analysis of the OAU's role in Chad shows that no
stone was left unturned to bring a lasting solution to the
Chadian conflict; but the noble efforts of the OAU could
not possibly bear fruit because the OAU has so far not had
much success in implementing its policy of resisting foreign
intervention in essentially African conflicts.
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War, poverty, disease, hunger, ignorance, inadequate
education, premature death, racism and genocide which we
are now witnessing in Africa and Third World countries in
general have been both cause and effect of European
capitalism. That is to say, the penetration of capitalist
mode of production into these countries has indeed brought
untold hardships and conflicts to the Africans.
However, not everybody agrees that "the history of
Africa's relations with the West has been a history of
robbery." The most sophisticated of those theorists who
stress the "positive contributions" of colonialism agree
that the mother countries might have benefited from "an
unusually high" rate of profit, particularly from colonies
with easily extracted mineral wealth. One of such writers
argue, nevertheless, that European colonialism did not
impoverish the colonies in any fundamental way. Whatever
their contention is, the truth remains that political
independence clearly did not mean total independence for
1C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York
Harper and Row, 1966), p. 125.
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the new African states. These countries still depend on
the colonizers, both for development funds and for the
technology necessary to achieve a higher standard of living
for their peoples. This means that the conditions of
exploitation remain. Moreover, Africans who had intensive
contact with the colonial political system shared experience
of humiliation, manipulation, and exploitation.
When the great scramble for Africa began, colonies
had become a necessary appendage for European capitalism,
which had by then reached the stage of industrial and
financial monopoly that needed territorial expansion to
provide spheres for capital investment, sources of raw
materials, markets and strategic points of imperial
defense. Thus all imperialists, without exception, evolved
the means, their colonial policies, to satisfy the ends,
the exploitation of the subject territories for the
aggrandizement of the metropolitan countries. They were
all rapacious; they all subserved the needs of the subject
lands to their own demands; they all circumscribed human
rights and liberties; they all repressed and despoiled,
degraded and oppressed. They took African lands, lives,
2
resouces, and dignity.
It is a truism that for most of the period from 1885
2Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Inter
national Publishers Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 1-8.
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to 1960, seven European countries - Great Britain, France,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Italy made a concerted
effort to conquer, administer, and hold on to Africa.
For about twenty-five years, from the end of World War I
to the end of World War II, it seemed they would be quite
successful. These countries claimed sovereignty, or
unihibited control over all African territory. Indeed,
the Europeans extended their grip on the whole of Africa
in order to ensure full exploitation of African resources
- both natural and human. Territories by outright war and
military action, sometimes in the ill-disguised form of
"treaties" imposed on local rulers by a combination of
force and plain deceit as it was in the case of Chad which
we will elaborate after the following chapter.
To maintain their domination over their newly seized
territories and to ensure their utmost exploitation, the
imperialists established full state power over them. The
political essence of capitalism which is imperialism is the
direct and overall subordination of one country to another
on the basis of state power being in the hands of the
dominating foreign power. The overall political power
was directed to tvjo main objectives - to keep the colonial
people in political subjection; and to make possible the
3
George Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical
Approach" in Immanuel Wallerstein, Social Change (New York:
Wiley, 1966), p. 34. See Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite,
p . 6 .
maximum exploitation of the people and the country's
res ource s .
We can safely argue by summarizing here that colonialism
enabled the imperialists to rob the African peoples in a
variety of ways. They were able to secure cheap land, cheap
labor, and cheap resources. They were also free to impose
a system of low-priced payments to peasant producers of
export crops to establish a monopoly-controlled market for
the import of the manufactured goods of the colony-owning
power, and secure a source of extra profit through invest
ment. The results on the economy of the colonial
territories were almost catastrophic. The African countries
inherit economies which are not merely underdeveloped but
distorted.
French colonialism in Chad was one of such situations
in which the colonialists codified administrative rules
and set up judicial systems; they collected taxes and
maintained a minimal order for a time; they established
new political frontiers that determined the limits of
contemporary states; and also established a new economic
sector, orienting it toward their own. All this was done
primarily to serve French interests.
h
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism; The Highest Stage of C a pitalism
(New York: Little Library, \933) , pp" 100-103~
Jack Woddis, Introduction to Neo-Colonialism (New
York: International Publ ishers , 19 7 6) , \>~p~. 14-1 6 .
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The civil war in Chad which has attracted worldwide
attention as a result of the massive intervention of some
foreign governments is a product of French colonialism or
imperialism which has created internal contradictions not
only in Chad but also in other African countries that went
through the process of colonization.
As the Europeans divided and colonized Africa, they
imposed their own Western capitalist system on African
economies. The various conflicts that are manifesting them
selves in Africa do not mean that Africans are wild dogs
that should be fighting one another; or because Africans
are inferior as the Europeans labeled us; but these conflicts
arise as a result of the capitalist mode of production
imposed on the African economy by the Europeans.
Statement of the Problem
Since the Republic of Chad gained independence from
France in 1960, there has been a continuous conflict which
has created political instability and brought total economic
chaos to the Chadian people. Many people such as Virginia
Thompson and Richard Adloff have linked the root cause
of the ongoing conflict in Chad to ethnicity; Harold D.
Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (London:
Longman Nigeria Limited, 1980), pp. 16-18.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981),
pp. 10-21.
Nelson et al. believe that it is a result of religion -
9
Muslims versus Christians; some people such as Rene Lemarchand
also believe that it is a result of certain class of people
in Chad struggling to gain power.
This study is premised on the assumption that the root
cause of the conflict in Chad is the result of the impact
of French colonialism and neo-colonialism that has continued
to impinge upon the thadian people even after political
independence has been achieved. The second assumption is
that the inability of the OAU to find a diplomatic solution
to the Chadian conflict is due to foreign intervention.
Of course, the study does not dismiss totally such variables
as religion, ethnicity, and class struggle as secondary
contradictions in the Chadian conflict. This is because
the Chadian ruling elites who are more or less, allies of
French imperialism do not hesitate to use religion and
ethnicity to attain and promote their goals. But our main
concern in this study is the phenomena of French imperialism
and neo-colonialism in Chad. Our contention is that, it
is because of the historical subjugation and subordination
of Chadian socio-economic formation by the French imperialists,
the Republic of Chad has been made to serve the French
8Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972),
pp. 1-16.
o
Rene Lemarchand, "Chad: The Road to Partition,"
Current History, 89:561 (March 1984), pp. 113-116.
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interests instead of serving the interest of the Chadian
people. The collision between pre-colonial social formations
in Chad with the advanced capitalist social formation of
France resulted in the intensification of exploitation and
the forcible subordination of the country's socio-economic
10
and political structures and practices.
In order to maintain the profitable system of colonialism,
the colonial power prevented industrialization in the Republic
of Chad; and they had no interest in creating modern industry
in Chad since it was their aim to utilize the resources
- raw materials and cheap labor to feed their own industrial
machines in France. At a glance, it could be seen that
Chad is a chronic case of underdevelopment.
Indeed, there is no doubt that France has remained
one of the major actors on the political scene of Chad.
Through the so-called aid, trade, and military support,
France has kept intact its domination over a large number
of Francophone states, including Chad. As a matter of
fact, French policy vis-a-vis Chad aims primarily at main
taining the 'dominant-dependent' relations between the two
12
countries, that is, France and Chad.
10J. Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical
Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 130,
1;LIbid., p. 136.
Edward M. Corbett, The French Presence in Black
Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960), p. 158.
8
In order to achieve its goal, France has never hesitated
to intervene in Chad so as to protect its clients. For
instance, the liberation struggle launched in 1978 by
Chadian nationalists led France to intervene militarily
in order to protect its puppet regime of Felix Malloum in
13
power.
Furthermore, as we examine closely, we have seen that
the subjugation and integration of Chadian economy with
that of France, allowed the French people to instill their
norms and values to the Chadians, making it even more
difficult for the Chadians to see themselves as people of
one country. Our analysis of the Chadian conflict and the
role of the OAU reveals the contradictions resulting from
the continuing process of economic domination and sub
jugation by French imperialism in Chad.
French interest in Chad is motivated by economic,
strategic and military objectives. Economically, it can
be observed that even after Chad had gained independence
from France, the Chadian economy continues to be heavily
dependent upon that of France. For instance, Chad's imports
since independence come from France; giving France the
first place among exporters to Chad. Moreover, foreign
investment in Chad is dominated by France.1^
"Chad: French Connection," Africa Confidential
21:16 (June 30, 1978), p. 10.. "
1A
U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for
Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1980), pp. 10-13.
9
The strategic location of Chad is important to France
in that the military bases in Chad are viably keyed to
interventionary activities to support pro-French regimes
in west and central Africa. During the colonial rule,
the Chadian people were a major source of military recruits
for France in Africa. Chadian forces in the French army
were noted for their contributions to the victory of free
France armies against the Axis powers when an attack was
made on Italian armies at Mourzouk, Libya from a base in
Chad.17
The OAU interest in Chad is to seek a peaceful settle
ment to the Chadian conflict without external intervention.
However, given the desperate maintenance of neo-eolonialism
in the Third World, particularly in Africa, the OAU was
by-passed by these external powers in order to promote their
strategic interests in Chad as opposed to African national
interests.
The right of the OAU to intervene in the Chadian
conflict comes from the Charter of the OAU, Article XIX
in which the Heads of States and Governments declared that
15Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa," Review
of African Political Economy 24 (May-August 1982),
pp. 55-82.
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1981), pp. 316-320.




Pledge to settle all disputes among themselves
by peaceful means and to this end, decided to
establish a Commission of Mediation, Concilia
tion and Arbitration. The composition of which
and condition of service shall be defined by a
separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government.
Indeed, foreign intervention has internationalized
the Chadian conflict beyond the OAU framework as a regional
organization under the Charter of the United Nations to
deal with African regional problems through peaceful settle-
19
ment of disputes.
In advancing reasons for foreign intervention in
African conflict, it would be worth mentioning that an
interventionist power acts for or against any regime for
its own interest, and not for the purpose of benefiting
the regime. Legum identifies three situational crises
as reasons for foreign interventions on the African continent
(1) Inter-Africa Disputes. Legum sees this as a recurring
element which generates from the will of various regimes
to strengthen their economic, political, military, and
diplomatic clout by enlisting the support of appropriate
powers. Thus Somalia's alliance with the Soviet Union in
the 1960s, according to Legum, was due to the desire of
1 8
Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity (Metuchen:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc. , 1970) , p~. 176; See also N. McKeon,
"The African States and the OAU," International Affairs
.42-53 (July 1966), p. 391.
1 9
Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN; Relations
Between the OAU and the UN (New York: Africana Publishing
Co., 1976), pp. 65-70.
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the Somalian regime to consolidate and increase its power,
vis-a-vis Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, in border disputes.
Therefore, Somalia invited the Soviet Union to participate
in the crisis of the Horn of Africa. Other cases Legum
mentioned were the Angola/Soviet-Cuba alliances during
the civil war; the call of Joseph Mobutu of Zaire for an
alliance with France, Belgium, China and the U.S. during
the Shaba attack in 1977; Egyptian-Libyan conflicts which
produced a multi-billion dollar arms deal between the Soviets
and Libya, and others. (2) Armed liberation struggles in
Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Since liberation
movements are faced with strong adversaries according to
Legum, they are forced to seek aid, mainly from outside
powers, to assist them in their struggles. The aid was
said to have come exclusively from the Soviet bloc: Cuba,
Yugoslavia, and China. (3) "Insecurely-based, often un
popular regimes struggle to maintain themselves in power."
They stretch their hands for alliances to foreign powers
who are prepared to supply military and economic aid.
Joseph Mobutu's and Idi Amin's regimes exemplified this
category. These three situational variable crises Legum
identifies as "a useful way of examining the role of foreign
powers in Africa... which have most commonly resulted in
20
increased foreign intervention."
20Colin Legum, "Foregin Intervention in Africa," The
Yearbook of World Affairs 1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1980), p. 80.
12
It is a fact that the intervenors are interested in a
regime only to the extent that such a regime is willing to
foster, protect, promote and carry out the program of
defined objectives of intervenor. In a crisis situation
in a target area, the first task of an interventionist
power is to decide whether to (a) retain the ruling regime,
(b) replace it by a new regime, and/or (c) reinstate an
old regime. An indication of this was the unceremonious
dumping of Bokassa of the former Central African Empire
from power by France. Following the deterioration of
relations between France and Bokassa, climaxed by the
killing of school children in Bangui, France invited Bokassa
to Gabon and told him to abdicate. As French local and
international media pounded thunderously on his case over
the Bangui massacre, Bokassa caused more embarassment to
France. After his overthrow by the French army, and despite
his French citizenship (which he acquired by virtue of
assimilation) his effort to secure permanent asylum in
France was denied and he was whisked off overnight to
Abidjan, in Ivory Coast. Commenting on Bokassa's fall
from power, a strong anti-communist journal, The Economist
wrote that, "Last week's neat and bloodless coup against
Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa," p. 59.
See also Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the
Use of Intervention as an Instrument of Foreign Policy
Objectives: A Critical Study of Victims of French Foreign
Policy Objectives" (Ph.D. dissertat ion, Atlanta University,
19 8 2) .
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Emperor Bokassa bore a plain made-in-France stamp. Having
22
maintained Bokassa, France unmade him."
An unparalleled, racialist anti-Idi Amin campaign was
mounted by the Western powers when they considered him to
be against Western interests. The Western powers helped
Amin to usurp power from the elected government of Milton
Obote immediately after independence.
Joseph Mobutu w*as imposed on the Zairean people by
the Western powers not because of their fondness of him,
but because there was no qualified substitute to carry out
the defined objectives of the Western capitalist nations.
According to a key European diplomat analyzing the Western
role during the Shaba II assault, "there is no alternative
to the regime of Joseph Mobutu, so we have to support him
23
in hopes of reforming him."
Legum also asserts that the Western interest in Africa
is basically "economic and strategic." He notes that the
loss of direct colonial control over the resources and
markets of former colonies, especially France, Britain,
and Belgium, brought about the problem of how to maintain
their access to these resources and markets of the continent
2 2
The Economist (29 September - 5 October, 1979), p. 8
23
An anonymous quotation by The Washington Post
(June 7, 1978), P. 12A.
14
Theoretical Frame of Reference
Since the phenomenon of imperialism is important for
our analysis, it is necessary to review some of the theories
of imperialism. Although a large number of theoreticians,
such as Hans Morgenthau, use a political frame of reference
in order to define imperialism, V. I. Lenin's approach is
economic. To Lenin, imperialism is both a process of
political subjugation that follows from needs for economic
exploitation, and a situation whereby the world becomes
territorially sub-divided into politically controlled
economic spheres of influence.
Michael Barratt Brown defines imperialism as
economic control and exploitation of foreign
lands arising from the necessity for counter
acting the impediments to the accumulation
of capital engendered by the internal
contradictions of the domestic capitalist
economy . 2 ->.
To put it another way, it is the outward drive of certain
people to build empires - both formal colonies and privileged
positions in markets, protected sources of materials and
extended opportunities for profitable employment of labor.
Marx's treatment of capitalism contains an explicit
theory of imperialism which is very important to our analysis
24
Donald J. Puchala, International Politics Today
(New York: McMillan Publishers Inc., 1977), p. 76.
Michael Barratt Brown, The Economics of Imperialism
(New York: Merlin Press, 1970), p. 22.
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This theory says essentially that imperialism is a necessary
outcome of capitalism. Marx, of course, throws light on
imperialism in his analysis of the process by which surplus
value is converted into capital, process called accumulation.
Surplus value according to Marx is value of the product
of the workers less what the capitalist pays him. Marx
maintained that the process of using surplus value to
engineer more surplus value is the capitalization of surplus
value. If surplus value is to be used to generate more
wealth, it has to be converted into means of production
as well as means of subsistence for workers. The capitalist,
Marx contended, cannot survive and remain competitive without
progressive accumulation or the continuous reproduction of
his capital on a continuously expanding scale. This in
itself, suggests a relationship between capitalism and
imperialism. Interestingly enough, Marx shed a lot of light
on imperialism, and its relations to capitalism. He shows
that capitalism is inherently expansionary and the
contradictions of capitalist accumulation will tend to
transport capitalism to economically backward countries.
V. I. Lenin holds that imperialism grows out of the
logic of the capitalist system. But Lenin goes somewhat
beyond Marx in asserting that imperialism symbolizes a
particular stage in the development of capitalism. It
Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy ( Peking-: Foreign Languages Press , 1976) , pp. 18-23.
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reflects a transitional stage of capitalism to a higher
economic order, a transitional stage characterized by the
displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist
monopoly. According to Lenin,
Imperialism is capital in that stage of
development in which the dominance of
monopolies and finance capital has
established itself; in which the export
of capital has acquired pronounced
importance; in which division of the world
among the international trusts has begun,
in which the division of all territories
of the globe among the biggest capitalist
powers has been completed. '
Lenin contended that, although the economic foundation
of imperialism is monopoly, this monopoly which grew out
of capitalism exists in the general environment of capitalism,
commodity production and competition, in permanent and
insoluable contradiction to this general environment. The
monopoly stage of capitalism is, not surprisingly, also
a state in which the accumulation of capital exists side
by side with the poverty and starvation of the masses.
Indeed the superabundance of capital and mass impoverish
ment are two sides of the same coin. According to Lenin,
this is so because uneven development and a semi-starvation
level of existence of the masses are fundamental and in
evitable conditions and premises of this mode of production.
As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital
V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of
Capital ism, p. 123.
17
will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard
of living of the masses in a given society, for this would
mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the
purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad
to the backward countries. This is one aspect of the
relationship.
Another aspect emerges from the tendency of monopoly
to engender stagnation and decay or loss of dynamism.
Because the monopolist can, up to a point, fix prices at
least temporarily, his incentive continuously to revolutionize
his means of production is greatly reduced. Lenin cites
the example of a machine invented by a certain Owens which
revolutionized the manufacture of bottles. Lenin sees all
this as being indicative of the fact that capital has become
overripe and cannot find avenues of profitable investment,
a situation which compels the export of capital.
Hobson considers some of the psychological motives
which have been put forward as an explanation of imperialism
such as national pride, quest for glory, and bellicosity.
While admitting that these factors might be relevant to
the explanation of imperialism, he dismisses them as not
constituting a major cause. He asserts that the dominant
motive for imperialism was the quest for markets as well
as opportunities for higher returns on investments.
According to Hobson, the need for this quest arises partly
because as a result of the development of capitalism in
18
in the West, industry was more productive and needed greater
imports of raw materials, more food for the urban population
growing in response to industrialization, and products to
meet the rising demand for luxury goods created by a rising
standard of living. Hobson maintains that a more important
cause of imperialism was the tendency for production to
28
outgrow consumption.
Hobson concludes that imperialism is really the vehicle
of the growing cosmopolitanism of capital. He rejects the
explanation of imperialism as an inevitable and integral
aspect of industrial progress. To do this, he raised the
question as to why there should be underconsumption or why
there should be more saving than could be profitably and
usefully employed? He answers that if the economy was
such that consumption power of incomes were distributed
according to needs there would be no underconsumption;
that since human needs are not finite, consumption would
rise with productivity and there would be no excess saving.
He then goes on to point out that it is quite otherwise
in an economy where income distribution bears no relation
to need and some people have far more income than they
could possibly consume. In that kind of economy, according
to Hobson, there is bound to be underconsumption. In so
far as this type of distribution and underconsumption are
2 8
J. A. Hobs on, A Study of Imperialism (London:
Dennis Dobson, 1954), pp. 82-84
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necessary attributes of capitalism, Hobson maintains that
imperialism is a logical outcome of capitalism.
Another theory that we would consider is that of
Kautsky.
Kautsky explanation of imperialism is more
complex and sophisticated, for it is couched
in Marxist rather than in liberal terminology.
He utilized some of Hobson1s lines of think
ing, however, especially the emphasis on
imperialism as a manifestation of protection-
ism and mil itar ism . *■ v
Kautsky envisioned an imperialism in which there might be
collective exploitation of the world by international
fiance. The interests of the capitalist class as a whole
conflicted with those of capital - a majority of powerful
capitalists who relied on military means to support their
expansionist efforts. An internationally united finance
capital thus might lead to a peaceful resolution of real
and potential conflict generated by the rivalry of national
finance capital.
Rosa Luxemburg also saw imperialism as the conversion
of surplus into capital which finds itself everywhere in
the world economy and does not limit its accumulation to
an isolated capitalist society. The drive of capital to
expand is the outstanding feature of modern development,
and in its final phase capitalism has adopted such
Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative
Politics: The Search For A Paradigm (Boulders: Westview
Press, 1981), p. 317.
20
an unbridle character that it puts the whole civilization
of mankind in question. Indeed, this untamable drive of
capital to expand has gradually constructed a world market,
connected the modern economy and laid the basis for
. , . 30
socialism.
Another theory of imperialism that we need to consider
is that of Johan Galtung. Galtung understood imperialism
as a structural relationship between collectivities.
Imperialism is a system that splits up
collectivities and relates some of the
parts to each other in relations of
harmony of interest, and other parts in
relations of disharmony of interests, or
conflict of interest. Collectivities may
be nations of center and the periphery,
and each nation in turn may have its own
center and periphery. Imperialism is
defined in terms of a number of relation
ships between the center and the periphery.
We have seen that imperialism is a necessary outcome
of capitalism. It is important to bear this in mind not
only because it helps us to cut through the confusion over
the motives of Western colonization in Africa but also to
shed light on the colonial experience in Africa and its
effects on Africa's development particularly in the
Chadian case.
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Indeed, European capitalism and French
colonialism in Chad served to ensure its
dependence upon capitalist relations of
production. Through forced labor, taxation
and rents, the peasantry was compelled to
engage in production for exchange and to
cultivate the cash crops (cotton and
groundnuts) necessary for the development
of French industry. Village chieftaincies
became one of the levels of metropolitan
administration, for chiefs being made
responsible for designating the 'volunteers'
for public works and stimulating the
cultivation of cash crops in order that
taxes be pa id. ^
The capitalist penetration of Chadian economy created
some fundamental affinities between the Chadian economy
and that of France. The controlled development of the
Chadian economy in the interest of the metropole, which
went along with the expansion of colonial trade, meant
structural links and structural interdependence, for instance
in the division of labor between primary production and
manufacture, and in the dependence of economic growth in
3 ^
colony on the metropole's demand for colonial imports.
Nevertheless it is correct to say that capitalism is a
necessary outcome of imperialism. This is true because
in the Republic of Chad as it was in all cases in Africa,
"the monetary system was invariably an extension of that
of France. In other words, the control of Chad's reserves
32
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and of the issue of currency rested in France."34 Such
control was justified by arguing that it gave the colony
monetary stability and international status and helped its
3 5
trade. However, monetary dependence was essentially a
means of exploitation.
Significance of the Study
This study will contribute to the available literature
more information concerning the Chadian conflict and the
role of the Organization of African Unity in finding a
peaceful settlement to this conflict which started
immediately after her independence. Whereas a great deal
of information has been accumulated on such conflicts as
the Ethiopian-Somalian boundary disputes, the Somali-Kenyan
conflict, the Nigerian-Biafran conflict; little is known
about the Chadian conflict and the role of the OAU in its
efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
The Republic of Chad also represents a unique case of
imperialist strategy to continue with its exploitation
after formal political independence has been gained by
the former colony. It is unique in that since independence,
the Chadian people have not witnessed any political stability,
'Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black
Join-nai_of Modern African Studies 10:4 (19 7 2)
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and the Republic of Chad has not been able to harness her
economic resources for the benefit of the Chadians. More
over, the study will help to develop a framework for
analyzing the major conflicts confronting the African nations
in their search for nation-building. The Chadian case is
of particular interest because it typifies the kind of
conflicts found throughout Africa in particular and the
Third World in general.
Review of Literature
There have not been many writings concerning the
Chadian conflict since independence. Reasons why the
Chadian conflict has been ignored by many writers cannot
be explained in this study. Nevertheless, there are few
articles and books that deal with the conflict which we
are going to review.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff in their book,
Conflict in Chad, maintained that of all the African countries
that won independence from France in 1960, Chad has en
countered the most serious obstacles to achieving nation
hood. Among the most formidable of its internal handicaps
have been its landlocked situation; frequent changes in
its political frontiers; vast desert areas; a small, unevenly
distributed population of diverse origins, religions, and
ways of life; strong and often conflicting tribal and
regional loyalties; traditional chieftaincies of widely
varying scope and authority; and an almost total lack of
2k
internal communication. Since independence, according to
Thompson and Adloff, these impediments to national unity
have been compounded by an unrepresentative, often repressive
government and a plethoric, inefficient, and sometimes
36
corrupt bureaucracy.
According to the authors, France's aim in conquering
the territory that became Chad was to unite its northern
with its central and west African empires. The authors
maintained that because the area was amorphous in both
natural and human terms, only internationally recognized
frontiers could give it a framework and only a strong
government could maintain internal order.
It is the authors' belief that the French conquerors
found no coherent political institutions in either the
northern or southern regions of Chad, and that they devised
similar types of government for these areas, based in large
part on the manner of response of the local populations
to France's efforts to mold their development.
The authors maintained that the present conflict in
Chad is caused by tribalism, regionalism and ethnicity.
Overall, tribalism, according to the authors was little
affected by French rule, and regionalism, for different
reasons, survived most strongly in Tibesti and Ouaddai -
the two poorest regions in Chad.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad, pp. 23-29.
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Thompson and Adloff conclude that France's overall
impact on the Chadian economy - as on its political develop
ment - was spotty, due in part to natural conditions and
demographic differences in Chad.
It is indeed disheartening in that Virginia Thompson
and Richard Adloff have distorted the truth about French
rule and continuous French interventions in Chad after
political independence. Are these authors making us to
believe that French rule in Chad was to unify the country?
Colonialism did not call for any unification of the colonized
people. Indeed, it divided and ruled the colonized people
- making it difficult for them to develop their own economic
and political ideologies. French colonialism in Chad was
no exception as it was obviously in the interest of the
colonial power to maintain order in the country and to make
Chad to contribute to France's economy. For instance,
monopolies for the sale, transport and export of cotton
were manned by French companies, and there was total
absence of indigenous companies. French rule divided the
country into regions making it easier for France to control
it administratively and politically. French colonial power
enacted a policy of forced cotton cultivation which was
exported to France without any monetary returns to Chadians.
It is surprising that Thompson and Adloff are dwelling
so much on the climatic, environmental, social and economic
factors as the causes of underdevelopment and present
26
conflict in Chad without mentioning anything about French
imperialism that has in fact exploited the country for so
many years. If the contention by Aristotle "that man is
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a political animal by nature" is correct, then this
negates the contention maintained by Thompson and Adloff
that the French conquerors found no coherent political
institutions in Chad.
Another author) Samuel Decalo in an article maintains
that the problem facing Chad does not only stem from the
intractability of inter-ethnic animosities, the incompati
bility of existing sub-nationalism, the absence of
representative structures, and the destabilizing effects
of acute dependency relationships. Decalo believes that
3 8
the core of the conflict concerns the social and admini
strative dimensions of Chad itself: always extremely rudi
mentary even in the populated south, the state apparatus
simply has never extended over much of the periphery. And
even where its presence is felt, according to Decalo, it
is not always been accepted.
It is the author's contention that control over the
human and material resources encompassed within the
territorial boundaries of Chad has often been intermittent
and weak. He believes that what Chad faces today, as at
O "7
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independence, are the twin tasks of building a nation and
a state. Though not unique to Chad, the dimensions of
these problems certainly appear monumental in this former
French colony.
Samuel Decalo stated explicitly that sixty years of
colonial rule did not effect any major changes in Chad.
Though the French fought hard to conquer the territory,
once it was theirs It was grossly neglected. In no sector,
according to Decalo was this neglect more evident than in
education. For instance, there was only one school in Fort
Lamy (Ndjamena), with barely fifty pupils; that there were
still only eighteen qualified teachers in the entire colony
in 1933.
The author maintains that it was French colonial rule
that created underdevelopment in the country. Raw materials
which were greatly needed for French industries were taken
away by the imperialists to develop their own metropolitan
without any consideration to the colonized people.
The present conflict which has claimed many lives in
Chad, according to the author, is a product of French
imperialism and neo-colonialism.
Indeed, Samuel Decalo's analysis of the conflict in
Chad has a lot to offer to anyone who wants an understanding
of the present conflict which has its roots from French
imperialism and neo-colonialism in Chad. Colonial rule
was not a blessing for the Chadians and Africans as a whole;
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for it meant extreme poverty, ill-health, bad housing,
illiteracy, political tyranny and chronic hunger for the
masses. According to Decalo, French rule has brought about
the present conflict, and has divided and kept the Chadians
in a state of passive inertness, and acceptance of prevail
ing rules. The playing off of one tribe or religion against
another, became an essential characteristic of colonialism
in Chad. *
Decalo's analysis of the Chadian conflict is relevant
to our study because we are looking at the impact of French
imperialism and neo-colonialism in Chad.
Rene Lemarchand in his article maintains that the root
cause of the conflict in Chad is due to ethnicity and
factionalism which he believes is as old as the segmentary
lineage systems around which revolves much of the socio
political life of African societies.
In such systems, he contends, power is
widely diffused. Clan, subclan and kinship
groups are the principal units around
which individual solidarities crystallized,
but never long enough to coalesce into a
durable nucleus of power.^9
The author stated that the sheer diversity of cultural
entities within Chad's boundaries were long concealed by
the simplicity of the north-south dialectic in the early
phase of the civil war. For almost a decade, roughly from
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1969 to 1978, civil violence pitted the predominantly Sara,
Christianized south against the Islamicized 'rebel' north.
With little attention paid to the existence of minorities
on each side of the north-south cleavage, it was generally
assumed that all northerners were Arabs and all southerners,
Sara.
Lemarchand in analyzing the Chadian conflict also
believes that the conflict is due to Libyan annexation of
part of the country by Gaddafy. Although, the author
maintains that the aim of annexation was to work for the
realization of a complete unity between the two countries,
the projected union was shelved when it became known that
Gaddafy was promoting his selfishness through the annexa
tion .
The author concluded that the Chadian conflict is a
conflict that involves different ethnic groups in Chad,
and that the OAU cannot do anything in terms of finding
a peaceful settlement to the conflict since different
factions involved are not willing to negotiate for peaceful
settlement.
Far from being the root cause of the conflict in Chad,
the Libyan intervention could be seen as an intervention
to protect his fellow Muslims from being dominated by the
southern Christians. We totally disagree with Lemarchand
for dwelling so much in ethnicity and Libyan annexation
as the causes of the conflict.
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Methodology
The two principal methodological approaches utilized
in this study are descriptive analysis and historical
analysis.
Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive analysis is a technique used in social
science research in describing a given social phenomenon.
This technique is utilized in order that events are
40
described and critically analyzed. Since Chad was
controlled and ruled by France for so many years, this
method enables us to describe the specific historical
periods, the events, the various political actors in Chad
before and after independence from France. It also allows
us to describe analoguous events or conflicts in Africa
particularly and .the Third World in general.
Historical Analysis
In order that this study will not be a mere narrative
statement of facts, events are described and critically
analyzed. This is important in the light of numerous
efforts by the OAU to find a peaceful settlement to the
Chadian conflict. Since the Chadian conflict evolved
immediately after independence, this approach will allow
us to describe and analyze the historical period which the
40
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Republic of Chad was controlled by the French, and also
after the neo-colonialists have taken over power from the
colonialists.
Aristotle in studying the various Greek city-states
used historical analysis and the law of similar causes in
order to explain how political institutions and governments
of Ancient Greece evolved.
It is in the same vein, that we will examine and
analyze the ongoing conflict in Chad and the role of OAU
as a product of history. My emphasis of the historical
approach derives from my own conviction that one cannot
understand the dynamics and logic of contemporary social
phenomena without knowing how the phenomenon came about.
This approach is useful in that it could also allow
us to describe and analyze analoguous conflicts in Africa
such as the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, the Nigerian-
Biafran War and even those so-called border conflicts, such
as Ethiopia versus Somalia.
Sources of Data
An exhaustive use of historical materials, books,
magazine reports, newspapers, scholarly journals, government
statistics, United Nations publications on Africa, and
other works that are of relevance to our study will be
41
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attempted.
This bulk of the data for this study will be seriously
scrutinized and a serious effort will be made to decipher
the information at hand.
It should be clear that this study does not pretend
to present a definitive [analysis and] solution to the
civil war in Chad instead, we are concerned with sketching
the broad outlines so that the more recent events can be
properly understood.
The study shows that French rule and continuous French
intervention in Chad has resulted in a chronic case of
underdevelopment in that country. It attempts to understand
the Chadian conflict and the role of the OAU as -a product
of history. In this case, the history of Chad under French
rule and the history of African people as a whole trying
to free themselves from vestiges of imperialism.
Chapter One of the study deals with the statement of
the problem, theoretical frame of reference, the significance
of the study, data collection and analysis, and the
methodology. Chapter Two begins with a brief examination
of the ideological differences in the formation of different
pollitical blocs in Africa. It proceeds with an examination
of Nkrumah, Tafawa Balewa, and Emperor Haile Selassie's
conception of African unity.
Chapter Three of the study analyzes the Republic of
Chad under French rule, and the root cause of the Chadian
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conflict; the economic fabric of Chad, major factions and
ideological differences among the different factions are
analyzed.
Chapter Four of the study critically examines the
various countries that have intervened directly or indirectly
in the Chadian conflict which makes it very problematic for
the OAU to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Such
countries as France,* the United States, Libya, Nigeria,
Egypt, Sudan and Zaire are discussed.
Chapter Five assesses the role of the OAU in its efforts
to effect a diplomatic solution to the Chadian conflict.
Here, we are assessing the efforts made directly by the OAU
or indirectly by African countries on behalf of the OAU.
Before examining the OAU efforts, a brief history
behind the formation of the OAU and how it is set up to
settle conflicts among member states is presented.
The study concludes by suggesting that if the Republic
of Chad is to be successful in achieving political and
economic independence, it must wage war against neo-
colonialists and petty-bourgeois elements who are aligning
themselves with the imperialists to destabilize the political
economy of the country. It is only by winning this war, that
we believe, the Republic of Chad and other African countries
would be able to utilize their resources for the development
of Africa and not for the development of imperialists
countries.
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The study recommends that since the Republic of Chad
has been incorporated into the capitalist system for so
many years, and it has not been able to overcome the problem
of dependent capitalist development, she must denounce and
cut off all ties with capitalism which is an exploitative
system, and commit itself to a socialist system in which
equality and tranquility will prevail. The planned economy
that we are suggesting will, however, have to be fought for
by people who are committed to a change that will alleviate
the sufferings of the masses in Chad.
Our analysis of the OAU's role in Chad shows that no
stone was left unturned to bring a lasting solution to the
Chadian conflict. But the noble efforts of the OAU could
not possibly bear fruit because the OAU has so far not had
much success in implementing its policy of resisting foreign
intervention in essentially African conflicts. Moreso, the
OAU lacks the resources and authority to enforce its
diplomatic initiatives among member states.
The study concludes that as long as African countries
cannot mobilize their resources and be able to develop a
monolithic ideology in fighting imperialism and neo-colonialism,
Africa will continue to remain an arena of foreign intervention
in its internal conflicts, such as the Chadian conflict.
CHAPTER II
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE FORMATION
OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL BLOCS
In this chapter, we will examine and analyze the
ideological differences in the formation of different
political blocs in Africa which eventually helped in the
formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We
will look at how Nkrumah, Tafawa Balewa, and Emperor Haile
Selassie who were the leading pioneers of African unity
perceived African unity. This will help us to understand
the reasons why African countries are unable to develop a
monolithic ideology to fight against imperialism and neo
colonialism in order to liberate Africa of dependent
capitalist development.
According to C. Wright Mills,
ideologies are intellectual and moral creations;
they contain high ideals, easy slogans, dubious
facts and sophisticated theories. Ideology is a
social reality in terms of which certain insti
tutions and practices are justified and others
attacked; it provides the phrases in which
demands are raised, criticisms made, exhortations
delivered, proclamations formulated and, at times
policies determined. Political ideology
designates agencies of action, of the means of
reform, revolution, or conservation. It contains
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strategies and programs that embody both ends
and means .
Ideology plays an extremely important role in the
political life of many African countries. Interestingly
enough, it serves to legitimize the rule of politicians
and military men who may have led their countries' independence
movements or have attained power by coup d'etat, but who are
unable to lead their countries quickly into the promised
land of economic development. In the confusion resulting
from the modernization process, ideology may serve as a guide
to action and as a kind of social cement. As projected on
the international scene, ideology enables a government to
assume the desired image for the benefit of its domestic
2
constituency.
In Africa, different political ideologies have been
propounded by different political actors in their search
for African unity. These different ideologies have indeed
helped in the formation of the Organization of African Unity
which, of course, was founded at a time when African leaders
were experiencing their taste of independence and were anxious
to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent, they
however, saw the danger posed by the divisions of language,
culture and religion, by the economic inequalities, by the
1C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 12-13.
2William I. Zartman, "National Interest and Ideology,"
in Vernon McKay, ed., African Diplomacy (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1966), pp. 46-47.
37
controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonial
powers. It quickly became clear that a high degree of
cooperation was necessary among the fledging African states,
if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and
political entity. It was to achieve this cooperation that
led to the formation of the OAU.3
There were considerable differences of opinion as to how
African unity could Best be attained. The signing of the
charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement
especially at a time when Africa was sharply divided into
three rival blocs - the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group
and the Brazzaville Twelve. The Casablanca group (led by
Ghana) stood for a radical, militant, and left-oriented
approach to African unity. The central thesis of the
Casablanca group was a "Union Government of African States."
This thesis rejected totally any kind of partitioning of
Africa. In the words of Ghana's Foreign Minister Ako Adeji,
To us in Ghana, the concept of African unity
is an article of faith. It is a cardinal
objective in our policy. We sincerely believe
that the indepndent African states can,
and may some day, form a real political union -
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pants at a conference at Casablanca convened on 3 January 1961
by King Mohammed V of Morocco and attended by representatives
from Egypt, Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the
Algerian Provisional Government. See Jon Woronoff, Organizing
African Unity (Methchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.,
1970), pp. 31-76.
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the Union of African States...it does not
matter whether you start with an association
of African states or whether you start with
economic or cultural cooperation, we must
start from somewhere, but certainly the
union can be achieved in the end.^
Firstly, Africa should have an overall economic planning
on a continental basis that would increase the industrial
and economic power of Africa. Secondly, Africa should aim
at the establishment of a unified economic planning organi
zation and a unified military and defense strategy are set
up, it would be necessary to adopt a unified foreign policy
and diplomacy to give political direction to our joint efforts
for the protection and economic development of Africa.
The underlying factor behind the formation of the
Casablanca group was the fight against imperialism and neo
colonialism. Led by the first President of Ghana, Kwame
Nkrumah, the group believed that the balkanization of Africa
into series of small states is leaving some Afircan countries
with neither the resources nor the manpower to provide for
their own integrity and viability. Without the means to
establish their own economic growth, they are compelled
to continue within the old colonial trading framework.
Hence, they are seeking alliances in Europe and elsewhere,
Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to
African Politics; A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 234.
Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1970), p. 176.
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which deprive them of an independent foreign policy and
perpetuate their economic dependency.
The Casablanca group recognized the dangers of neo
colonialism, and summed it up as follows:
Imperialism is still a most powerful force
to be reckoned with in Africa. It controls
our economies. It operates on a worldwide
scale in combinations of many different
kinds; economic, political, cultural,
educational, military, and through
intelligence and information services. In
the context of the new independence mount
ing in Africa, it has begun and will continue
to assume new forms and subtle disguises.
It is already making use, and will continue
to make use of different cultural and
economic associations which colonialism has
forced between erstwhile European masters
and African subjects. It is creating client
status, which it manipulates from the distance.
It will distort and play upon, as it is
already doing, the latent fears of burgeoning
nationalism and independence. It will, as it
is already doing, fan the fires of sectional
interests, of personal greed and ambition
among leaders and others will be the devious
ways of neo-colonialism by which their
stranglehold on Africa's resources for their
own continued enrichment.
The Casablanca group was more vocal concerning a
Union Government of Africa because they realized that any
form of economic union negotiated singly between the fully
industrialized countries of Europe and newly emergent
countries of Africa is bound to retard the industrialization,
and therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and
7Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to
African Politics; A Continental Approach, p. 266.
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therefore, the prosperity and the general economic and
cultural development of African countries. Of course, the
Casablanca states, though sympathetic to Dr. Nkrumah's
approach in general terms, none of its leaders committed
g
himself to implement the call for a union government.
The Monrovia group was the largest gathering of African
states at that time, and this group believed in the main
tenance of each African state as a sovereign nation. The
group stood for a conservative, and Western-oriented approach
to African unity. The participants in this group agreed on
the following five principles:
absolute equality and sovereignty of African
states; each African state to have the right
to exist and no state to try to annex another;
voluntary union of one state with another;
non-interference in the affairs of other
African states; no dissident elements from
one state to be harbored by another state.
The Monrovia Conference was followed by a conference
in Lagos in January 1962. The conference reaffirmed the
principles set out at the Monrovia Conference. It is
really surprising to see how many countries wanted to
o
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The Monrovia group owes its name to the Monrovia
Conference held during 9-12 May 1961 and attended by
delegations from twenty African states. The states represented
were: Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazza
ville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Upper Volta.
Ibid, pp. 8-43.
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maintain the status quo by joining the Monrovia group.
This in fact, demonstrates that after the achievement of
political independence, the majority of elites who took
over power from the colonial masters were not interested in
African unity as a whole but they were interested in becoming
leaders of their different countries in order to satisfy
their selfish ambitions by cooperating with he imperialists
to exploit and drain the resources of Africa. They have
continued to play a role that makes Africans hewers of wood
and drawers of water. It is the same group of people who
have concluded that Africa cannot survive without aid and
loans from the imperialist countries.
The Brazzaville Twelve group as its name implies was
the group that held its meeting in Brazzaville which was
attended by twelve Heads of State. Its aims were
"organizing cooperation between its members in all fields
of external policy in order to reinforce their solidarity,
ensure their collective security and their development, and
maintain peace in Africa, Madagascar, and the world."
This group shared a desire to remain on the best of terms
with France. They strongly opposed any kind of communist
The Brazzaville Twelve was formed in October 1960 at
Abidjan, Ivory Coast at a meeting of Heads of State of
former French colonies. See Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein,




presence in Africa, and they sided with France in the
Franco-Algerian conflict. They also agreed to become a
permanent association (Union Africaine et Malgache), the
charter of which was subsequently signed in Malagasy on
12 September 1961.
The contradictions which this group of African political
leaders have created by opting to remain puppet regimes for
France suggest that African countries cannot determine and
control their own political and economic affairs. Above
all, it also suggest that as long as there are many poltical
actors in Africa who do not see the danger posed by imperial
ism and neo-colonialism, it would be difficult to achieve a
revolution on a continental basis. But revolutions that
will cater for the welfare of the masses can occur in those
countries that are committed to the welfare of the masses of
people in those areas.
Nkrumah's Conception of African Unity
Kwame Nkrumah was viewed by many as the man who ignited
the flame of African emancipation. Kwesi Armah, a one time
minister in Nkrumah's government, described Nkrumah in the
following words:
Certainly, Dr. Nkrumah is a man in a million.
He is a man who was bitten once by an idea,
and has since then devoted his whole energy
and life to a cause - the cause of the
African and the idea of a regenerated,
prosperous,' happy and effective African
society. Dr. Nkrumah is also a man of
millions. Millions all over Africa and the
world admire his striking achievements in
diverse fields, his achievement in the
field of letters, thought, and political
strategy and action.
According to Samuel G. Ikoku:
Kwame Nkrumah has been correctly christened
to the genius of the African Revolution.
This is amply proved by a review of his
performance from the end of the second
World War till his death...here indeed was
a unique African.1^
In his article , R. 'A. Akindele also asserts;
Nkrumah's credentials as a leader of the
African Revolution look impressive.
Indeed, it is not preposterous to assert
that radical African national is^n has largely
been a Nkrumahist phenomenon.
Nkrumah1s approach to the task of African unity up
till 1966 was grandiose, institutional and diplomatic. For
almost a decade, his scheme for African unity revolved around
the possibility of a union of the sovereign states. At the
Cairo Summit Conference of the OAU in July 1964, Nkrumah
warned his fellow Heads of State about the problems which
can only be solved through the force of a Union Government
of Africa. He went on,
13Kwesi Armah, Africa's Golden Road (London: Heineman
Educational Books, Ltd., 1965), p. 98.
^Samuel G. Ikoku, "A Tribute to Kwame Nkrumah,"
Presence Africaine 85 (First Quarterly 1973), pp. 32-33.
15R. A. Akindele, "Kwame Nkrumah: The Man and His
Foreign Policy," Queens Quarterly 79:3 (Autumn 1972), p. 380.
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by this I do not mean the abrogation of
any sovereignty. I seek no regional unions
as a basis for unity. Indeed, the more
independent states there are within our
union government, the stronger will be
our unity, and the freer will be each
sovereign state within the union to attend
to its specific and exclusive problems.
In the specific field of common action, Nkrumah put forward
"defense, foreign policy and economic development, including
a common currency for Africa. He then proposed that the
Union Government shall consist of an assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the independent African States."
Of course, the idea of unity, (based on the whims of Heads
of State), has been widely held by past and present African
leaders. While Nkrumah pleaded for a "one swoop" political
approach, a great number of other leaders were in favor of a
"step by step" regional or bilateral approach. However,
what many leaders ignored is the dynamics of capitalist
development, and the consequence of nationalism. As we can
see, most African countries are developing capitalist countries
(fundamentally different from developming socialist countries
like China, Albania, Vietnam, North Korea, etc.) thus they
are plagued with internal contradictions, which are only
curable by means of a thorough social revolution. Externally,
they are satellite countries to the Euro-American-Japanese
16Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 132-149. See
also Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa
and the OAU, pp. 1-4.
17Ibid.
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powers a greater stranglehold on the countries involved.
Both the British and the French, at one time or another,
plotted to form some sort of Federation of Africa. The EEC
countries certainly want a combination of African countries,
especially of those that have something useful to offer, to
be tied to the Community.
Lamenting on the development of the past decade,
Nkrumah observed that
the number of rash military coups in Africa
reveals the lack of Socialist revolutionary
organization, the need for the founding of
an all-African vanguard working class party,
for the creation of an all-African people's
army and militia.
He continued, "Socialist revolutionary struggle, whether in
the form of political, economic, or military action, can
only be ultimately effective it is organized, and it has its
19
roots in the class struggle of workers and peasants." And
under the present circumstances when imperialists dominate
the entire continent through indigenous bourgeoisie and
puppet governments, teleguided and marionetted by neo-
colonialist, the need for armed struggle has arisen.
For the unification of Africa cannot be
achieved by consent, by moral precept or
moral conquest. It is only through the
resort to arms, that Africa can rid itself
once and for all of all the remaining
vestiges of colonialism, of imperialism,
18Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (New York:
International Publishers, 1970), p. 54.
19Ibid., pp. 54-88.
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and neo-colonialism; and a socialist society _„
be established in a free and united continent.
As a matter of fact, Kwame Nkrumah was one of the
architects of Pan-Africanism - a movement that sought unity
for Africa as a whole. The essence of Nkrumah's approach
was that it also called for a partial surrender of national
21
sovereignty to the "Union Government of Africa." The view
for a Union Government of Africa by Nkrumah was based on the
belief that political unity should precede economic cooperation
and that only a continental union could be an effective
instrument against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nkrumah's
conception of African unity is stated as follows:
We cannot allow ourselves to be so dis
organized and divided. The fact that I
speak English does not make me an English
man. Similarly, the fact that some of us
speak French or Portuguese. We are Africans
first and last, and as Africans our best
interests can only be served by uniting
within an African community. Neither the
Commonwelath nor a Franco-African Community
can be a substitute...The survival of free
Africa, the extending independence of this
continent, and the development towards that
bright future on which our hopes and endeavors
are pinned, depend upon political unity...
Proof is therefore positive that the continental
union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum
if we are determined to move forward to a
realization of our hopes and plans for creating
a modern society which will give our peoples
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Nkrumah was convinced that if African countries developed
their pontentialities in human and natural resources in
separate isolated groups, their energies would soon be
dissipated in the struggle to outbid one another; and economic
frictions among Africans would certainly lead to bitter
political rivalry. However, Nkrumah1s approach to African
unity was rejected in favor of the idea of a functional
combination of sovereign states cooperating in the achieve
ment of common goals.
Tafawa Balewa's Conception of African Unity
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Nigerian Prime
Minister at that time, assumed the role of a spokseman for
the 'moderates', and represented what emerged as the majority
of the opinion during the Addis Ababa conference at which
he represented the Monrovia group. His conception of African
unity and his speech during the conference was a clear-cut
reply to the main points of Nkrumah's proposal. He rejected
the idea of surrendering part of each state's sovereignty
for the benefit of the Union Government of African States by
saying:
Nigeria's stand is that, if we want unity
in Africa, we must first agree to certain
essential things. The first is that African
States must respect one another. There must
be acceptance of equality by all the States.
No matter whether they are big or small,
they are all sovereign and their sovereignty
is sovereignty. 3
23
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead,"
Foreign Affairs 2:6 (October 1962), p. 136.
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Tafawa Balewa continued with the remark that "We cannot
achieve this African unity as long as some African countries
continue to carry on subversive activities in other African
24
countries." He maintained that African unity could only
be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational,
scientific, and cultural cooperation and by trying first to
get the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on
»
the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of union
as proposed by Nkrumah. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa went on
as follows:
Some of us have suggested that African unity
should be achieved by political fusion of the
different states in Africa; some of us feel
that African unity could be achieved by taking
practical steps in economic, educational,
scientific and cultural cooperation. My country
stands for the practical approach to the unity
of the African continent."
He reiterated his earlier position that Nigeria should
do her best to bring about closer understanding, and more
exchange of visits and ideas between all the countries of
Africa. The greatest problem facing the new African leaders,
observed Balewa, was how to keep their continent out of Gold
War conflicts. Toward that end, his government was prepared




Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity:
Africa and the OAU, pp. 6-7. See also Leslie Rubin and
Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics; A
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a list of matters in which we think we have common interest."
Despite the Balewa government's deep interests in
African affairs - "we belong to Africa and Africa must
2 7
claim first attention in our external affairs" - and
despite his strong feelings about colonialism, racism and
the need to regulate the access of outside powers to the
African continent, Nigeria's African policy did not seem
likely either to inspire national pride or to satisfy the
psychological needs of the various populations. "A policy
which advocates functional cooperation instead of organic
(political) union of Africa," declared and opposition
spokesman on foreign affairs, "cannot inspire anybody."
Unlike the radical African states which had insisted on a
supranational political unity in Africa and were quite
willing to use all means at their disposal to achieve it,
the Balewa government not only treated Pan-African union
as a long term evolutionary process which might ultimately
grow out of prolonged contacts among the various African
states, but also insisted on inviolability of national
boundaries and legal equality of all states. These principles
place a high value on national independence and territorial
26Ibid.
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Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead,"
p. 136.
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Anthony Enahoro, H.R. Debates, September 1961 Session,
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integrity, and emphasize the use of a functional rather than
a political or revisionist approach to Nigeria's involvement
in intra-African politics. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that Abubakar maintained that economic and cultural cooperation
was not only a necessary step to African unity but was to be
placed ahead of political union. Even the government's
support at that time for nationalist and liberation movements
in Africa was too hefiged and sporadic to be taken seriously
29
by anyone.
However, it could be seen that Sir Abubakar's cautious
approach towards African unity won the support not only of
the Monrovia group but significantly, also of the Casablanca
group.
Emperor Haile Selassie's Conception of African Unity
Emperor Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian Head of State,
known also at that time as the elder stateman, stated as
follows:
What we require is a single African organi
zation through which Africa's single voice
may be heard and within which Africa's
problems may be studied and resolved. We
need an organization which will facilitate
acceptable solutions to disputes among
Africans and promote the study and adoption
of measures for common defense and programs
of cooperation in the economic and social
fields...let us, at this time, create a
29For a detailed statement on Nigeria's assistance to
nationalist movements in non-self-governing territories,
see Edwin 0. Ogbu, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy," Journal of
Administration 2:1 (October 1962), pp. 22-30.
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single institution to which we will all
belong, based on principles to which we
all subscribe, confident that in its
councils our voices will carry their proper
weight, secure in the knowledge that the
decisions there will be dictated by Africans
and only by Africans and that they will take
full account of all Africa's vital considera
tions .30
Haile Selassie's conception of African unity, of course,
is based on the gradual approach which rejected the idea of
surrendering part of»each state's sovereignty for Union
Government of African States.
We have seen that almost all African government recognize
African unity as an ultimate goal but because of colonialism
which has drawn artificial boundaries and partitioned Africa
for Europeans' interest, African political actors continue
to base their programs and politics on national needs rather
than on the interest of independent Africa as a whole.
Kwame Nkrumah's call for a continental unity was brushed
aside, and the African leaders settled for a superficial
unity which brought together African Heads of State but not
African peoples. This arrangement, of course, suited the
so-called 'moderate' governments in countries such as
Ethiopia (as it was then under Emperor Haile Selassie),
Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Liberia under
President Tubman, and Libya under King Idris. They
30
See Volume I of the Proceedings of the Summit
Conference of the Head of State and Government held in Addis
Ababa in May 1963 published by the Provisional Secretariat
at Addis Ababa. See also Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished
Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU, pp. 5-6.
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commanded a majority in the organization, and they made sure
that none of the OAU decisions would conflict with their
interests. The willingness, on the other hand, of the
'radicals1 - such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bella of
Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea,
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda -
to join the OAU was 'based on their hope that they would
gradually be able to convince the others to come their way
and shift the organization to a unity of greater depth and
close cooperation.
Indeed, why African countries have not been able to
make a headway towards a continental unity is because most
of the leaders in Africa, who we may describe as petty
bourgeois are actually reactionaries. We are saying that
the majority of the states in Africa are controlled by
reactionaries who align themselves with the capitalist-
imperialist countries to exploit and perpetuate under-
development in these countries. These African leaders are
incapable of transcending the territorial boundaries of
31
the colonial administrations. Above all, imperialism
defined the context in which constitutional power was to be
handed over, so as to guard against the transfer of economic
power or genuine political power. The African petty
31
Patricia Berko Wild, "Radicals and Moderates in the
OAU: Origins of Conflict and Bases for Coexistence,"
International Organization 20:1 (Winter 1969), p. 37.
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bourgeoisie accepted this, with only a small amount of
dissent and disquiet being manifested by the progressive
32
elements such as Nkrumah, and Sekou Toure. Whereas the
colonialists had maintained unity for exploitation, the
African petty bourgeoisie lacked the capacity to demand
both unity and freedom. So they accepted the balkanization
which led to the fragmentation of Africa into smaller units
called states.
It is a fact that the bourgeoisies have been for
national unity in the areas in which capitalism was first
engendered. They sought political unity to guarantee the
integration of production and distribution, giving rise to
what were then relatively large nation states in 'Britain,
France and Germany as compared to the numerous feudal
fiefs which previously existed. The failure of the African
ruling class to effect meaningful unity boils down to the
fact that they fear that larger territorial units might
have negated their narrow class interests in their respective
states as we mentioned earlier. It could be seen, therefore,
that throughout the continent, none of the successful
independence movements denies the basic validity of the
34
boundaries created by imperialism. Of course, to have
32
Walter Rodney, Towards the Sixth Pan-African Congress
Aspects of International Class Struggle in Africa (Atlanta:
Institute of the Black World Press, 1975), pp. 1-12.
Ibid., p . 12.
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done so would have been to issue a challenge so profound
as to rule out the preservation of petty bourgeois interests
in a compromise independence worked out in conjunction with
international capital. They maintain themselves as a class
by fomenting internal divisions and by dependence on external
capitalist powers. All across the continent, it could be
seen that most African mini-states, if you will, are engaged
in consolidating their territorial frontiers, in preserving
the social relations prevailing inside these frontiers, and
in protecting imperialism in the form of the monopolies and
their respective states.35 The capitalist superpowers,
directly and indirectly, individually and collectively,
guarantee the existence of the African petty bourgeoisie
as a ruling class and use them to penetrate and manipulate
African political economy. This has been done so crudely
and openly that one does not have to be specially informed
or specially aware in order to perceive what has been going
on.
In Africa today, all the activities or international
capital are aimed at perpetuating the division of the
. . 36
continent which they initiated at the time of the partition.
The petty bourgeoisie is showing that it seeks to maintain
35Ibid., pp. 10-16.
36See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
(Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974), pp. 1-
27. See also Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa,
pp. 55-74.
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the division of the African masses, since the anti-colonial
alliance with all other classes has gained its objective of
formal independence. Pan-Africanism which calls for
political unity of all African states with a total disregard
to the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonialists has
been so flouted by the present African regimes that the
37
concept of African unity is dead for all practical purposes.
In many respects, African countries have been further shut
off from one another during the present neo-colonial phase
than what it was during raw colonialism. Even within the
context of the existing African nation-states, the African
ruling class has seldom sought to build anything than tribal
power bases, which means that, they seek division and not
unity at all levels of political activity, be it national,
continental, or international.
"The dominant mode of thinking in Africa today is
inherited from the colonial masters and is given currency
3 8
by the state apparatus. " African leaders fight the bogey of
communist threat rather than the reality of capitalist-
imperialist oppression. Even the more progressive of this
ruling class harbor and protect local reactionaries while
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In twelve, fifteen, or twenty years of constitutional
independence, the various parts of Africa have scored no
victories in ending exploitation and inequality. On the
contrary, social differences have increased rapidly and
the same applies to the amount of surplus extracted by
foreign monopoly capital. In the spheres of production and
technology, the so-called development decade of the sixties
offers the spectacle of decreasing agricultural production,
a declining share of world trade, and the proliferation of
dependency structures because of the further penetration of
39
multinational corporations.
It would be correct to say that the transformation of
the African environment, of social and production relations,
the break away with imperialism and the forging of African
political and economic unity are all interrelated and
important phenomena which Africans must fight for if their
political independence is to be meaningful.
The arguments that we may advance in favor of African
unity can be roughly divided into two categories: economic
and political. Although the relative importance attached
to each of these categories varies from one African country
to another and from one era to the next, each of them
deserves to be more fully elucidated.





colonialism, has not only created micro-states in Africa and
established rigid patterns of import-export economies, but
the artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries have created
41
obstacles to the normal flow of economic activities. The
independent African states are also too small, weak and
poor to be able to develop individually. The neo-colonialist
forces control their economies and make a mockery of their
economic policies, 'To solve some of these economic problems
and create favorable conditions for the promotion of African
economic development, it is a must that the African states
form a political union. Such a political union will (i)
enable African countries with small internal markets to
achieve economies of scale from larger industrial units
producing for the amalgamated market; (ii) further
specialization between individual members, in some cases
exploiting different natural resources and other advantages
of the federal units; (iii) increase Africa's bargaining
power. The amalgamated market would also be more diversified
in structure and therefore less vulnerable to external
Of the twenty-two independent states in West, Central
and East Africa, four have less than one million inhabitants,
three between one and two million, and nine between two and
four million.
The underdeveloped and insignificant nature of inter-
Afircan trade is indicated by the fact that in 1962 it counted
for 2.5 percent of Africa's overall foreign trade. Partly
because the exports of most African states consist mostly of
raw material and partly because the African states themselves
belong to different currency and preferential zones, the bulk
of Africa's trade is still primarily oriented towards the
markets of the industrialized Western countries.
58
fluctuations.
The political arguments for unification are equally
important and compelling. Apart from keeping Africa out
of Cold War conflicts, continental political unification
would save the continent from all dangers and threats of
imperialism and neo-colonialism. It would also rid the
continent of all vestiges of racism and white domination.
It will also enable Africans to take their own political
destiny in their own hands. Only with unity can Africans
really govern Africa, and their resources will be used for
43
the benefit of Africa.
May we say that it is because of the unwillingness of
the majority of African leaders to agree on a continental
unity that Africa has become a dumping ground for;the
imperialist markets. The heavy dependence on the outside
markets means that the life of a number of African countries
hangs on the whims of outsiders. African export commodities
have their prices determined by non-African buyers rather
44
than by African producers. This is, of course, a
simplification of a complex problem, but it illustrates the
42
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economic difficulties of the continent which, despite its
wealth in oil, diamonds, gold and other precious metals and
minerals, and indeed its potential for a "green revolution"
in agriculture, has not yet evolved a mechanism capable of
dove-tailing the economic needs and activities of the
various countries in a way that would benefit Africa in
general.
The OAU since its inception has faced several ideological
and political tendencies and these tendencies continue to
exist up until today, hence the difficulty for the OAU to
come to a general agreement on conflict management. Indeed,
the ideological divisions and differences have characterized
the history of the OAU as evidence in the formation of the
Monrovia, Casablanca and the Brazzaville Twelve as we
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mentioned earlier. Besides, conflicting national attitudes
towards economic development and political set-up, multi
national corporations, the questions of Black African trade
and "dialogue" with South Africa, support for liberation
a 7
movements, etc., have influenced the OAU.
On the "dialogue" issue, until about 1970, most members
agreed that South Africa was impervious to peaceful negotia-
51 b i d .
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tions and must be challenged by supporting guerrilla action
against it. There were few lonely voices of dissent, by
48
such leaders as Malawi's Banda and Lesothos' Chief Jonathan.
However, in 1970, the Ivory Coast made a major diplomatic
thrust in favor of opening a "dialogue" with South Africa
49
and as many as seventeen OAU members support the idea.
Though the dialogue strategists could not push their
diplomatic initiative to full advantage at the critical OAU
Summit at Addis Ababa in 1971, the diplomatic battle at the
summit clearly reflected the basic division among members of
the OAU.
To further support our contention that ideological
divisions and differences have great impact on the OAU's
ability in conflict management, let us take the case of
Angola. At the first extraordinary summit of the OAU ON
Angola during 10-16 January 1976, the OAU members were equally
divided on the question of recognition of the MPLA government
there. Again, at the 13th Summit meeting, the OAU assembly
found itself in the throws of a severe internal crisis on the
Polisario issue. In this case, both Morocco and Mauritania
48
Michael Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of
African Unity (London: Oxford University Press, 1976),
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warned that they would disaffiliate themselves from the OAU
entirely if the summit approved a pro-Western Sahara
(Polisario Front) resolution tabled by Benin.
The differing political and ideological attitudes and
practices of the African states, which facilitates the
unscrupulous intrusion of cold war and superpower rivalry
in the continent, are fundamental and all pervasive. On
the question of attitudes towards erstwhile colonial powers,
the practice of African states is fundamentally divergent.
The conclusion in February 1975 of the Lome Convention by a
52
group of African states is clear illustration of the point.
In the field of decolonization of Africa, though the
"emancipation of all dependent territories" was listed as an
aim of the OAU, and in spite of the many declarations of
intent in that respect, it does not seem there was a clearly
worked out plan as to how that aim should be realized. In
fact, there was no agreement as to the extent and scope
within which the OAU should embark on its policy of
liberation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the OAU
Liberation Committee suffered from lack of cooperation from
53
the very beginning.
See Keesings Comtemporary Archives 1976, pp. 27595-
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For an excellent analysis of the subject, see Johan
Galtung, "Lome Convention and Neo-Capitalism," African Review
6:1 (1976), pp. 33-48.
53
M.H. Fargal, "African Unity and Liberation" (M.A.
thesis, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1968), pp. 30-48.
62
A study of liberation movements in Africa shows that
the OAU backing for the liberation movements has not been
uniform so to speak. For example, while the exile government
of Angola (GRAE) headed by Holden Roberto, who was also the
President of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) was supported by the moderate member states of the
OAU, the radical MPLA, headed by Augustino Neto was backed
by the radical group* of African states. This split was
evident even after Angola's independence on November 11,
1975. As pointed out earlier, in the first OAU Special
Summit on the question of Angola, held between January 10-16,
1976 at Addis Ababa, the forty-six OAU members remained
divided on the question of the recognition of the MPLA
government.
Another case that may be worth mentioning is ending the
illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the white
minority regime in Rhodesia had posed a major problem to the
OAU. And yet, the OAU assembly on October 22, 1966
adopted the mildest possible resolution in that the OAU placed
the main responsibility on the shoulders of Great Britain
4Ibid., pp. 48-53.
55Ibid.
Aniridha Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the
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and the United Nations, simply urging the former to use force
to prevent the UDI. Even the proposal for economic sanctions
against Rhodesia was defeated as unrealistic. On November 11,
1965, Rhodesia proclaimed UDI.5 The African states could
not push the Security Council to invoke in this case the
mandatory enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.58 On its part, the OAU Council met at its sixth
extraordinary session at Addis Ababa on December 3, 1965,
and merely adopted the strongest possible resolution the OAU
had even passes. The resolution stated:
If the United Kingdom does not crush the
rebellion and restore law and order, and
thereby prepare the way for majority rule
in Southern Rhodesia by December 15, 1965,
the Member States of the OAU shall sever •■'
diplomatic relations on that date with the
United Kingdom.59
However, translating this threat into reality was not
easy. On nine out of the then thirty-six member states of
the OAU complied with the resolution. The annoyance of the
nine with those who did not make the break rankled for a
long time. President Nyerere of Tanzania described the
refusal of some states to implement the resolution as having
"dealt a death blow to the OAU."
57Ibid.
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With these cases, we have seen that ideological
differences that exist in the OAU made it very difficult
for the organization to be effective in settlement of
intra-regional conflict and/or any other issue affecting
Africa as a whole.
We will now proceed to the next chapter to present a
background of the Republic of Chad and the root cause of
the Chadian conflict*.
CHAPTER III
THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD AND THE ROOT CAUSE
OF THE CHADIAN CONFLICT
Our main concern in this chapter is to examine the
root cause of the Chadian conflict; but before we do so, a
brief historical background of Chad becomes necessary.
The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in north
central African bounded by Nigeria, Niger, Libya, Sudan,
Central African Republic, and the Cameroun. It is about
two and one half times the size of France, but with a sparse
population of four and one half million which includes
eleven main ethnic groups and 192 smaller ones. According to
Samuel Decalo, the population can roughly be divided into
fifty percent Muslims, forty-three percent followers of
traditional religions, and about seven percent Christians.
Most of the Muslim population resides in the north and share
a common historical and cultural background. By the same
token, most of the followers of traditional African religions
and the Christians reside in the south and have a common
heritage with Africa south of the Sahara. This is not to
''"Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil
Strife in Chad," Journal of Modern African Studies 18:1
(March 1981), pp." 23-17.
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suggest that the two broad groupings outlined above are
monolithic; on the contrary, within both groups there is
wide ethnic diversity and rivalry. Table 1 shows a general
ethnic composition of the Chadian population. The two broad
divisions mentioned above do capture a significant division
of the population based on common work, culture and history.
The advance of Europeans into the Chadian region
represented an expansion of French interests in Africa. The
International Congress of Berlin in 1884, initially called
to settle conflicting European claims in Africa, settled
little in regard to separate national claims but served
instead to accentuate the rivalry and to establish the ground
rules for a new wave of competition. Zones of influence based
on military and economic presence supplanted the former policy
3
of free trade.
We find it necessary to give a quick idea of class
structure in Chad. We consider that the ruling class, that
is those who are directing the affairs of the state, the Emirs
or what may be called Chiefs form one group; followed by the
ruling class; after them come the artisans and the Fulani -
traders, and then after that come the peasants properly
speaking.
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa
Publications Ltd., 1983-84), p. 288.
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TABLE 1
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CHAD 1974
1. Southern Sedentary Groups 1,139,000 34.2%
Sara 800,000 24.0
Mboum, Laka 112,000 3.4
Moundang 90,000 2.7
Toubouri 75,000 2.2
Massa (Banana) » 50,000 1.5
Others 12,000 0.4
2. Sendentary & Seminomadic
Groups of the Sahel 902,000 26.8%
Maba 170,000 5.0
Bulala, Kuka 80,000 2.5
Haddad 100,000 3.0
Dadjo 65,000 . 2.0
Massalit 48,000 ' 1.5
Moubi 25,000 0.8
Zaghawa, Bideyat 40,000 1.2
Hadjeray 87,000 2.6
Kenembu 60,000 1.8









4. Other Groups 645,350 19.5
Total 3,300,000 100%
Source: Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London:
Europa Publications, Ltd., 1983-84), p. 301.
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The ruling class who occupy a position of power with
all privileges use their positions to manipulate and exploit
all other groups in order to promote and attain their goals.
For example, before Felix Malloum became the President
through a coup d'etat in 1975, he instigated the northerners
to revolt against what he termed "the southern domination."
The exploitation continues regime after regime. For instance,
Hissene Habre and Goukouni Oueddei have their own standing
army through conscription using religion and ethnicity as a
means to divide each of these groups, even to the extent of
making them to fight among themselves, and making it more
difficult for these group of people to recognize who their
real enemy is.
The village in Chad, like any other village in African
country's was founded and organized by several extended
families, which have their own network of relationships.
Although certain traditions concerning collective ownership
of the land have been preserved, the Chiefs or Emirs and
their entourages have retained considerable privileges as
regards ownership of land and the utilization of other
people's labor; this means that the peasants who depend on
the Emirs are obliged to work for a certain period each year
for their existence.
Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad (Metuchen,
N.J.: Scarecrow PresT^ Inc. , 1977) , p*^ 13-21 .
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At the present neo-colonial dependent period, the
Republic of Chad being a neo-colonial dependent state is
ruled internally by the petty bourgeoisie or what may be
called comprador-capitalists and externally tied to the
former colonizer - France. To support this contention, we
are making a particular reference to both the economic and
political structures,.set up by both governments - when
Goukouni was Presid&nt, and now that Hissene Habre is in
charge. When Goukouni was the President, he appointed
people from the upper echelon of the society as members of
his cabinet. Hissene Habre followed the same trend when
he became the President in 1982 by setting up a government
which is also dominated by the ruling class. Fir.empirical
observation, politics in the Republic of Chad is structurally
dominated by the petty bourgeoisie with little or no
participation on the part of the masses as it can be seen
in Table 2 that follows. Moreover, as the table indicates,
the economic structure of Chad had remained the same, that
is, essentially a colonial capitalist structure.
The petty bourgeoisie succeeded in assuming the leader
ship role in Chad after independence, and thus to supersede
Berch Berberoglu, "The Class Nature of the State in
Peripheral Social Formations," Journal of Contemporary Asia
13:3 (1983), pp. 324-328.







Presidents Hissene Habre (took office 21 October 1982)
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development - Djidingar Dono
Ngardoum
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation - Idriss Miskine
Minister of Internal Affairs and Security - Tahar Guinassou
Minister of Defense and Veterans - Routouang Yoma
Minister of Justice - Oudalbaye Naham
Minister of Economy and Trade - Ali Djalbord Diar
Minister for the Control of Natural Disasters - Taher Abdeldjelil
Minister for Livestock and Water Resoruces - Adoum Moussa Seil
Minister of Finance and Equipment - Elie Romba
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction - Joseph Yodeyman
Minister of Public Works, Mining and Petroleum - Hassan Djamous
Minister of Transport - Loi Mohamad Shawa
Minister at the President's Office for Information - Soumila
Mahamat
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications - Assileck Halata
Minister of Education, Youth and Sports - Abba Sidick
Minister of Further Education and Research -Gouara Lassou
Minister of State Enterprises - Ngartokete Tatola
Minister of Labor and Women's Promotion -Doubangar Doregim
Minister of Health and Social Affairs - Koibla Djimasta
Minister of Tourism, Crafts, Forests and Natural Reserves -
Kolbassia Vouna
Source: Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London:
Europa Publications, Ltd., 1983-84), p. 302.
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the traditional rulers, because it was the only class that
was:politically and intellectually capable of representing
its own class interests as though they were the general
Q
interests of the colonized society as a whole. The petty
bourgeoisie on assuming power in Chad, has reduced considerably
Q
the power granted to Chiefs or Emirs by the colonial masters.
The role of the State in Chad today, "is; to take charge of
the political interests of the bourgeoisie and to realize the
function of political hegemony which the bourgeoisie is
unable to achieve on its own." When this role is fulfilled
at a moment of a severe political crisis, the result is likely
to be an extreme inflation of executive power and exploitation
of the masses. This seems to be the case in Chad.
Having conquered Chad, France did not apply a unified
administrative policy to local chiefs and sultans until after
1920. The policy implemented was partly a function of the
willingness and ability of the local chiefs to control the
people under them and partly a function of their proximity
to French administrative centers. Although French colonial
policy in general favored the reduction of power of local
authorities, in Chad greater reliance was placed on tradi-
Q
See Berch Berberoglu, "The Class Nature of the State
in Peripheral Social Formations," pp. 324-336.
9Ibid.
Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, vol. 1:
State and Bureaucracy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977),
pp. 43-110.
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tional administrative structures and officials. This was
particularly true in the northern areas which were largely-
populated by nomads and which was a considerable distance
from the French administrative centers in the south.
The civil service during the colonial era was composed
almost entirely of Europeans; Chadians were not offered the
opportunity to train for administrative positions until the
late 1950s. French" colonial rule did not bring about any
socio-economic advances in Chad. Indeed, Chad was very much
neglected once it was finally conquered, especially since
administrative appointments the AEF (French Equatorial
Africa) in general (and Chad in particular) were the least
attractive and/or desirable postings that were frequently
assigned either to novice colonial administrators or to
derelict officials as a sign of demotion and/or punishment.
Most of those posted to the AEF were the dregs of the French
13
colonial civil service. The development of local repre
sentatives institutions was largely a post-Korld War II
phenomenon. Under the administration of Governor General
Francios-Joseph Reste, some experimentation in cooperatives
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1979), pp. 482-484.
1 2
J. A. Ballard, "Politics and Government in Former
French West and Equatorial Africa: A Critical Bibliography,"
Journal of Modern African Studies 3:4 (December 1965),
pp. 589-601.
1 3
William B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: The French Colonii
Service in Africa (Stanford: Hoover Intstitution Press,
1971), pp. 73-75.
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and local councils occurred before the war, but these efforts
offered little permanent basis for future political develop
ment after the war and again reflected the French tendency
to transfer to French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatorial
Francaise - AEF), institutions that had developed elsewhere,
with little regard for the local setting and the state of
14
political maturity.
Initial economic exploitation of the territories of
AEF was carried out through the use of concessionary companies,
whose brutality, mismanagement, and corrupt activities
provided material for the journals of political opposition
parties in Paris. The fall of several French governments
and the rapid exhaustion of resources eventually brought
about the elimination of company concessions. Chad was
generally spared this technique, except in the introduction
of cotton production, because of its general lack of readily
exploitable resources.
The French colonial government, in Chad used its controls
over imports and import licenses and government supply and
transport contracts not only as a means of revenue but also
to keep economic activities under French control; moreover,
French policy did not encourage African enterprise in Chad
14
Felix Sylvester Eboue, "Governor of Chad Territory,"
Journal of Negro History 29:4 (October 1944), pp. 501-502.
Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, p. 39—51•
Ik
as was the case also in other states in French Equatorial
Africa. Because of Chad's geographic position and special
ties with France, the French have long regarded the young
Republic as an area of importance to the maintenance of
France's presence in Africa. During the colonial era and
up to the present, the bulk of armed resistance and rebellion
has come from the Muslims particularly from the Bokou-Enedi-
Tibesti (B.E.T.) region. Some observers suggest that the
southern elites were more amenable to colonial domination
hence the French recruited most of its officials from the
south. French colonial policy did give more automony to
the north mainly because of the inhospitable terrain (mountains
and desert) while in the south a more structured "bureaucracy
evolved in the urban centers, particularly Ndjamena, the
capital. The most modern city in Chad is the capital,
Ndjamena, which was founded by Muslim pilgrims from West
Africa. Figure 1 is a map of Chad showing prefectures and
towns. The city is separated from Cameroun by the River
Chari that has no bridge, so people cross the river in dugout
canoes. Table 3 shows area and population prefectures.
In the Repubic of Chad there are no railways and hardly
any paved roads; during the rainy season, the poor tracks
See Edward Corbett, French Presence.in Black Africa
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 160.
Graham Hancock, ed., Africa Guide (London: World of
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connecting the urban centers are transformed into impassable
swamps. Kith Ndjamena some 700 miles from the coast, most
imports have travelled up to 1,800 miles to reach Chad.
The poor communications act as a major developmental
constraint and inhibit national unification. Intense socio-
economic differences sharply separate various population
groups, reflecting fundamental diverging patterns of social
77
organization and lifestyles, and deeply entrenched inter-
1 ft
ethnic animosities. These cleavages in general parallel
the country's internal historic tug-of-war, though other
divisions are often of equal intensity. While the locus of
authority since independence has been Ndjamena, the modern
capital, this power stems from the economic viability,
cultural unity, and numerical strength of the Sara south,
with a 'reactionary'* Muslim counter-pull exerted by Abeche,
the imperial capital of Ouadai, an anarchic element as from
pre-colonial days, represented by the Toubou of Borkou-
1 9
Ennedi-Tibesti (BET).
In the far north of the country reside the semi-nomadic,
highly independent, and taciturn Toubou who have" formed the
backbone of the rebellions against Ndjamena since 1966.
Pacified since 1920s - having previously contested the French
entry under the banners of both Turkey and the Sanusiya - the
Toubou were eventually pushed into rebellion by President
Tombalbaye's inept rule in 1966.
Unlike elsewhere in francophone Africa, eighty years
of colonial rule did not effect any major changes in Chad.
-I Q
Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972),
pp. 27-28.
19
G.J. Kogongar, "Introduction a la vie et histoire
precoloniales des populations Sara du Tchad," (Ph.D.
disseration, University of Paris, 1971), pp. 87-88.
20
James Hoagland, "Chad: Respite in Two Year Rebellion,"
Washington Post (August 2, 1970), p. A25.
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Though the French fought hard to conquer the territory,
once it was theirs it was grossly neglected. This is one of
the reasons they refused to build such infrastructures as
railroads, and pave roads because they were not interested
in the development of the area but were interested in si
phoning off the raw materials which they needed in develop
ing their own country - France.
In no sector was neglect more evident than in education.
In 1921, for example, there was only one school in Fort Lamy
(Ndjamena), with barely fifty pupils; in 1933 there were
still only eighteen qualified teachers in the entire colony,
and the largest school had just three grades and 135 pupils,
mainly children of the Senegalese tirailleurs that the
French had brought with them. The first secondary school
was not established until after World War II, and as late as
1958 there were only three in the entire country. While
the pace of education greatly escalated after independence,
the overall rates of scholarization still lagged behind
those other least developed countries in the former Federa
tion d'Afrique Equatoriale Francaise.
In 1971 the country had no institutions of higher
learning. Students who wished to further their education
It was only in 1962 that the first two Chadian doctors
- Bajoglo Baroun and Outel Bono, both later to play a prominent
role in politics - grated and returned from Paris. See
Harold Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad, pp. 150-154.
22Ibid., pp. 154-156.
79
beyond the secondary level were required to enroll in
colleges and universities abroad. Of the eighty-three
students enrolled in such institutions in 1966-67, all were
male; thirty percent were studying in France, .and the
remainder in Belgium, the People's Republic of the Congo,
and Senegal. The first European explorers arrived in Chad,
part of several early African empires, in the 1800s. The
country became a Fre'nch protected state around the turn of
the century. It became part of French Equatorial Africa in
24
1910 and gained its independence in 1960.
French colonialism, of course, had a collective impact
on the area that was twofold: (1) the arbitrary drawing of
territorial boundaries and the implementation of divide and
rule tactics resulted in the exacerbation of long standing
class, ethnic and religious cleavages, and (2) colonial
domination resulted in the chronic 'underdevelopment' of the
country. In other words, the collision between pre-colonial
social formations in the area with the capitalist social
formation of France resulted in the intensification of
exploitation and forcible subordination of the country's
socio-economic and political structures and practices.
After the military conquest of Chad carried out between 1916,
23
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, International Yearbook of Education, 1972,
vol. 32 (Paris: International Bureau of Education, 1970).
24
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging
States of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1960), p. 86-90.
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the country was ruthlessly exploited.
The development of politics of Chad was dominated from
the initial years after World War II by political forces and
considerations originating in France. Local elections were
won largely by members of the European dominated Chadian
Democratic Union (UDT), associated with the metropolitan
Assembly of French People (Rasemblement du Peuple Francais -
RPF) . The UDT ruled* with rigid administrative policy, and
government administration members who became identified with
the opposition Chadian Progressive Party or the Independent
Socialist Party of Chad (Parti Socialiste Independance du
Tchad - PSIT) were subject to dismissal or transfer to
distant posts. The number of Chadians engaged in party
politics by Europeans who were more interested in the
struggle between the (Rasemblement du Peuple Francais - RPF),
and French Socialist Party, and the French Communist Party
was made possible by encouraging internal divisions in Chad.
It comes as no surprise that today Chad is one of the
poorest and least developed countries in the world. The
legacy of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation can be
illustrated graphically by a glance at the socio-economic
data for the country. Chad has a per capita income of only
See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad,
p. 70.
See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 38-39.
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eighty dollars ($80.00) per year, a GNP of $290 million and
a national budget of $100 million.27 These figures should
be contrasted with Chad's foreign debt of over $18.5 million.
These figures indicate that the economy is distorted and
incapable of producing a good standard of living for the
overwhelming majority of the population. Table A shows a
general budget of Chad from 1976 to 1978. The civil war
and Sahel droughts h'ave only added to the problems of
survival for the peoples of Chad. Other data that should
be considered here include: an illiteracy rate of ninety-
three percent, male life expectancy of twenty-nine years,
female life expectancy of thirty-five years and an infant
2 8
mortality rate of 200 per 1,000 live births.
In summary, it can be safely argued that Chad is a
chronic case of underdevelopment. The objective conditions
described above provide the basis for the present conflict.
Armed with this brief characterization of the country's
background, we can now proceed to look at some of the root
causes of the Chadian conflict.
Chad, a vast landlocked country in central Africa has
had an unhappy history since independence in 1960, and has
been riven by armed rebellion since 1965. Figure 2 shows a
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (April 8-12, 1980),
p. 26451.
7 Q
These statistics reflect only estimates made in 1976.
The present situation can only be presented to be much worse
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political map of Chad with major cities. Independence
mainly meant a simple changing of the guard and the manifold
problems inherited from the colonial era were not approached
from the standpoint of seeking fundamental solutions.
During Tombalbaye's rule, the conflict was largely
between the indigenous African people of the south and
Saharan Arab Muslims of the north. The indigenous African
people of the south as we mentioned earlier, were relatively
receptive to French assimilationism, which gave them an
upper hand over the Saharan Arab Muslims of the north in
bureaucracy, colonial politics and position of privileges.
Khen formal independence came, the northerners mounted
resistance to the authority of the southern dominated
government and bureaucracy. This was exacerbated by the
introduction of the one-party system by Tombalbaye's regime.
When Ngarta Tombalbaye became the nation's first president
at independence, he effected a gradual concentration of
administrative, political and military powers in his own
hands. At the outset, French administrators were replaced
at regional governmental levels in the Arabized areas by
southerners who were from the President's ethnic group.
The serious administrative inefficiencies that occured
29
created great animosity toward the government.
2 9
Samuel Decalo, Regionalism, Political Decay and
Civil Strife in Chad," pp. 24-50.
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The Arabized people deeply resent what they regard as
political domination by the southern elements. They object
to the obligation to pay taxes on livestock, which the
central government has imposed as a primary source of income,
as well as the civic taxes that must be produced from meager
incomes. They also feel that their part of the country has
been comparatively neglected in the government's programs
30
aimed at national development.
Resentment heightened with the 1962 ban on all political
parties except the southern based Progressive Party of Chad
(Parti Progressiste Tchadien - PPT), and the adoption of a
new constitution in 1963 advocating a strong presidential
form of government. Tombalbaye's purge of Muslim politicians
from his cabinet in 1963 and the dissolution of the National
31
Assembly drew Arab opposition. Tax riots in the Sahel in
1965 also grew into banditry, violent defiance of the central
government and, finally, organized guerrilla resistance.
In September 1963 there were demonstrations and riots at
Fort Lamy, resulting in heavy casualties and numerous arrests,
There was even greater violence in central Chad two years
later, heralding the beginning of Chad's long drawn out
rebellion, which Tombalbaye at first denounced as a plot to
exploit ethnic and religious antipathies by northern Muslims
Ibid., p. 5 6.
Etienne Mallard, "No Alternative to Tombalbaye?"
Combat (October 20, 1969), pp. 8-9.
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having close ties with fellow Arabs in Sudan and Egypt.32
It should be noted that Tombalbaye's use of the term
"northern Muslim" did not apply to the BET alone, but to
all Muslims, both black and Arab, living outside the five
southern prefectures. Because educated Sara tribesmen
formed the backbone of the civil service, they were inevitably
posted throughout Chad, and in regions other than the south
they had little cont'act with the indigenous population,
which they tended to rule with a heavy hand.33
In foreign affairs, Tombalbaye's views were colored by
the French administration's early hostility toward him as a
militant PPT campaigner, and also by a parochialism born of
personal experience that was limited to French Equatorial
Africa.
Just as in his social and political contracts Tombalbaye
became mistrustful and withdrew more and more into himself,
so in foreign policy he grew increasingly isolationist.
Gradually he severed the ties that Lisette had formed with
the RDA and had perpetuated with the FEA countries of the
UDEAC.35
32
Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 100-117. "
33
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in




Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, pp. 43-
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Chad's attainment of sovereign status enabled Tombalbaye
to establish diplomatic relations with and seek aid from a
wide range of countries with a view to making Chad less
dependent on France. His diplomacy had no ideological
3 7
orientation, but was based on realpolitik. Soon little
was left of his inheritance from Lisette other than such
measures and policies as would be of use in reaching his
primary goal of governing Chad with a wholly free hand. To
achieve this, he first had to dispose of his internal
opponents, and to eliminate them Tombalbaye was not above
enlisting help of any external forces that promised their
38
cooperation.
Tombalbaye's tightening of his control over'the bureau
cracy and the chiefs met with great opposition. By 1963,
however, when the repression that followed the outbreaks in
September clearly indicated that his major targets had become
"northerners" and Muslims, opposition among those two elements
of the population began to crystallize, leading eventually to
39
the armed revolt against Tombalbaye's rule.
The regime of Tombalbaye was thoroughly corrupt and
36
Ibid., p. 49 .
37
Colin Legum, "Crisis Over Chad," in Africa Contemporary
Record, 1980-1981 (New York: Africana Publishing Company,
1982), pp. A43-A44.
38
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1980-1981), p. 96.
39See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 32-40. "
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managed to stay in power mainly through French military and
economic support.40 When France realized that Tombalbaye
could no longer represent their interest, they organized a
coup d'etat on April, 1975 which killed him. The proclamation
issued by the authors of the coup accused the President of
having despised the armed forces of having cast a slur on
n . . 41
national unity and of pursuing disastrous economic policies.
The French troops stationed at Ndjamena did not intervene.
General Felix Malloum who had earlier been implicated in
President Pompidou's alleged plan to overthrow Tombalbaye in
1973, was installed as the new President on April 1975. The
coup came at a time when success of the liberation movements
42
could no longer be considered negligible.
May 13, 1975 saw the formation of the Supreme Military
43
Council (CSM) headed by General Felix Malloum. The new
leaders promptly endorsed Chad's existing international
commitments, dissolved the National Assembly and political
parties, disbanded the general paraphernalia of government,
released some political prisoners, and promised Chadians a
Kessing's Contemporary Archives, (July 22-21, 1975),
p. 1103.
A1Ibid., pp. 1103-1105.
42Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 84-86.




new constitution and democratic elections. Moreover, no
spectacular vendettas were undertaken against members of
Tombalbaye's government, and only a few of the most
45
oppressive and venal of them were arrested. In mid-May,
1975, the CSM sent out three teams to "explain" the coup and
its aims to Chadians throughout the country.
In the provisional government of May 13, 1975 (confirmed
on August 16), eight' of the nine ministers were members of
the CSM. Furthermore, although four civilian technocrats
were appointed to rehabilitate the economy, the key portfolios
remained in the hands of the military. To be sure, more posts
were given to Muslims than in the previous regime, but there
was no corresponding improvement in the ethnic and regional
imbalance. Late in 1975, the authority of the central govern
ment and its head was strengthened by the banning of all
political demonstrations and the replacement of elected
municipal councils by prefects appointed by the Ndjamena
authorities/6 Already in May, the office of paramount chief
had been abolished (although the current incumbents were
reprieved by lifetime tenure), and within three months,
eight of Chad's fourteen prefectures were headed by newly
appointed prefects. On November 21, strikes, of which there
id., p. 67.
45Samuel Decalo, "Regionalism, Political Decay and
Civil Strife in Chad," p. 100.
A6Ibid., pp. 100-104.
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have been, fifteen since the coup d'etat, were forbidden.
Thus labor grievances were added to the other causes of the
unrest and impatience felt by many Chadians.^7
On the credit side of the ledger, Malloum's accomplish
ments were not widely appreciated, perhaps because they were
to some degree negative, in that they put an end to certain
abuses. Thus arbitrary arrests, a fairly common practice in
Tombalbaye's time, virtually ceased, and some government
measures contributed to reviving the country's economy.48
Taxes were reduced, as were increased; imports of essential
consumer goods were encouraged; and a lid was placed on some
4 9
soaring prices. As regards foreign relations, goodwill
missions were sent to Arab governments, but no progress was
made in including Libya to abandon the Aozou Strip. With
the failure of efforts by various leaders in Africa and
Europe to liberate Madame Claustre, Franco-Chadian relations
worsened, and this overshadowed all other external issues.50
Incensed by the direct dealing by Paris (and Bonn) with
Habre, which entailed the payment of ransom money and furnish-
47
Jean-Claude Froelich, Tensions in Chad (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp.
•m r Al6X Rondos» "What Hope for Chad?" West Africa
(May 5, 1976), p. 6.
Largeau M. Elgard, "Employment, Economic Positions
50A
Andrew Lycette, "Chad's Distraous Civil War," Africa
Report 22 (September-October 1978), p. 1063. ■
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ing of non-military supplies, Malloum demanded on September 27
that France withdraw its troops from Chad. Malloum may have
gained some popularity by issuing that ultimatium, but Chad's
economy suffered in terms of the compensation France has been
paying for the use of military bases and the blow to local
trade that resulted from the departure of its free spending
Legionnaires.
Realizing that he had yet to win the hearts and minds of
his compatriots, Malloum called a halt to military operations
against the FAN and courageously toured the rebel areas in
the winter of 1975-76. Preaching national unity and re
conciliation, he frequently proclaimed his willingness to
negotiate with any and all rebels, and even voiced praise
of Habre as a patriot.
On the first anniversary of the April 13, 1975, coup
d'etat, Malloum was the target of an unsuccessful assassi
nation attempt in which reportedly four Chadian were killed
and seventy-two wounded. Concurrently, Chadian students in
Paris occupied their country's embassy in protest against
Malloum's suppression of dissident trade unionists and youth
groups as well as the non-payment of their scholarships.53
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara 1976-77, 4th ed




See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad
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These disappointing reactions to his campaign of conciliation
persuaded Malloum that he must tighten his grip on the
country, and in the late spring of 1976 he reorganized the
54
armed forces and then reshuffled his government.
Generally speaking, the military junta that replaced
the first government did not bring any significant change in
the composition of leadership or administration of the country
Like his predec'essor, Felix Malloum continued to fight
the northern rebels with French troops. The problem of
nationalist struggles for power increased tremendously under
the rule of General Felix Malloum. In January 1978, an
agreement was signed in Khartoum by President Malloum and
Habre in the hope of securing a cease-fire and forming a
government, to include FROLINAT, which commanded nationwide
support. At the same time, however, FROLINAT settled its
internal differences and unified its command under a
Revolution Council led by Goukouni Oueddei. The various
factions or movements that were fighting against the central
government included Forces Armees Populairs (FAP). The name
of Forces Armees Populaires, given originally to the combined
armies of Goukouni and Acyle' in March 1978, was retained by
Goukouni for his own Toubou forces, after the alliance of
54Ibid., pp. 68-73.
55Ibid., pp. 73-78.
See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad, pp. 148-151.
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the two leaders collapsed into mutual hostility in July and
August of that year. Another faction was Forces Armees
du Nord (FAN). The FAN was composed of Toubous of the
mountains and plains of the BET who had rebelled against
the Tombalbaye regime beginning in 1965. In the early 1970s,
Goukouni Oueddi, son of the Derde of Tibesti, yielded his
command fo the Second Liberation Army to Hissene Habre, and
c o
the army became known as the FAN.
Another faction that was fighting against the central
government was the "Volcan" armies. The original "Volcan"
army was the heir to the First Liberation Army, founded by
Ibrahim Abatcha in 1966 and taken over by El-Baghalani four
59
years later. It may be there were other factions fighting
against the central government but current data concerning
these factions or movements are lacking.
In September 1978, the FROLINAT launched a general
offensive inflicting crushing defeats on the Chad National
Army, and captured Fada and the northern capital of Faya-
60
Largeau. Felix Malloum was forced to appeal to Libya and
France to arrest the progress of the victorious rebels.





See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
p. 43. ~~~ —
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Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad, pp. 122-130.
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Benghazi which amounted to a de facto division of the country
between FROLINAT and Malloum's government. The hope that
this agreement would be the basis for a unified government
including Malloum, Goukouni and Habre floundered on Malloum's
refusal to agree to Goukouni's demand that all French troops
in Chad be withdrawn. Goukouni's forces inflicting heavy
defeats on Malloum's government forces, led to his resigna
tion as the President of Chad on March 23, 1979.63
The Economic Fabric of Chad
As we mentioned earlier, Chad is one of the world's
poorest countries, even inside the category of the twenty-
five classified by the United Nations as "least developed,"
while the ravages of Sahel drought have further injured the
64
economy.
The country's immense dimensions - 1,000 miles from
north to south, and 500 miles in width - coupled with an
extremely rudimentary internal communications network,
further limits prospects for economic development or the





See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad,
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For a general overview of the economy, see World Bank,
Chad; Development Potentials and Constraints (Washington, D.C
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) and Surveys of African
Economies, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C: International Monetary
Fund, 1978), pp. 176-178.
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coast multiplies the costs for every commodity, raising the
prices of imports, and driving down local producers' prices
so that they may remain competitive in world markets.




















































































Source: FAQ Production Yearbook, 1982 (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1982), p. 116.
Crop farming and nomadic cattle-raising occupy most
of the population and accounts for nearly one-half of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Other principal crops grown in
Chad are millet, sorghum, manioc, rice and wheat. Cotton
is indigenous to Chad. Table 6 shows other principal crops
in Chad. The purchase, ginning, and marketing of cotton in
Chad are undertaken by a single company, Societe Cotonniere
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Publications Limited, 1982), p. 67.
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du Tchad (COTONCHAD), which purchases the entire output.
The cultivation of cotton was imposed upon the southern
populations (so that they might pay the poll-tax and that
the colony might start paying its keep). Despite the
centrality of cotton to the economy and its role as the
principal economic occupation of the majority of the
population, its cultivation is neither favorably regarded
nor is its expansion for increased exports assured.
It could be seen that the incessant factional fighting
in Chad, that plagued the country since independence had
Kessing's Contemporary Archives (September 18-22,
1978), p. 1064.
Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 84-89.
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slowed down exploration of minerals. The current oil finds,
first discovered late in 1975, are expected to climb
enormously as additional thorough exploration occurs whenever
it is possible. Frond has been the principal mineral export
but desposits of iron, tin, tungesten, kaolin and bentonite
have also been found. Other minerals like uranium, copper,
nickel, assisterite, and gold have been discovered as
prospects for the nation's economic strength whenever the war
allowed this to happen.
Chad has a chronic trade deficit. In 1974 the deficit
was 11,803m. francs CFA as shown in Table 7. Table 8
shows principal trading partners with Chad. Nevertheless,
Chad continues to import most of its needs from France,
hence France remains Chad's principal trading partner for
many years. Foreign investment is dominated by France,
with the U.S. participation in some of the investments.
France continues to enjoy surpluses in trade with Chad.
The following Table 9 shows the pattern of trade between
Chad and France year-in and year-out.
In 1970, the French trade surplus was 31.8 million
francs. Eight years later it increased to 256 million francs,
representing an enormous increase of seven hundred and five
World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Washington, D.C,: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1981), pp. 50-51.
f\ ft
U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for
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CHAD IMPORTS AND EXPORTS WITH FRANCE
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Company, 1981), pp. cl56-7.
percent. The French own most of Chad's industry including
the major industries in Chad. The currency, the CFA franc,
is issued by the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC)
and tied to the French franc. This indeed demonstrates that
Chad's economy is heavily dependent on the French economy.
Chad's imports from the UDEAC (Central African Economic and
100
Customs Unions) countries fell after her withdrawal from
UDEAC from 3,500m. francs CFA in 1975.69 Substantial
deficits with her former UDEAC partners continue to be
recorded (exports to UDEAC amounted to 402m. francs CFA
in 1975).
Since independence in 1960 Chad has continued to be
heavily dependent upon foreign financial assistance. France
continued to be the principal supplier of foreign aid
including direct budgetary assistance which amounted to
about 2,500m. francs CFA in 1976. In that year approxi
mately half of the aid disbursed (26,000m. francs CFA) was
of French origin and rather more than half of that was for
technical assistance in agriculture, education, and health.
Of course, none of these aids are given without strings
attached. The heavy dependence on French aid for economic
and other so-called support, are the causes of underdevelop-
ment in Chad.
In 1980, the Transitional Government of National Unity
inherited an internal public debt of about 10,000m. francs
CFA, while the state's external balance was aggravated by
a massive outflow of currency (the CFA franc, linked to
the French franc, remains fully convertible) caused by
World Bank, International Financial Statistics, 1980-
1981 (Washington, dTc~1 International Monetary Fund, 1982),
p. 241.




















departing businessmen. Table 10 shows the balance of
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (London:
Europa Publications Limited, 1978), p. 120.
Since 1971 development expenditures through the budget
have become negligible. Expenditures on defense and internal
security continue to dominate the budget and accounted in
1973 for more than one quarter of total expenditure.
Hissene Habre's government introduced a new budget for

































the revenue side, however, only 8,000m. francs CFA were
expected to be raised from total taxation, with the balance
to be financed out of foreign aid. Almost one half of
public expenditure (17,000m. francs CFA) is allocated to
defense and security, leaving little for development spend
ing. This is because the government is maintaining a
35,000 man strong national army and faces continuing
security problems, particularly in the north. The economic
problems of the country have been exacerbated in recent
years by the disappointing progress of agriculture, by the
disastrous drought conditions and, above all, by the
73
protracted civil war.
Major Factions in the Chadian Conflict
One of the most significant developments in the
country's post-independence era was the formation of the
74
Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) in 1966.
After 1966 the armed rebellion against the neo-colonial
regime became more systematic and attracted significant
backing from a variety of sources. Although FROLINAT has
been racked with factional strife since its beginnings, it
7 2
"Fact Sheet About Chad," African Recorder 21:14
(September 10-23, 1983),p. 5949.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad, pp. 20-23.
A"FR0LINAT Formed," Africa Research Bulletin 17:12
(December 15, 1966), p. 5906.
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was able to secure control of the northern half of the
country by 1977-1978. The success of FROLINAT's military
strategy, moreover, prompted the Supreme Military Council's
(CSM) government of Felix Malloum to officially recognize
the movement and seek national reconciliation. In fact,
if it were not for the presence of French troops Malloum1s
government would have been toppled by the guerrilla
offensive of 1977 and 1978.
Malloum at the urging of France sought to break the
momentum of guerrilla struggle by forming a new government
with former guerrilla leader Hissene Habre. This agreement
was signed January 1978, in Khartoum, Sudan, and elevated
Hissene Habre to Prime Minister. Political observers,
however, said that the signature on January 25 of a "basic
charter" was not in itself a spectacular political event.
It simply confirmed the two parties' will, expressed in an
earlier Khartoum statement, to lay the foundations for
Chadian national unity. The original Khartoum agreement
called for the formation of a provisional government of
national union which would help bring about reconciliation
among all forces in the country.
75Ibid., p. 5907.
"Guerrilla Leader Now Prime Minister," New Africa
136 (October 1978), p. 38.
Kessing's Contemporary Archives (May 12, 1978),
p. 28977.
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It was believed that the basic charter would provide
the "institutional framework for the Republic of Chad until
the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of the
organs stemming from it."
Under the Khartoum Accord, a new provisional govern
ment would have the task of implementing a detailed political
program according to a precise timetable. It would lead to
general elections fo'r a constituent assembly, which would
result in political institutions. However, while there was
no official word on the contents of the "basic charter, it
was believed to provide for a "security and defense
commission" incorporating leaders of General Felix Malloum
and Hissene Habre.78 It was also thought to provide for
a 'consultative council1 with both of these new bodies
supervising strict application of the Khartoum Accord.
That would involve progressive dissolution of Malloum's
ruling Higher Military Council (CSM) and the designation
of a president of the Republic and a prime minister
responsible for forming a new government. It was through
this agreement that General Felix Malloum had become the
president of the Republic of Chad, with Hissene Habre
nominated as the Prime Minister. For President Malloum
7 ft
"Chad: Pact With Former Rebel," Africa Research
Bulletin 8:14 (August 1-31, 1978), p. 4958.
79"Chad: Mini-Summit Failure," Africa Diary 22
(July 1978), p. 10604.
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his new appointment at that time could be presented as a
success for his policy of national reconciliation. Super
ficially, it was the first tangible result since the policy
was announced when he came to power in April, 1975 after the
assassination of President Tombalbaye.
The new government of President Malloum and Prime
Minister Habre proved to be unworkable and by February,
1979, fierce fightin'g broke out in the capital city. One
reason that may be advanced for the failure of this agree
ment was that General Malloum did not include the most
8 0
hardline armed opposition to his regime: the Libyan
backed faction of FROLINAT (Chad National Liberation Front)
which is now known as GUNT (Transnational Government of
National Unity). The Prime Minister Hissene Habre broke
away from FROLINAT because of alleged Libyan involvement
in the conflict. As Habre backed out of the Union govern-
meet, he went back to organize his armed forces to launch
a new attack on the government of Felix Malloum. The new
offensive by Habre's armed forces sent Felix Malloum into
exile.
Once again, November 10, 1979, saw the formation of a
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) which was
Q Q
See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conf1ict
in Chad, pp. 46-49.
81
See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
p. 86.
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agreed upon in Lagos. The accord was set up with Goukouni
as President, Kamougue as Vice-President, and Hissene Habre
as the Defense Minister.
The creation of the Transitional Government of National
Unity (GUNT) under the leadership of Goukouni Oueddei was
however greeted with a sigh of relief and a measure of
guarded optimism. It was maintained that the composition
of the GUNT regime in Chad, and especially the enhanced
role of the defeated Sara South within it, might possibly
stabilize a situation still exceedingly volatile and in
herently unstable. Yet, as West Africa cautioned, "Twenty
years of government by a group unrepresentative of the
country, pretending to fill the vacuum at the center of
power and doing so with conspicuous ineffectiveness, cannot
8 3
be easily Erased." Even given the sincerity and goodwill
of eleven factions in the GUNT power hierarchy - which is
far from assured, because every conceivable opportunistic
faction has been included was an attempt to bring unity,
peace and stability to Chadians who have never experienced
84
any of these since independence.
o 9
"Chad: Eleven Heads of States Meet in Lagos," West
Africa (November 17, 1979), pp. 1224-1225.
o o
"Encouraging Move Towards Peace in Chad," West
Africa (December 10, 1979), pp. 2269-2270.
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Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad, p. 31.
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Having assumed power as the President, Goukouni Oueddei's
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) never showed
itself able to administer the sprawling nation, wracked by
war and recurrent poverty. Forged at a peace conference in
August, 1979, GUNT encompasses eleven Chadian political and
military factions representing various regional, ethnic and
political tendencies, and the differences among them were
8 5
simply never overcome. As leader of a shakey coalition,
Goukouni began a balancing act between Libya and French
pressures. Conscious of Gaddafy's territorial ambitions on
Chad, he had at one time threatened to fight what he called
"Libyan imperialism." But eventually, he accepted Libyan
assistance to neutralize Habre, his Defense Minister who
was seeking to gain total control in the civil war stemming
from deep distrust between themselves.
The Transitional Government of National Unity led by
Goukouni did not function, so to speak, and President
Goukouni felt betrayed when the OAU troops refused to side
with him and to engage in the fighting against Habre's army.
In mid 1982, Habre returned with an armed force to take
control of the government; and Goukouni fled to Cameroun.
85<tChad: Habre's Turn," Africa News 12 (June 14, 1982),
pp. 5-6.
ft f\
"International Dimension in Chadian Conflict,"
African Recorder 22:19 (September 10-23, 1983), p. 6282.
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It could be observed that the current fighting is mainly
between Goukouni of GUNT, who is being aided by Libya, and
President Habre, who is receiving assistance from France-
8 7
and the United States. A brief breakdown of major
contending forces in the Chadian conflict would include
the following:
1. Peoples Armed Forces (F.A.P.) led by Goukouni
Oueddei. This is now called Transitional
Government o»f National Unity (GUNT).
2. Northern Army Forces (FAN) led by Hissene Habre.
3. Force Armee de l'Occident (F.O.A.) led by Moussa
Modela. This force was created out of remains of
the 3rd Army of FROLINAT and is loyal to the
F.A.P.
4. Chad Armed Forces (F.A.T.) led by General Wadal
Abdelkader Kamougue. Remains of former C.&M.
army from the south.
5. Front d'Action Commune Provisoire (F.A.C.P.) led
by Mahamat Abba Seid.
6. Conseil Democratique de la Revolution (C.P.R.)
led by Acyl Ahmat and allied with (F.A.C.P.).
7. FROLINAT First Army or Volcan Force led by
Abdoulaye Adoum Dana.
8. FROLINAT Original led by Abba Siddik based in
Algiers .
9. FROLINAT Fondamental led by Hadjaro Senoussi.
10. FROLINAT Third Army or Mouvement pour la Liberation
du Tchad (MPLT) led byAboubakar Abdellrahaman.
These forces were almost wiped out by Goukouni.
11. Union National Democratique (U.N.D.) led by Facho
Balam and suppofted mainly by southern professionals
It should be clear that these eleven factions do not
at all have the same political and military power.
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"Chad: A Complaint to United Nations Council,"
African Recorder 22:19 (September 10-23, 1983), p. 6279.
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Actually, the most powerful groups in the conflict seem to
be Goukouni's GUNT and Habre's FAN. But since 1979 all
eleven factions have been involved in both political and
O Q
military actions. The question that may be asked here
is, "What is the motive behind so many factions struggling
for power in Chad?" The fundamental reason for this, is
that when France colonized the area, they imposed their
advanced capitalist .system on the Chadians. We are all
familiar that this system calls for accumulation of wealth
and exploitation by few ruling elites at the expense of the
majority of the people. It is to grasp the center of power
which is equated with wealth that gives rise to so many
competing factions in the Chadian conflict; for -they feel
that if they can gain power, they will be able to enrich
themselves and enjoy those privileges which were enjoyed
by the colonialists. It is our contention that none of
these factions is really committed to a change in political,
economic, and social conditions of the people in Chad. For
instance, after his forces first conquered the northern
government stronghold of Faya-Largeau in June, 1983,
Goukouni stated categorically that, "He had no ambition
to become President again;" according to him, "All I want
89
is to destroy Habre."
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"Chad: The A to Z of Factionalism," Africa Confidential
20:23 (November 14, 1979), p. 4.
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It should be spelt out here that Goukouni's rise to
power on 23 March 1979 did not usher in peace and stability
but merely reversed the role of the former combatants. With
Ndjamena in Muslim hands, the Sara South - the stubborn
periphery - became the center of resistance. The bloody
confrontations between elements of the victorious liberation
forces during Goukouni's regime underscored the utter lack
of unity and discipline of the condition that had emerged
victorious, providing a dramatic contrast with the calm
and remarkable cohesiveness of the defeated south.
Ideological Differences Among the Different Factions in the
Conf1ict
Habre and Goukouni are Moslems from the nor-th and
former allies in the long civil war against rule by non-
Moslems from the southern part of Chad, but they are now
9 0
fighting each other in a bitter civil war. This is one
of the reasons we said earlier that religion, ethnicity,
and factionalism are not the root causes of the Chadian
conflict.
Habre and Goukouni are fighting in order to maintain
the status quo - the present capitalist system in which
few people dominate, manipulate and exploit the masses.
Their ideology therefore, is capitalist ideology that calls
for accumulation of wealth of the society by a few
90
"The War in Chad: Personal Conflict Draws Foreign
Intervention," Africa Report (September-October 1983),
pp. 7-8.
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individuals at the expense of the total population in a
given society. Their ideology is not an ideology which is
committed to a change in social, political and economic
institutions in Chad which will alleviate the sufferings
of the masses of people in the country.
Even though at present, Goukouni Oueddei is receiving
military and economic support from Libya, this does not
mean that Goukouni is really committed to a change in
91
Chad. We mean a commitment to a revolution that will
alleviate the sufferings of Chadian people, and set the
Chadian economy free from French imperialism and neo
colonialism. To support this contention, in 1980 Libya
was supporting Goukouni when the survival of his government
was threatened by Habre. Gaddafy's troops occupied the
country from December 1980 until November 1981, keeping
Habre's forces out of Ndjamena. But Goukouni remained
suspicious of Gaddafy, and he turned to France for military
and economic assistance in 1981. The French readily agreed
to help Goukouni, on the sole condition that he ask the
Libyans to leave Chad. With the promise of French aid
behind him, Goukouni asked Gaddafy to coordinate the Libyan
withdrawal with the arrival of an OAU peace-keeping force.
This suggests that Goukouni has no intention of turning his
regime to the left.
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Habre on the other hand, is receiving military and
92
economic assistance from France and the United States.
The implications for this is well known, for if Habre
succeeds, the Chadian economy will be tied to that of the
center - France and remains a puppet regime to the United
States. This, of course, means a continous exploitation,
subjugation, and subordination of the Chadian economy.
Presently, the ,seat of government in Chad is occupied
by Hissene Habre who formed the government on September 29,
1982.
It is, our belief, therefore that a people's revolution
has never occurred in Chad; it may be in the future, but not
in the era of Goukouni or Habre who are fighting- to maintain
the neo-colonial dependent state in Chad in order to continue
with the pattern of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation.
In other words, their ideology is capitalist ideology which
neglects the interests of the masses to cater for the
interests of the ruling class.
Let us proceed to discuss foreign intervention in the
Chadian conflict.
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CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT
In this chapter, we will [discuss and] analyze some of
the objectives that motivate foreign countries to intervene
in the internal affairs of African nations particularly in
the Chadian conflict. We will examine French intervention,
Nigerian intervention, Egyptian intervention, Sudanese
intervention and Zairean intervention in the Republic of Chad
The contemporary world system is characterized by
superordinate/subordinate interdependency of nations which
gives rise to inequity and crisis. Consequently, inter-
ventionism has become the principal instrument for maintain
ing the system by those who profit from it, while those who
are subordinate to it make efforts simultaneously to create
a more equitable system.
Recognizing the impact of interventionism on this socio-
economic and political conditions of the target areas, the
General Assembly of the United Nations in its December 21,
1965, adoption of a "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection
*Hans J. Morganthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene,"
in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., At Issue: Politics in the World
Arena (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 64-67.
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of the Independence and Sovereignty," which stipulated that:
(i) No State has the right to intervene
directly or indirectly for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any State. Consequently, armed
intervention or other forms of interference
or attempted threats against the personality
of the State or against its political,
economic, and cultural elements, are
condemned; and
(ii) No State may use or encourage the use of
economic, political, or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order
obtain subordination of the exercise of
its Sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also, no State
shall organize, assist, forment, finance,
incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist
or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the regime of another
State.2
Despite the stipulation by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, the United States, between 1945 to the present
intervened 230 times in the internal and external affairs of
several nations, virtually all interventions were in the
southern areas of the world. France also intervened eighty
times in Africa from 1954 to 1983; presently, France has
18,255 troops distributed over twenty-four countries in
Africa and another 35,200 in metropolitan France.
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, December 21,
1965, Document A/5974, No. 2131 (XX).
3
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without
War (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1978), p. 23.
Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Africa," The
Yearbook of World Affairs 1980 (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1980); and Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International
Intervention in Africa," in Colin Legum, et al., Africa in the
80s: A Continent in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1979).
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In a somewhat theoretically refined account confined to
African and foreign interventionism, Legum seeks to explain
the causes of external intervention in Africa. He identified
three major parties as being involved in the foreign inter
vention in Africa: (a) African nations, (b) foreign powers,
and (c) the OAU. He attributes foreign intervention in
Africa to the dynamics of internal structure and the
situations in that region as a whole. He perceives the
African continent as being made up of "fifty odd African
countries" with each being dispossessed of homogeneity that
would facilitate conflict free national integration; there
fore virtually no nation-states yet exist in Africa. Legum
regards Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Somalia as -the African
countries having the requirements of nation-state because
these countries are homogeneous culturally.
Legum proceeds to argue that foreign intervention in
Africa is determined by African internal conditions. He
examines the OAU, and some responses of African leaders.
1979). Both works are complementary to one another. The
last citation was devoted virtually to politics of
irrede'ntism and border disputes largely discussed in the
light of OAU1s response from the perspective of its Charter
on border disputes as well as the organization's weakenesses
We review both simultaneously with appropriate footnote
citations as to which one is referred to.
Robin Luckham, "French Militarism in Africa," Review
of African Political Economy 24 (May-August 1982), pp. 55-82
Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International
Intervention," p. 23.
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The participation of the OAU in African conflicts and in
prevention of foreign intervention in Africa were described
as powerless due to the lack of central authority, which is
characteristic of all international organizations. Conse
quently, it became impossible to muster a strong majority
that would take an interventionary action on behalf of any
member against "foreign meddling." It seems that the
penetration of the ©rganization by former colonial powers
through client-state members and the manipulative tendencies
of the Western powers are the central problem rather than
Legum's diagnosis of the problem. Secondly, Legum argues
that OAU's principles of "non-interference" in each other's
domestic affairs, and the automatic recognition -of colonial
borders at independence, deprived the organization of any
effective role as mediator. As a result, the exiting
governments are supported against secessionist politics of
irredentism, "expansionist nationalism" and the like.
The responses from African leaders are of two groups.
The first group, represented by President Nyerere, holds
that there is a tendency for an African nation to call in
foreign troops when its sovereignty is threatened. But
foreign response is determined by what the interventionist
powers perceived to be gained. Moreover, the intervenors
are prepared to exacerbate conflicts beyond initial and
normal proportions if only by doing so their interests could
be served. Nyerere sees contemporary intervention as a
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great danger to African freedom from the Euro-American world,
which still regards Africa as its sphere of influence and
acts accordingly. Nyerere concludes:
We reject the right of Western European
countries to dominate Africa, just as much
as we would reject attempts by Eastern
bloc countries to dominate Africa. In
particular, we want to be clear that
Tanzania resents the arrogance and the
contempt of those who purport to set up a
Pan-African Security Force, or an African
Peace Force, on'behalf of Africa (in
apparent reference to French proposals for
an inter-African force). Either Africa
will do that for itself, or there will be
no Pan-African Force defending the freedom
of Africa, only something calling itself
by foreign domination of this continent.
The second group is represented by the former Senegalese
President, Leopold Sedar Senghor. Senghor regarded inter
vention in the continent as a product of communist expansion
ism which aids local rebellions and insurgents. He sought a
solution by calling on the Western bloc to adequately arm
African nations if they did not want to see the continent
o
fall to communist domination.
French Intervention in Chad
According to the French Constitution of 1793, Article
119, the French people "do not interfere in the domestic
affairs of other nations and will not tolerate inteference
Statement made in Dar es Salaam on June 8, 1978, quoted
by Africa Current 12/13 and reproduced by Colin Legum,
"Foreign Intervention in Africa," p. 79.
Newsweek (June 9, 1978). Cited by Colin Legum,
"Foreign Intervention in Africa," p. 79.
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9
by other nations in their affairs." Yet, history has
recorded nearly six centuries of French intervention in
Africa. It was first an intervention to obtain slaves,
followed by formal colonialism, and at present institutional
ized with the establishment of force d'intervention for the
continent.
In the Chadian case, three objective determinants of
intervention could be put forwards economic, strategic, and
diplomatic/psychological objectives of stabilizing power in
Africa are met through France being the decisive force in
directing and determining the outcome of situations in Chad.
There are French missionaries, technicians, teachers, and
troops supposedly performing duties of the "civilizing
mission" which fulfills the psychosis of being a better
people, which cements the French national image. A French
official communique on the situation in Chad shows the
diplomatic component of its relation with Chad. It said
in part, "Our view is that we give Chad its independence in
1962 and we did everything we could to preserve the country's
territorial unity and integrity within the principle of
national sovereignty."
The economic component is also significant in that,
as we mentioned in Chapter Three, Chad continues to import
9
Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene,"
p. 61.
10French Embassy, "The Situation in Chad," 81:2
(February 1981), p. 3.
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most of its need from France. Thirty-nine percent of its
total imports in 1979 came from France, giving France the
first place among exporters to Chad. Foreign investment in
Chad is dominated by France.
The strategic interventionary objective is also
significant in relation to interventionary bases in West and
Central African nations and important in the event of another
attack from her European counterparts as was the case in
World War II. The combined army base and air base outside
Ndjamena has served as France's major military installation
in Central Africa. The bases in Chad are viably keyed to
interventionary activities to support pro-French regimes in
West and Central Africa. Viewing the continued crises in
Chad, French strategists perceive it "an affront on an
African scale" with all the strategic repercussions that this
might have in Niger, Mali, Togo, and Senegal, to name only
13
these countries.
The major French acquisitive intervention in Chad took
place in 1981 by military attack mainly on the northern part
of the country and France thereafter established its rule.
However, it was the war of April 22, 1900, that finally
U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for Africa
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980),
p. 10.
Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad




brought the entire country under the French rule. In area
and population, A,960 square miles and four million persons
respectively, Chad is the largest country of former French
14
Equatorial Africa.
Chad presents a case of prolonged French interventions
in Africa. Since independence Chad has been racked with
unprecedented internal struggles for political power by
various nationalist groups and made indecisive by equally
numerous French and other interventions. Because of the
economic, strategic, and diplomatic objectives of France
in Chad, French interventions were carried out to restore
order in such a way that those objectives are not jeopardized
by supporting the faction prone to serving the French
interests. Between 1960 and 1983, France intervened thirteen
times in major crises. These thirteen cases are the ones
in which direct intervention of France was thought to be
necessary notwithstanding the routine stationing of French
troops in Chad to bolster the prestige and control of the
favored regime. Despite the incessant eruption of crises,
French troops have been maintained one way or the other and
bases have been maintained. However, numbers of troops are
withdrawn, increased or reduced according to crisis demand.
1A
Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad (Metuchen,
N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1977),p. 78.
15Ibid., p. 64.
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Let us now proceed with a discussion of the process and
detail of interventions. At independence in 1960, Tombalbaye
became the first pro-French Chadian president and remained so
until his death following the military coup d'etat of April
1975. During Tombalbaye's rule, French interventions were
decisive in saving Tombalbaye's regime. Between 1960-67, a
number of rebellions against Tombalbaye's government was
registered. They were decisively crushed with French inter-
ventionary forces. In 1968, rebellions in various locations
in the northern side of the country broke out but were
brought under control by the use of French troops. The
situation worsened in 1969 when armed rebellions erupted in
the east-central part of the country with Toubon' nomads
getting out of control. Tombalbaye called in an estimated
1,600 French troops, who subsequently crushed the rebellion.16
French troops continued to fight rebels in northern Chad for
most part of 1970. The rebels, numbering 2,000 when they
regrouped in June, 1970, were equipped with modern weapons.
The most serious of the numerous clashes between Toubon
rebels and French troops took place near Largeau on October
11, 1970. In an ambush by Toubon rebels, eleven French
For details on rebellions and situations in Chad, see
Benard Lamne, "Recent History," in Europa, Africa South of
the Sahara (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1981),
pp. 285-291; "Chad - A Civil War Continues," Clements Inter
national Report (May 1980), pp. 4-5; West Africa (August ~3TT
1968), p. 1030.
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parachutists were killed and ten others wounded. A week later
Tombalbaye announced on Chad radio that 2,000 rebels equipped
with modern weapons had been located in northern Chad and
went on to say, "thanks to foreign intervention," in an
apparent reference to French forces.
Franco-Tombalbaye relations began to sour when Tombalbaye,
influenced by Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, took initiatives that
were inimical to French objectives. First, was the policy
of "Cultural Africanization," or "Authenticity," which was
nothing more than symbolic, but nevertheless African in
18
origin. Furthermore, it was a challenge that shook the
whole fabric of the French cultural control mechanism in Chad,
and called into question the validity of the civilizing
mission. The "Cultural Africanization" aimed at living in
accordance with the African cultural heritage. In Chad, it
became official with the formation of Mouvement Nationale
pour la Revolution Culturelle et Societe (MNRCS), which
superseded the ruling government party, Parti Progressise
Tchadien (PPT). Tombalbaye changed his civilizing colonial
name of Francois to Ngarta and orderd the renunciation of
all Christian names throughout the country. African
ritualism was reintroduced mainly in the south and among
17
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the civil servants. Fort Lamy became Ndjamena, and streets
with colonial names were changed to African names. A group
of thirty American Baptist missionaries were expelled from
the country on charges of opposition to and subversion of
1 9
"Cultural Africanization" policy. As a result of cultural
Africanization, the MNRCS executive did not allow Chad to be
represented at the Paris Conference of French-speaking
African countries, which took place on November 13, 11973.
The relations between the Chadian regime and France
became increasingly strained as Tombalbaye repeatedly
criticized the SDECE Chief, M. Jacques Foccart, also former
French Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs,
and accused him of interference in Chadian domestic affairs.
Specific charges were (a) an attempt by an agent of Foccart
to gain the ear of General Felix Malloum, the former C-in-C
of the army then under house arrest for subversive activities;
(b) an accusation of Foccart of having been active for
thirteen years in preparing "fourteen plots against the
security and welfare of the people," and (c) on September 24,
1973, the Chad radio accused President Pompidou of allegedly
planning an armed intervention in order to replace President
Tombalbaye's government by one "entirely devoted to himself"
(i.e. to the French President). How accurate these charges
19





are was confirmed two years later when Tombalbaye was
replaced by Malloum following a military coup d'etat.
While relations between Chad and France were strained,
relations between Chad and Libya were bolstered by an
exchange of visits to Tripoli in December 1972, he condemned
"Zionist expansionism" and reaffirmed support for the rights
of the Palestinian people. The Libyan government was said
to have undertaken to contribute to the strengthening of the
unity of Chad by denying a refuge place to FROLINAT rebels.
A grant of 23,000 million francs in development credits was
21
said to have been made to Chad. Gaddafy returned the visit
to Chad on March 5-6, 1974, and reiterated "friendship which
unites the Arab countries with the whole of Africa."
Tombalbaye also sought to diversify his country's dependence
on foreign powers. Following the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China in November
1972, two technical aid agreements were signed in May 1973,
providing for a Chinese loan of 11,250 million francs to
22
Chad. The first group of ten Chinese rice growing experts
also arrived in Chad in November 1973. Tombalbaye tried to
remove Chad from the French monetary zone. He described





of colonialism and decided to leave the organization.
In the face of these developments, France began to shop
for a replacement. Internal and external developments
combined to heighten France's concern. The Euro-American
captialist world press presented the policy of Cultural
Africanization in a horrifying manner particularly through
missionaries whose converts had been told to go back to
24
their original practice of an African ritual called udo.
This was seen as reintroduction of customary African practices
to "frighten his potential opponents." Several summary
executions were alleged to have been made of those who
refused to take part in the rituals. Having mobilized world
opinion against Tombalbaye's regime in this manner, a new
pro-French regime led by General Felix Malloum, who had been
earlier implicated in President Pompidou's alleged plan to
overthrow Tombalbaye in 1973, was installed on April 13, 1975,
after a bloody coup d'etat that claimed Tombalbaye's life.
One notes that Euro-American capitalist world press opinion
served to accelerate intervention to displace the undesirable
African regimes. This point should not be overemphasized,
but it exhibited the same pattern in the preliminary cases
23Ibid., p. 26456.
24
See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in




of the overthrow of Idi Amin of Uganda and Bokassa of the
Central African Republic.
The first major armed opposition during Tombalbaye's
27
regime was FRONLINAT, which' sought the 'overthrow
of the Tombalbaye regime. Abba Sidick, the first leaderf
of FROLINAT, at its inception, said that his organization
was not seeking secession from Chad but fighting to "give
a content to Chad's »independence" by establishing a govern-
2 8
merit which could not "leave the real power to France."
By the time of Malloum's assumption of power, FROLINAT had
broken into more than eight factions fighting one another
or fighting the French-backed government of Felix Malloum.
There are eleven major factions in Chad as we mentioned
earlier fighting to gain the control of the government..
The faction led by Hissene Habre is currently in control of
29
the government.
Shortly after Malloum took office, two French archaeolo
gists Mme • Claustre and her husband M. Pierre Claustre were
captured by Habre's faction of FROLINAT. The French sought
to deal directly with the rebels and pushed aside the
See "French Intervention in Central African Empire,"
Africa Confidential 18 (October-December 1976), pp. 8-10.
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Malloum government. Malloum protested the move and asked
3 0
for the withdrawal of French troops, which never materialized.
In 1976, Malloum's regime signed a new military aid
agreement with France to bolster his defense against the
rebels. As the fight continued, France became more and more
involved on the side of Malloum. In major fighting, French
military intervention prevented the takeover of Quininang
Kebir, a town of about 7,000 people, by the rebels in July,
1977. Late in January, 1978 Malloum's forces and French
pilots engaged a FROLINAT offensive drive around Faya-
Largeau. Three French pilots and two chad NCOs were killed
when their DC-3 aircraft was shot down by FROLINAT rebels.
In March, 1978, 1,000 French troops were airlifted to Chad,
according to French radio, "to block the rebel drive on the
capital." It was supplemented in April by another 150 extra
soldiers to "ensure the safety of French nationals," but
whose mission was to train the Chad army. On March 7, 1979,
northern rebels launched an attack on Abeche but were repulsed
by a joint Franco-FAN force. Another battle broke out on
February 10, 1979, between Malloum and Habre supporters for
a general strike. The government troops who intervened in
the ensuing scuffle were attacked in turn by Habre's forces.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in Chad,
p. 32.
31
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Earlier, disagreement over the release of FROLINAT rebels
from prisons has strained the relationship between Malloum
and Habre.
The presence of French troops, even though they did not
take part in the fight, prevented taking over the government
which Malloum temporarily abdicated to Lt. Col. Abdelkadar
Kamougue when the fight broke out while Malloum sought
protection under Fr-ench forces in their military bases in
Chad.32
The protracted unrest in Chad became a concern for its
neighboring countries, particularly the flow of refugees to
those areas from Chad. It led to several unsuccessful
attempts to unite various factions in Chad.33 On January 22,
1978, an agreement was signed between the Malloum government
and FROLINAT in Khartoum, under the auspices of the Sudanese
government, for the creation of a government of national
union of Chad comprising all contending factions. This
agreement also covered a cessation of hostilities, the
establishment of a constitutional assembly and a general
assembly for political detainees, mutineers, and Chadians in
exile. On February 5, Malloum freed political prisoners and




^^^ See Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Chad,
For a brief discussion on various mediation parties
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by April 5. The efforts failed. On February 15, 1978,
FROLINAT factions reported their capture of Fada, and the
fall of Faya-Largeau on February 18. Subsequent quadri
partite efforts involving Libya, Sudan, Niger and Chad in
another agreement of March 28, 1978, for cessation of
hostilities also failed. The failure of these efforts led
to another conference in Kano in March 11, 1979, in which
some Chad factions signed a new agreement. The agreement
was to take effect on March 23, 1979. Known as the First
Kano Conference on National Reconciliation, the provision
of the peace accord called for a general ceasefire, the
establishment of a
transitional government of national union,
demilitarization of Ndjamena to a radius
of 100 kilometres, general amnesty for
political prisoners, release of prisoners
of war, dissolution of all political
organizations and the gradual integration
of all military factions into the National
Army.35
We will elaborate more on the conferences in the next chapter
Prior to his resignation on March 23, 1979, President
Malloum announced the formation of a Provisional State
Council and named Goukouni Oueddei its leader, who there
upon became d_£ facto head of state. Like previous efforts,
34
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Bulletin 16:5 (May 7, 1979), pp. 23-25.
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it disintegrated but this time on the grounds that other
rebels were not represented in the Kano after three months.
On October 9, 1979, armies of the four rebel groups (FAT,
FAN, FAP, and MPLT) made an orderly withdrawal from the
capital but only to nearby villages in violation of the
required 100 kilometres radius demilitarization of the
capital. The Lagos agreement called for the withdrawal
of French troops, having noted that "the continued presence
of French soldiers is an impediment to a lasting solution
37
of the problems in the country." The African peace
keeping force which was supposed to have been in Chad failed.
In desperation, Goukouni Oueddei asked France to suspend the
withdrawal of its troops until an African peace-keeping
force arrived. Fighting has since continued largely between
Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre.
In the fighting which broke out after the Lagos
Conference, Goukouni called in Libyan troops which decisively
defeated the major rival force of Habre in December, 1980.
Libya's influence and plan for a merger with Chad gave rise
to condemnation by France and its allies and their demand
for the explusion of Libyan troops from Chad. The former
Kessing's Contemporary Archives (November 22, 1979),
p. 26819.
37
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French Prime Minister, Pierre Mesmer described the Libyan's
influence in Chad as the "worst setback for France in Africa
for twenty years." On taking over the French government in
May 1981, Mitterrand took action to correct the "setback"
39
by having Oueddei expel Libyan troops from Chad. This
was accomplished by giving Goukouni Oueddei's forces
logistical support, weapons, and functional bureaucratic
economic assistance,* and the mobilization of African countries
40
in the deployment of interventionary forces in Chad.
Questions have been directed to the French government
by newspapers and researchers as to the reasons for its
intervention in Chad. There are two major answers given.
First, they refer to the military agreements as the basis for
intervention. According to a French official communique of
January 8, 1981, these interventions were made at the request
of the appropriate authorities for specific security
objectives under the terms of agreements signed with the
41
Chadian government. They also refer to a ceasefire
agreement signed between the Malloum government and FROLINAT
on March 27, 1978, as the basis for continuation of inter-
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vention in the face of the ceasefire agreement violation.
This legalistic argument is to justify French intervention
in pursuance of its vested interests in Chad. The second
answer applicable to Africa as a whole is in conformity with
the objective explanation we have been discussing. In line
with some other official French statements, the former French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis de Guiringuad, said in
answer to a televised interview that:
Africa's raw materials have to reach the
world market, after all, and when tensions
persist in a region, when there is in
security, it is a fact that economic
development is retarded. That, by the way,
is the main reason we are criitcal of the
attitude of the Soviet Union and Cuba.
France's interests in Chad continue to be served in the
chaotic situation by putting the faction prone to serving
French interests in power; France has followed it up by
efforts to restore a stable atmosphere conducive to the
realization of those interests. The support faction is,
however, retained or replaced according to performance in
office in prompting French interests. The Tombalbaye regime
was immediately faced with a removal threat when he started
to kick against French ways. Likewise, Malloum's failure to
42
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enforce order led to a studied silence over his fall from
power and his replacement by a new pro-French convert regime
of Goukouni Oueddei who had his original support base in
Libya.44
The continued success of French interventions.may be
explained by wide inequality between the leaderships and the
masses in the country and foreign backed repression. Most
important, having no. governing national ideology and
philosophy based on their own historical experience, the
leadership adopts a colonial agenda, an agenda under which
the Chadian people have been exploited for centuries back.
The leadership is concerned with entrenching itself in the
positions of privilege rather than working for a change that
will liberate the entire population from continued French
intervention.
In the present fighting between Goukouni and Hissene
Habre, France is intervening by supporting Hissene Habre
with anti-aircraft weapons, crack French paratroops and
other military weapons to defend Habre's regime which is a
puppet regime of France.45 Apart from a continuing airlift
of arms and other military equipment, the French government
of July 8, dispatched up to one thousand troops to Chad which
44,..
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helped President Habre' s forces to recapture Faya-Largeau
for Goukouni's rebel forces on July 30, 1983.
On August 13, 1983, the French dispatched another unit
of about 480 French paratroopers to be flown to the key
town of Abeche which is further south. The total number of
French troops in Chad at present is estimated to be 2,000.
Some of these troops are marines who wear a badge describing
48
themselves as instructors. However, like those at Abeche,
they are frontline combat troops who are fighting side by
side vith the Chadian soldiers loyal to President Hissene
Habre.
U.S. Intervention in Chad
Three main objective determinants of U.S. intervention
in Chad could be put forward: containment of Colonel
Gaddafy's regime, economic and strategic. The containment
of Colonel Gaddafy's regime is the most important determinant
of U.S. intervention in Chad. This is true because for most
of the history of Chad, the U.S. attitude was "so what,"
said an American diplomat. "Its;only when Gaddafy got more
4 9
involved that we changed that attitude."
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Under the Carter Administration, the United States
rejected the idea of directly supplying Chad with World
War II bombers and made it known that American advisors
50
would not be sent to Chad to train soldiers in any capacity.
When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981,
one of its earliest foreign policy decisions was to reverse
the Carter Administration's policy of accommodation and
dialogue with the Libyan leader. U.S. officials at that time
described orders from the top to develop a broad strategy,
including overt intelligence operations to contain Colonel
Gaddafy militarily and isolate him politically. To the
Reagan Administration, Colonel Gaddafy was, as one State
Department official put it, "the most dangerous man in the
world."51
The U.S. opposition to Libya's Muammar Gaddafy dates
from his seizure of power in 1969 when Gaddafy proclaimed
that Libya would become a socialist country. It should be
noted, however, that the U.S. foreign policy since World
War II has always aimed at destablizing any of the Third
World countries that have opted out of capitalist democracy
to choose the socialist path to economic and political
"Chad: Great Power Rivalry," Africa Confidential
19:1 (June 6, 1978), p. 5.
"Conflict in Africa: Chad War May Enter a More
Perilous Phase as a Key Town is Lost," The Wall Street
Journal .202:3'(August 12, 1983), pp. 1-9.
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development. Whenever any Third World country, proclaimed -
socialist path to development, the U.S. always intervenes
by imposing sanctions, and even militarily'in order to in
stall a puppet regime in that country that would represent
the U.S. interests. The recent case of military inter-
52
vention in Grenada demonstrates the U.S. stubbornness to
impose its so-called democracy to the developing countries
of the Third World. * Of course, this points to the dangers
of neo-colonialism and imperialism.
The United States has had one criterion of allegiance
throughout the entire history of Chadian conflict. American
support has gone to forces opposed to Libya. Although the
Reagan Administration favored Habre, it resumed diplomatic
relations with Goukouni immediately after he expelled the
Libyans in late 1981. The Americans subsidized the OAU
peace-keeping force, which replaced Gaddafy's troops.53
American worries about Libyan subversion in Africa
increased in October 1981, when Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat was killed, and Sudan seemed on the verge of a
Libyan backed coup." The U.S. initially focused its
anti-Gaddafy effort on Sudan, providing a broad program of
52
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military, economic and intelligence assistance. It should
be pointed out that the United States has no interests in
Chad itself, but the Reagan Administration does fear that
if Gaddafy installed a socialist regime in Chad, he would
use the country as a springboard to destabilize America's
regional allies, particularly Sudan and Egypt.
The Reagan Administration has conceded that Chad is
of little economic o»r geopolitical significance, and it is
clear that the U.S. policy is directed against Gaddafy
rather than toward Chad. At the onset, the Reagan Admini
stration felt that France the former colonial power in
Chad should play the most active role in preventing Habre
from being overthrown. But when they realized that Libya
was getting more involved in the conflict, the Reagan
Administration changed its rules and intervened fully in
the conflict. Ronald Reagan denounced Gaddafy's empire
building and offered U.S. aid and intelligence to Chad.
It condemned Libya on August 8, 1983, or "open aggression"
in bombing the strategic town of Faya-Largeau. The State
Department in an unusually strong statement, called for an
immediate withdrawal of Libyan military forces from the
57
former French colony.
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To countervene the Libyan's intervention, the United
States pledged $10 million in aid and supplies to Chad's
5 8
government in its war against the rebels. The U.S.
military transports were also dispatched to Ndjamena with the
first consignment of military aid to the Habre government in
order to crush Libyan backed forces of Goukouni Oueddei.
The U.S. airborne surveillance planes were also dispatched
to Egypt, apparently"to observe Libyan war plane activity.
With Habre now facing a crushing defeat, the U.S. had decided
to intervene by sending weapons and a handful of advisors to
Chad and AWACs radar surveillance planes to neighboring
Sudan in order for Sudan to help Habre in his struggle to
59
maintain power in Chad.
To show annoyance over Libya's intervention in Chad,
the Reagan Administration also sent Habre thirty heat-seeking,
shoulder-fire Redeye anti-aircraft missiles for use against
Libyan warplanes, as well as other emergency military equip
ment, such as jeeps and radios, for use against Libyan
backed forces. Three U.S. Army Sargeants were also flown to
Chad to show Habre's men how to use the Redeyes.
8"Chad: The U.S. Role," Africa Recorder 21: 16
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The economic determinant of intervention is also signi
ficant in that American economic links have expanded in Chad
through the presence of three oil companies: Exxon, Conoco,
and Chevron, which laid out U.S. $25 million for exploration
since Goukouni became the President, and it has continued
under the present regime of Hissene Habre. The results of
their exploration have been positive and in the near future
Chad will apparently*produce enough oil to become an exporter,
In addition, uranium deposits are said to have been found in
Chad: that will certainly fortify American interests in
political stability under a pro-Western government. More
over, in the present Chadian conflict, the U.S. is benefiting
economically by selling her military weapons to Habre's
government.
The strategic determinant is also important because the
U.S. administration having identified Libya under Gaddafy as
the major threat to the region's stability, saw Libyan inter
vention as evidence of a concerted Soviet inspired push into
central Africa which would outflank strong U.S. friends there
and destabilize the region. Libya's regime is considered
to be a support of terrorism, with its support for the
rejectionist front states in the Middle East, and apparent
support for terrorist movements. It followed then, that the
"Chad: Great Power Rivalry," p. 5.
See Europa, Africa South of the Sahara, pp. 491-493.
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U.S would inevitably support opponents of Libya such as
Hissene Habre, even if this ran counter to the proclaimed
policy of the OAU.
The Reagan Adminstration also fears that with Sadat,
Sudan's self-proclaimed 'defender' gone, Libya which has
not concealed its dislike of the government in Khartoum,
partly because of its pro-U.S. stand, might feel free to do
anything with President Nimeiri. The U.S. supported the
creation of the African Peace Force because it thwarted
Libya's design for a merger with Chad that would have
provided Colonel Gaddafy with a base foor wider African
activities.
Libyan Intervention in Chad
Any assessment of the impact of Libyan intervention in
Chad must take into account the intangibility of Libya's
objectives. Although King Idriss and Colonel Gaddafy differed
as to the methods they used and the intensity with which they
pursued their clearcut goals, both gave priority to the
promotion of Arabism and Islam in Central Africa, and only
second place to the acquisition of such mineral resources as
might lie beneath the BET's rugged surface.64 Certainly
Libya's help in financing the building of great mosques and
and institutions of Islamic learning in Chad promoted its
63
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prime objectives, but in such construction Libya had to share
the credit with other Arab contributors to the same ends,
they included Saudi Arabia, and the conservative Gulf States.
In Gaddafy's view, it was essential to control northern
Chad in order to protect its Muslim population from their
continued domination by the southern Christians. Ready to
hand was the FROLINAT which, when Gaddafy came to power in
Tripoli, had been struggling for five years against the
Tombalbaye regime and was eager for the help Gaddafy could
and did readily give. Gaddafy's seems to be getting away with
his clandestine takeover of the Aozou Strip until 1975, when
the military coup d'etat at Ndjamena required him to alter
his strategy. Such a change had also been made* essential
by the military and propaganda successes being scored against
Libya as well as CSM regime by the FAN Commander, Hissene
Habre. Since that time, Gaddafy has been vainly searching
for ideal Chadian Trojan horse that would hasten Chad's
disintegration and facilitate the spread of Libyan influence
f\ ft
throughout the whole country.
What role, if any, the Libyan colony in Chad plays in
65Ibid., pp. 86-91.
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Gaddafy's overall plan for penetrating Chad is not clear,
for adequate current data are lacking.
Libya's interest and intervention in Chad has many
historical roots, some of them going hundreds of years back
into history of contact between Tripoli and the desert of
69
deserts down south.
On June 15, 1980 a treaty of friendship and cooperation
was signed in TripoM between Libya and a representative of
former President Goukouni, without the prior consent of the
GUNT. Article 7 of the treaty permitted Libya to intervene
should the. internal security of Chad be threatened. The
FAN offensive of October 7, 1980 brought in its wake direct
interventionon the part of Libya. During October, Libyan
aircraft bombed Faya and Ndjamena. Helicopters transported
between 1,500 and 2,000 FAT troops into Ndjamena, and tanks,
guns, mortars, helicopters and aircraft were driven in large
numbers across the desert. Three Libyan regiments and an
Islamic A,500 to 5,000 men took part in the hostilities.
On December 10 Ati was taken and the man Ndjamena-Abeche
road was cut off. On December 15, 1980 after an intensive
five days of shelling, the FAN evacuated Ndjamena. Some
69Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
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of them took refuge in Cameroun; the veterans among them
however, regained the eastern region around Biltine, where
they reoccupied the Aramkole Massif which had been their
stronghold in 1976-78.72 On December 21, 1980, Abeche was
in turn evacuated. Habre had lost the battle and, in
military terms, no longer constituted a threat to the
GUNT even though both Sudan and Egypt had clearly demon
strated their intension to support him.
Following the fall of Ndjamena, the atmosphere in the
capital by then became, increasingly relaxed despite frequent
pillaging. On December 24, 1980, at an inter-African
conference in Lagos, Nigeria proposed and accepted a motion
in support of the GUNT and allowing for elections to take
place in 1982.73
The situation was again placed in the balance when
Goukouni signed an agreement in Tripoli on January 6, 1981,
74
paving the way for a gradual merger of Chad and Libya.
Certain sections of the accord authorized the permanent
intervention of Libya in Chadian affairs. The GUNT did,
however, publish a statement on January 12, following a
stormy ministerial meeting, according to which the Tripoli
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agreement constituted nothing more than a declaration of
intent, and stating that no merger could take place without
the formal consent of the two peoples. The consequences
of the merger agreement were, however, crucial, both
nationally and internationally.
Within Chad, President Goukouni's authority was jeo
pardized by his successive changes of policy. For no
Chadian whether Musl'im or otherwise, could consent to the
absorption of his country by Libya, and the south, represented
by the FAT, had not been consulted concerning, the merger.
The Libyans had under their direct command all of northern
Chad, divided between the various FROLINAT factions. Libya's
grip on the capital prevented the reopening of air, postal
and radio communications with the outside world.
Libyan intervention in Chad could be explained in terms
of economics. Minerals, possibly uranium, in the Auzou
Strip, annexed by Gaddafy, is an attraction. The possibility
of access to Sudan's western flanks to undermine President
Nimeiri's pro-Mubarak regime is another. The extension of
a Pan-Islamic radical belt stretching from Chad to Port
78
Sudan is the acme of Gaddafy's hopes.
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conflict in
Chad, p. 31.
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Libyan intervention in Chad is interpreted by many
African states as an attempt to spread socialise into Africa,
hence such countries as Nigeria, Zaire and many others have
openly condemned what they called Libya's imperialism in
Chad; but they have ignored the U.S. and French imperialism
79
which present a real threat to African development.
Nigerian Intervention
The Nigerian intervention in Chadian affairs indeed has
many historical roots. According to Anthony Hopkins, the
majortiy of Nigerians who reside in Borno State migrated
from Chad and settled in Nigeria. With Chadians have common
or similar language, common culture and are of Muslim
, . . 80
religion.
The position taken by the Nigerian government for
intervening in Chadian conflict is to find a peaceful
settlement of the civil war and to help in settling the
Chadian refugees who fled Ndjamena to Borno State in Nigeria
o -i
since the out break of the civil war. When Obasanjo
followed through on the ceasefire between the national army
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and Habre's FAN in March 1979 by proposing a conciliation
conference at Kano, his offer was accepted. Public opinion
in Chad and many African countries favored Nigeria over Libya
as a mediator, for the Lagos government was a relative new
comer to the Chadian scene and had never tried to annex any
part of the country.
The Nigerian government under the leadership of Obasanjo
organized a conference in Kano. Obasanjo's invitation to
five obscure Chadians to attend the Kano Conference as
delegates was the rock on which that conference floundered,
for his obvious intention was to infiltrate them into any
8 3
governing body that might emerge from the previous meetings.
Habre and Goukouni indignantly refused to sit at the same
negotiating table with men who they claimed, represented no
significant segment of the Chadian population and were
merely the spokesmen for self-interested foreign governments.
The perservance shown by Nigerian leaders in exerting
their influence on Chad's evolution is also to find a
solution that would ward off intervention by France or by
8 5
the Arab states.
In December 1980, an Emergency Summit Conference was also
8 2
"Chad: Civil War Continues," Africa Today 13:2
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sponsored by Nigerian government. These conferences and
summits will be thoroughly examined in the next chapter.
It is important to point out also that Nigeria was among
the three African countries that sent troops for the OAU's
86peace-keeping forces.
Another reason that may be advanced for Nigerian
intervention in Chad is the fears maintained by the Nigerian
government that Coldnel Gaddafy could possibly turn Chad into
a socialist state through the annexation which could even
tually spread to Nigeria being a neighboring country to Chad.
Egyptian Intervention in Chad
The Egyptian intervention in the Chadian Civil War is
not because the Egyptian government wants to help Chad to
settle their conflict amicably. The U.S. instigated Egypt
to intervene by supplying AWAC aircrafts and other military
weapons in order to contain Colonel Gaddafy's regime which
the United States accuses of representing Soviet interests
in Africa, aiding international terrorism and being a danger
8 7
to the stability of the region.
In 1982, the U.S. organized 'Bright Star 82* in Egypt
in which 4,000 U.S. troops took part in military manoeuvres
with Egyptian, Sudanese, and Somali soldiers. This military
Q C
E.G.H. Joffe, "The International Consequences of
the Civil War in Chad," p. 95.
William Ndege, "Zone of
News 124 (December 1981), p. 18.
87 Conflict in Chad," Africa
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exercise was, however, to pose a threat to Colonel Gaddafy's
regime. Egypt being pro-U.S. is being as an ideal base
from which the U.S. could launch a rearguard action against
the Soviet Union or Colonel Gaddafy's regime in Libya.
Egypt from Sadat to Mubarak has remained a puppet regime to
the United States hence Egyptian intervention is also U.S.
88
intervention.
Sudanese Intervention in Chad
Sudan is one of the countries that shares a common
border with Chad. The position maintained by the Sudanese
government for intervening in Chadian conflict is to grant
89
shelter to political refugees from Chad. Chadian rebels
have used Sudan both as a place of refuge and as a base from
which to attack their country's military strongholds in
90
eastern Chad. The attitude of the strongly Islamic local
officials in Darfur, where many Chadians lived, was markedly
more favorable to the FROLINAT than was that of the central
authorities. Relations between the government of Ndjamena
and Khartoum improved in 1969 when Nimeiri came to power in
Sudan, both because he persuaded Tombalbaye that he was not
aiding the FROLINAT and because he came to terms with his
"U.S. Intervention in Chad," p. 37.
Q Q




own rebels, who no longer tried to escape across the frontier
91
into Chad.
For many years, Chadian immigrants have been attracted
to the route to Mecca by way of Sudan, the Islamic schools
of Cairo and Khartoum, and above all the cotton plantations
92
of El Ghazera.
By 1977, Nimeiri was devoting most of his efforts
concerning Chad towa'rd strengthening the forces making for
unity there, and in so doing he aligned his country with
93
Egypt and France. As President of the OAU in 1978, Nimeiri
became more effective than before as a peacemaker at the
conferences on Chadian national unity held at Sebha, Tripoli,
and Benghazi, and at the same time at Khartoum he himself
was slowly succeeding in bringing Malloum and Habre to an
agreement.
The role that Sudan has played in the Chadian conflict
is of course backed up by the United States. Sudan's call
for arms has met with quick response from the United States.
Equipment contracted and supplied includes jeeps, armoured
personnel carriers and air defense guns. The U.S. has also
91
See Harold D. Nelson, et al., Area Handbook for Chad,
pp. 134-140.
92
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made available a $100 million package to Sudan for fiscal
95
1983. Other equipments include F-5e fighter jets and
sophisticated M-60 tanks to enable Sudan to meet the Libyan
threat to Chad and other pro-U.S. states in the region.
Since late in 1980 when Libyan troops intervened in
Chad on Goukouni Oueddei's invitation and drove Hissene
Habre into exile, Sudan has given shelter to Habre and
allowed him to use i*ts territory to wage war on the government
in Ndjamena which was by then under Goukouni Oueddei as
President. It was with the help of Sudanese troops and
logistical support that enabled Hissene Habre to recapture
the seat of government and become the current president of
the Republic of Chad.96
Zaire's Intervention in Chad
Mobutu's regime in Zaire which has remained a puppet
regime of the United States intervened in the Chadina conflict
in order to protect the interests of the U.S. Since the
United States wants to confront Colonel Gaddafy in all
fronts, the Reagan Administration has decided to use Mobutu,
he being a faithful servant to the United States.97
Since Mobutu has been maintained in power by the U.S.,
95Ibid.
Colin Legura, "The Crisis Over Chad," pp. A41-A42.
97
"Chad's Civil War: International Involvement,"
pp. 6905-5908.
151
he has to obey orders from the Reagan Administration to
intervene in the Chadian conflict, otherwise the U.S. may
withdraw its constant support to Zaire's government.
Mobutu's reason for intervening in the Chadian conflict
9 8
is to maintain law and order in Chad. Of course, Mobutu's
role in Chad is also serving his own personal interests.
For example, at the time Mobutu decided to get involved in
the Chadian civil wa»r, unemployment in Zaire was very high
and by recruiting young boys to go to Chad, he was trying
to solve the problem of unemployment. By also pretending
that his army went to Chad to restore law and order, he was
trying to restore the prestige of the army in his country.
Besides that, Mobutu was paying back his Western-, mas ter as
we mentioned earlier. He saw an opportunity in the Chadian
conflict to further his own interests in the sense that his
economy was in trouble by the same West particularly, the
U.S. were reluctant to lend Zaire any additional money, and
any other forr, of aid from the West was not easy to come by.
He used this opportunity to squeexe out as many concessions
99
from the West.
It is worth mentioning also that Zaire already has
three Mirage fighter jets in Chad. These are assigned to
9 8
"Chad; Fickle Fortune," Africa Research Bulletin
18:12 (May 23, 1982), p. 4673.
99
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defend the capital against attacks by the Libyan planes.
In June 1983, President Mobutu also dispatched 2,000 troops,
to Chad which helped Hissene Habre to recaptue Faya-Largeau
100
from Goukouni s forces.
With foreign intervention and neighboring meddling in
the conflict, the OAU is unable to find a peaceful settle
ment to the Chadian conflict. We will now proceed to
examine the OAU initiatives and its limitations in settle
ment of the Chadian conflict.
100"Chad: Fickle Fortune," p.
CHAPTER V
THE OAU INITIATIVES AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN SETTLEMENT
OF THE CHADIAN CONFLICT
In this chapter we will examine and assess the role of
the OAU and its limitations in finding a diplomatic solution
to the Chadian conflict. Here, we are concerned with the
major efforts made by the OAU or member countries on behalf
of the OAU. Before we proceed to assess the role of the OAU
in the Chadian conflict, let us briefly discuss the reason
behind the formation of the OAU and how it is set up to
settle conflicts among member States, for this will enable
us to understand more fully why the OAU should intervene in
internal affair of African countries and particularly in
the Chadian conflict.
The African states having realized that gaining freedom
was not the only thing, and that they were faced with another
perilous confrontation, namely, the intrigues of imperialists
to thwart their newly achieved freedom, met in Addis Ababa
in May 1963 to form the OAU. In other words, the African
leaders discovered that while colonialism has been pushed
out through the door, neo-colonialism, a much more dreadful
hmmanuel Kallerstein, Africa; The Politics of Unity
(New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 74- 79.
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version of imperialism according to Nkrumah sneaked in
2
through the back door.
The Congo crisis of the early 1960s gave credence to the
above realization. It provided a traumatic experience to the
young African states; it laid bare the realization that the
weaker and young African states were powerless in defending
their rights against neo-colonialism and a new brand of
imperialism. The crisis marked the official importation of
the Cold War to the African soil, and provided a proxy-war
like situation between the Soviet Union and the United States
of America.
To the United States, the leadership and economic policies
of the duly elected Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba,
3
were inimical to its economic and other interests. Above
all, the feeling that Lumumba was leaning towards the Soviet
Union was taken to mean that he would make the Congo a
communist state, and thereby, precluding the expansion of
U.S. economic domination in Africa. Therefore, the U.S.
policymakers declared that Lumumba must go; so he went, and
the U.S. was implicated.4 The manner in which the Congo
Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Highest Stage of
Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965),
pp. 239-241.
3
U.S. economic interest was motivated by Congo's mineral
resources. See Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1961),pp. 32-79.
4
The CIA has been implicated in the deaths.of Lumumba
and subsequent overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah maintained
that Joseph Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe (who were implicated by
U.N. Security Council Special Report on the death of Lumumba)
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was handled by the big powers working under the cover of the
United Nations convinced the African leaders of the necessity
of setting up an indigenous African organization to cater
for Africa's interests. This regional organization was to
play a role similar to that of the Organization of American
States (OAS) which serves the New World, or the Arab League
which collectively serves the Arab world.
When the independent states of Africa, meeting at Addis
Ababa in May 1963, establishing the Organization of African
Unity, they were of course, completing a process going back
more than a half of a century. Before the formation of the
OAU, there were numerous conferences aimed at bringing
African nations . together. We will not dwell so* much on
these conferences since this is not our major emphasis in
this study.
The Organization of African Unity was founded at a time
when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of
independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership.
Across the continent they saw the danger posed by the divisions
were members of Moral Rearmament (MRA), a U.S.A. based move
ment which supported and financed by the CIA. See Ray Schaap
Meter and Wolf, eds., Dirty Work Two; The CIA In Africa (New
York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1979), pp. 177-208.
Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN: Relations
Between the OAU and the UN (New York: Africana Publishing
Company, 1976), pp. 64-70.
P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and
Movement (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982),
pp. 18-96.
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of language, inequalities by the controversies over boundaries
arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. It quickly became
clear that a high degree of cooperation was necessary among
the fledging African states, if the continent was to survive
as a viable economic and political entity. The OAU, of
course, represented a practical response to the balkanized
condition of Africa at the end of its colonial experience,
when the leaders of * independent governments inherited many
sensitive border problems caused by the artificially drawn
frontiers imposed during the nineteenth century "scramble
for Africa;" there was thus a real need for an organization
capable of stabilizing the new continental political system.
The signing of the Charter establishing the" OAU was
quite an achievement at a time when Africa was sharply split
into three rival blocst the Casablanca group, the Monrovia
group, and the Brazzaville Twelve which we have analyzed in
the second chapter of this study.
The purposes of the OAU as stated in Article II (I)
are as follows:
- to promote the unity and solidarity of Africa;
- to coordinate and intensify their cooperation
and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples of Africa;
Carl Widstrand, African Boundary Problems (Uppsala:
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969),
pp. 168-183.
Q
Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity (Metuchen, N.J.:
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 51-68.
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- to defend their sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence;
- to eradicate all forms of colonialism
from Africa;
- to promote international cooperation,
having due regard to the UN Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.y
The order of purpose has no bearing on the fact that
the principal aim of the OAU was to free the African
continent of colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination
This emerged from the debate on the OAU Chater at Addis Ababa
in 1963 and was reaffirmed on many subsequent occasions.
To achieve the purposes stated in Article II (I), the
Member States pledged themselves to coordinate their policies
especially in the areas of politics and diplomacy; economics,
including transport and communications; education and
culture; health, sanitation and nutrition; science and
technology; defense and security.
Since the Organization of African Unity was created by
a community of states extremely jealous of their sovereignty
and attributes, it was therefore not surprising that the
9
Article II (I) of the OAU Charter convened in Addis
Ababa on May 1963. See Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of
African Unity and Its Charter (London: C. Hurst and Co.,
1968), pp. 193-221.
During 1971 the OAU Administrative Secretary-General
Diallo Telli, in his message to mark the eight anniversary
of the OAU recalled that "since it was established the OAU's
prime and urgent objective has been the total liberation of
our continent from all forms of foreign occupation, oppression
and exploitation." See Yassin El-Ayouty, The OAU After Ten
Years; Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1976), pp. 43-97.
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Charter emphasized the powers of the States while restricting
those of the organization. This, in fact, made the section
on "rights and duties of member states" somehow lopsided and
left considerable doubt as to the actual extent to which the
member states were bound to support the organization they
created. The only commitment accepted by the members of the
OAU was to bbserve scrupulously the principles of the
Charter. These principles, however, created a somewhat
unbalanced situation. Some of them merely confirmed the
sovereignty of the member states and non-interference in
their internal affairs. Others build upon this by prohibit
ing attacks against the members' territorial integrity and
independence or more specifically, the use of subversion
and assassination.
To make the OAU a purposeful tool, it was, nonetheless,
necessary to have some obligation upon the members to pursue
its aims. Article VIII of the OAU Charter which defined the
powers of the assembly of Heads of State and governments,
states that: "It is the responsibility of the Supreme Organ -
the assembly of Heads and States and governments to discuss
matters of common concern with view to coordinating and
harmonizing the general policy of the organization."
Boutrous Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter,"
International Conciliation 546 (January 1964), p. 62.
12
T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organization of
African Unity," American Journal of International Law 59:2
(April 1965), pp. 243-267. ~~~
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The implication of this is that the member states
coordinate their own policies while the assembly merely
coordinates the policy of the organization but not policies
of the member states. Sovereignty was used as an excuse for
eliminating any aspect that could infringe on states
competencies or even influence its action. The principle
of non-interference, to us, was a handy means of rejecting
any decision of the*OAU that seemed to be directed against
13
a member or merely restricted its freedom of action.
Realistically speaking there is no provision in the Charter
that makes the OAU's decisions binding on member states.
In the absence of such provisions in the Charter, it follows
that the OAU resolutions are merely recommendati'tins . As such,
they do not impose any legal obligations on the States which
abstain, nor even on those which approve them.
To become a member of the OAU, Article IV of the Charter
states that, "each independent sovereign African State shall
14
be entitled to become a member-state of the Organization."
The legal interpretation of this gives each independent
African state a right to membership which it can claim,
provided however, that it pledges to adhere to the principles
enshrined in the OAU Charter and to work for the achievment
13
John Markakis, "The Organization of African Unity: A
Progress Report," Journal of Modern African Studies 3:9
(October 1966), p. 214.
14
N. McKeon, "The African States and the OAU," Inter
national Affairs 42:3 (July 1966), pp. 390-409.
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of the objectives therein. Let us take a few moments to
examine the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration.
The desire to solve-problems within an African framework
has been connected with that mistrust of external influences
which is common among African statesmen. But it also stems
from deep reservations about the principles of international
law in the Western world. With the creation of the OAU,
Afircan leaders hoped they would be able to set thier own
standards for the conduct of interstate relations, standards
which would derive not from the customs and laws of the
colonial powers but from the principles of the OAU. In
this respect the OAU formulated general principles to be
observed by the conflicting parties. It refrained from
pronouncing judgements on specific issues or disputes because
to do so would have implied that the OAU was acting as a
supranational authority, a position the OAU has always
declined to adopt. The principles of settling all inter-
African disputes strictly within an African framework was
first officially announced by Emperor Haile Selassie. It
Erasmus Kloman, "African Unification Movements,"
International Organization 16:2 (Spring 1982), pp. 387-404.
Clyde Sanger, "Toward Unity in Africa," Foreign
Affairs 42:2 (January 1964), pp. 269-270.
William I. Zartman, International Relations in the




has since found expression in many OAU resolutions.
The first draft of the Protocol of the Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration started at the
First Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal in August
1963. At the Second Session in Lagos, Nigeria, the Council
of Ministers appointed a committee of experts to do a
thorough study of the basic draft which started in Dakar.
The members of the committee included experts from Ghana,
Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania and the United
Arab Republic. Once more the Lagos draft expanded and published
by experts that met in Cairo, where it was finally adopted.
The African leaders who were also meeting in Cairo, signed
the Protocol on July 21, 1964 and it became an integral part
19
of the OAU Charter. In October 1965, during the Accra OAU
Summit, the Commission headed by Justice M.A. Odesanga of
Nigeria was appointed, but it was not until 1967 that the
first meeting of the Commission took place in Addis Ababa.
The Commission consisted of twenty-one members elected
by the Assembly for a duration of five years, with a
provision for reelection. It should be noted here that the
Commission is viewed as an important organ of the OAU, hence
-1 O
See Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African
Unity, p. 103.
19
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Early Years of the OAU:
The Search for Organizational Preeminence," International
Organization 20:4 (Autumn 1966), pp. 774-779.
Jon Noronoff, Organizing African Unity, pp. 31-70.
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it is the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government,
and not the subordiante Council of Ministers or the Secre-
21
tariat that must appoint members of this Commission. In
electing officials, the basis for election allows the
candidacy of no more than two representatives from a single
state, but after the election, the final composition cannot
have more than one official from each state. Having been
elected, members caitnot be removed from office, except by
a vote of two-thirds majority of the total members of the
Assembly. Here again, it should be noted how difficult it
is to remove a member from the Commission. A consensus of
two-thirds majority is not easy to be obtained in an
Assembly where leaders have diversified politica"l views and
where more often than not, on certain issues, their only
agreement is not to agree. To make a complicated removal
procedure more complicated, before a member is replaced, it
must be proved that he is either incompetent or that he is
guilty of a certain misconduct. Members of the Commission
are barred from receiving or seeking instructions from any
member state and are also protected by the privileges and
22
immunities.
The Commission is placed under a bureau composed of
a president and two vice-presidents, who are elected by the
Ibid .
22
T.O. Elias, "The Organization of African Unity and
Its Charter," pp. 243-267.
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Assembly from among the members of the Commission. The
23
remaining eighteen members are called only when necessary.
The seat of the Commission is in Addis Ababa. It is important
and necessary to note that the Commission is not a permanent
body but a panel of judges and other experts who are
24
"activated when disputes are brought to it for settlement."
The parties involved in a dispute can select from among
the twenty-two members those they wish to hear their case.
Of course, the large number of Commission members makes it
possible for several groups to be established simultaneously
to deal with several disputes.
The Commission's area of operation is limited to
conflicts between member states and has very little to do
25
with a conflict between a state and the OAU. Notwithstanding
the number of judges it is comprised of, the Commission cannot
interpret the Charter of the OAU. That is the duty of the
Assembly. Neither can it serve as an advisory body for the
OAU: nor can it give its opinion on legal matters concerning
the OAU.26
For a dispute to be heard before the Commission, it must
23
Yassin El-Ayouty, The OAU After Ten Years; Comparative
Perspective , p. 9 7.
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be put forward by one or more parties; by the Council of
Ministers or even the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. Should one of the parties refuse to give in
to the authority of the Commission, the Commission's Bureau
may refer the matter to the Council of Ministers. However,
should one of the parties continue to be adamant, arrogant
and unyielding, there is nothing the Commission and the OAU
can do, for when framing the Protocol of the Commission, it
was agreed that the Commission's authority would be optional
2 8
and not compulsory.
On the other hand when there is an agreement or when
the parties consent to the authority of the Commission, the
mode of settlement is next decided. The normal "procedure
is that the parties, together with the : Commission choose
the working method and rules of procedure. The members of
the Commission, endowed with diplomatic privileges and
immunities, have a free hand in conducting investigations
and other findings to get the facts brought before it.29
The President of the Commission, with the consent of
the parties, together with one or more mediators chosen
from the Commission could introduce the mediation. Article
N. McKeon, "The African States and the OAU," pp. 390-
401.
28
Michael Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of
African Unity (New.York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1~976).
p. 73.
29
T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organization of
African Unity," pp. 200-213.
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XXI of the Protocol spells out clearly that:
The role of the mediator shall be confined
to reconciling the views and claims of the
parties. The mediator shall make written
proposals to the parties as expeditiously
as possible. If the means of reconciliation
proposed by the mediator are accepted, they
shall become the basis of a protocol of
on
arrangement between the parties.
Therefore, the primary task of the mediator is to try to
reconcile the various views and claims of both parties,
mainly by way of giving confidential pieces of advice and
recommentations to the parties. No procedural rules are
followed.
There is an upward trend in the use of mediators as the
bese possible solution. The Africans are great respectors
of elders as well as noble members in their communities.
More often than not, in the event of a quarrel, an elder's
judgment solves the problem. That is why on the state level
too, the OAU has repeatedly made use of the services of the
31
influential and often elder statesmen. Usually, these
leaders are able moderates, who have over long years been
drenched by torrents of political problems, but who stood
the test of torture. However, the complexity of modern
problems and foreign interventions, plus the fact that states
30
See Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African
Unity and Its Charter, pp. 90-121.
31
Haile Selassie I, "Towards African Unity," Journal
of Modern African Studies 1:3 (October 1963), pp. 284-287.
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are beginning to feel secure, make it increasingly difficult
for negotiators to produce tangible results.
Article XXII and XXIII of the Protocol describes the
procedures, while Article XXIV explains the duty of the
Commission of Conciliation. Under Article XXII the dispute
to be settled could be submitted to the Commission through
a petition forwarded to the President of the Board of
Conciliation by one»or more of the disputants. When the
president receives the petition, after he has secured the
agreement of the parties, he sets up a Board of Conciliators,
of which he appoints three members while each party appoints
one. The Chairman of the Board, who must be among the five
board members, is chosen by the President. Arit"icle XXIII
specifies that no two members from one country could sit
33
on the Board.
The duty of the Commission of Conciliation, as succinctly
explained in Article XXIV is to "clarify the issues in
dispute and to endeavor to bring about an agreement between
the parties upon mutually accepted terms." If there is no
agreement between the parties, the Board is empowered to
determine its own procedure. Article XXV makes it clear
that the parties could be represented by agents to act as
go betweens. They may also be assisted by counsels and
32
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Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 87.
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experts and other persons who may be of help. At the end of
the hearings the Board writes a report indicating the success
or failures of its endeavor. The report is forwarded to the
President of the Commission, with the approval of the parties
35
it may be made public.
As elaborate as it is, the Commission of Conciliation
is hardly used and has never settled a dispute. Essentially,
the most distinguis a*ble features of the Commission of
Arbitration are: (1) it is a court which bases its ruling
on international law, (2) the conclusions of the Arbitration
Tribunal are binding. Article XXVII of the Protocol
stipulates the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal in the
following manner:
1. The provision of arbiration by each party
from the members of the Commission.
2. A third person chosen from the Commission,
whith the consent of the two arbitrators
is made of the Chairman of the Tribunal.
3. Should the two arbitrators fail to agree
on the choice of the person to chair the
tribunal, the Bureau shall appoint ^6
It is specifically stated that the arbitrators shall not
be the nationals of the disputing parties, neither should
they have lived in or been employed in those countries.
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that recourse to arbitration is a submission in good faith,
the parties are bound to accept the outcome of the arbi
tration proceedings. This stand is made clear in Article
XXIX which states that:
The parties shall in each case, conclude
a compromise which shall specify (a) the
undertaking of the parties to go to
arbitration and to accept as legally bind
ing, the decision of the Tribunal, (b) the
subject matter of the controversy, and
(c) the seat df the Tribunal.38
In any case, in the event that there is no compromise as
stipulated by Article XXIX, Article XXX rules that Arbitral
Tribunal shall decide the dispute according to treaties
concluded between parties, international law, the Charter
of the Organization of African Unity and Charter" of the
39
United Nations. Like the Commission of Conciliation,
disputes are hardly referred to the Commission of Arbitration,
Though it was intended to create peace among member
states, the non-interference clause in Article III of the
OAU Charter has instead helped to create more problems at
worst, or at best helped to hinder peace and goodwill. The
concept of "non-interference" needed a clear and less ambi
guous definition. It is true that the ideas and intentions
expressed in its principle are good and sound. It was
3 8
See Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African
Unity and Its Charter, pp. 87-89.
39Ibid., pp. 87-121.
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intended to enhance mutual trust as well as healthy relations
among members; it was inserted to make sure one country or
those powerful African states should leave the less for
tunate and weak ones alone, but as Vincent B. Thompson
comments, "It inhibits states from pronouncing on actions
by individual states which some members consider detri-
40
mental to the interest of the continent." The Charter,
according to him failed to establish which issue might
cease to be a domestic and which issue may necessitate
Pan-African intervention.
Since its formation in May 1963, the OAU has witnessed
many conflicts among member states and has intervened in
most of these conflicts with a view of finding a peaceful
settlement to these conflicts. In the Congo crisis of
1964-1965, the OAU intervened by setting up an ad hoc
Commission to negotiate with the Stanleyville regime in
order to bring reconciliation between Presidents Kasavubu
41
and Tshombe. The background to the 1964-65 Congo crisis
goes back to the colonial history of the Congo and the
rule of Leopold II which had reduced the Congo to a
reservoir of slave labor exploited with a ruthlessness which
40
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42
crippled the country for several decades. The events
following the declaration of independence on June 30, 1960
have been described in great detail in many writings, hence
43
we will not go much into the detail of the conflict.
However, the OAU did not and could not bring peace to the
Congo and resolve its political problems. This was due
above all to foreign intervention in the conflict. If the
QAU Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo had been given more time,
it might have succeeded in its primary objective, which was
to forestall external intervention. The conclusion of
African leaders was that the only safeguard against the
occurrence of a similar situation was for them never to
allow themselves to become involved in the confrontation
between East and West.
The Congo crisis was the most important single event
that led African states to establish a policy of non-
44
alignment as the basis of their foreign policy.
4 2
Under the rule of King Leopold II the Congo's
population, more than that of any African country, was
ravaged by the slave trade, and declined by three million.
During the slave trade some fifteen million Congolese were
shipped across the Atlantic, of whom ten million died en
route from ill treatment. King Leopold did not suppress
slavery but merely changed its nature. He made forced
labor more profitable than the slave trade. See Earnest W.
Lefever, Crisis in the Congo; A United Nations Force in






Another important conflict in which the OAU intervened
was the Nigerian Biafran Civil War in 1967-70 in which the
Eastern region of Nigeria rebelled against the Federal
Government of Nigeria and declared the region the "Republic
of Biafra." The OAU did all it could to bring about a
peaceful solution to the conflict, but all failed. This was
partly because the Federal Government of Nigeria made it
abundantly clear that the conflict was internal affairs of
Nigeria. The Federal Government under General Gowon held
very firmly to the view that any intervention, even in the
form of a discussion at the OAU level, would be in violation
of Article III (2) of the OAU Charter, which prohibits any
4 5
interference in the internal affairs of States. ■
The OAU has also intervened in the Algeria-Morocco
border conflict in which full scale hostilities had broken
out between Algeria and Morocco along their common borders.
The origin of the Algeria-Morocco border dispute lay, of
course, in colonial history: its immediate cause, however,
was a clash between the national interests of the two
countries - on the one side, Moroccan irrendentism and, on
the other, the attractions of the mineral resources in the
disputed territory. Ideological differences between the two
46
regimes compounded the problem. It was a classic example
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Facing the Future (New York: Africana Publishing Company,"
1971), pp. 14-67.
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of the danger which had haunted the drafters of the OAU
Charter. A troublesome legacy from the colonial days, the
border between Algeria and Morocco had never been clearly
defined.
The dispute between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya stems
mainly from Somali irredentism. The Somali case was first
brought to the OAU quite early in 1963. At the summit
conference, in that »year, the Somali delegate President
Aden Abdullah Osman demanded the adjustment of the boundaries
which he claimed divided the Somalis along the entire length
of existing borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. He accused the
Ethiopians of taking possession of a large portion of Somali
territory without the consent and against the wishes of the
inhabitants. Although through the efforts of the OAU a
ceasefire between the parties was effected, the OAU was
unable to effect a diplomatic solution to the Somalia,
47
Ethiopia and Keny border conflict.
Given the overview of these conflicts, we have seen
that the OAU has intervened in almost all of the conflicts
in Africa, be they border conflicts or conflicts that arise
as a result of rebellion.
Throughout the civil war in Chad, attempts have been
made by the OAU and individual African states on behalf of
the OAU to mediate in the conflict. We would like to point
h 7
Mesfin W. Mariam, "Background to the Ethio-Somalian
Boundary Dispute," Journal of Modern African Studies 2:2
(July 1964), pp. 189-220.
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out that all of its diplomatic initiatives by the OAU
eventually ended in failure. The OAU involvement in Chad
is, of course, justified by the OAU Charter which specifically
provides for peaceful negotiations to settle conflicts and
48
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
The Charter also formally created the Commission of Media
tion, Conciliation and Arbitration which is supposed to
have the expressed function of solving disputes of conflicts.
However, in general practice and in the Chadian situation
in particular other means have been employed to solve the
conflict. Cervenka elaborates on this peculiar development
when he asserts:
Disputes among the OAU members have been settled
through direct negotiations between states, good
offices offered by third parties, and ad hoc
committees composed of Heads of State, diplomatic
negotiations conducted during sessions of the
Assembly of. Heads of State and Government. A
rather striking feature of the OAU's handling of
disputes is that not one has ever dealt with by
the organ created specifically for that purpose.
In other words, the Commission on Mediation, Concilia
tion, and Arbitration is mainly a nominal body which seldom
if ever operates according to its original purpose. When we
look at the OAU's initiatives in Chad, we are mainly concerned
Article II No. (c), Article III No. 2-4 and Article
VII, "Charter of the Organization of African Unity," in
Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and





with the successes or failures of various conferences, ad
hoc committees, summit conferences and actions of the third
parties on behalf of the OAU.
The OAU has in fact tried almo.st every conceivable
diplomatic initiative in Chad but anarchy and civil war
continue. Unfortunately, the Chadian conflict demonstrates
the dilemma historically faced by the OAU which is an
inability to enforce its diplomatic decisions. Let us
move to examine the OAU initiatives starting iwth the Kano
National Reconciliation Conference.
The Kano National Reconciliation Conference, March-April, 1979
In March, April and May 1979, Nigeria, Libya, Sudan
Cameroon, Niger and four Chadian 'tendencies': FAT (Malloum),
FAP (Goukouni), FAN du Tchad (MPLT) or Third Army, a
splinter group from the Goukouni faction conducted a series
of meetings came to be called the "Kano National Reconcilia
tion Conference" and provided the foundation for the more
comprehensive settlement that would come in August, 1979.
In spite of efforts by France, which proposed the
holding of a conference of reconciliation at Ndjamena,
Libya and Nigeria imposed their choice of Kano as the
conference location. The Kano Conference was held on
March 12-16, 1979, chaired by the Nigerian General, Shehu
Yar'Adua. Under the terms of Kano Agreements, a ceasefire
"Chad: Kano Peace Conference," Africa Research
Bulletin 16:5 (June 15, 1979), pp. 49-50.
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was signed by the factions represented (FAP, FAN, MPLT,
and Malloum's followers in FAT), and the following
arrangements were made: the demilitarization of Ndjamena,
the liberation of prisoners and hostages, the dissolution of
existing government bodies, the formation of a Government
d'Union National de Transition (GUNT), and the creation of
an integrated army. Nigeria was to send a neutral force to
maintain security in Ndjamena until a government could be
set up. On March 23, 1979, Malloum and Habre tendered
their resignations. A provisional state council of eight
members (two from each faction) was constituted under the
presidency of Goukouni Oueddei. When a transition govern
ment was set up in late April, 1979, its composition did not
reflect the actual disposition of forces and therefore the
new government could not get recognition from the OAU, nor
52
from the countries on its borders.
A second conference was held at Kano on April 3-11,
53
1979 to constitute the GUNT. In addition to the signa
tories of Kano I, five new factions were presented, all
claiming allegiance to FROLINAT: the Forces Populaires de
Liberation led by Mahamat Abba; the Conseil Democratique
Europa, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1983), p. 290.
52
"Kano Peace Conference Failed," West Africa
(April 30, 1979), p. 2611.
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Publishing Company, 1982), p. A41.
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Revolutionnaire led by Ahmet Acyle; the FROLINAT Originel
led by Abba Siddick; Volcan led by Abdoullaye Adam Dana,
and FROLINAT Foundamental led by Hadjaro Senoussi. The
conference was a failure. Nigeria and Libya exerted
pressure to impose Mahamat Abba as president, but Goukouni
and Habre refused to recognize the five new factions, and
returned to Ndjamena. As Habre and Goukouni refused to
cooperate, Nigeria slapped an oil boycott on the country
and pulled its neutral troons out in order to force the
54
parties back to the negotiation table.
Even before the ink was dry on the Kano Agreement,
fighting broke out again. The failure of the Kano Agree
ment, however, does not mean that this series of meetings
was without significance. The importance of the events
in March, April, and May, 1979 was that power was trans
ferred from the southern elites to northern Muslim elites.
But the agreement was destined to fail because it did not
include all of the major protagonists in the conflict and
peace-keeping force which was to be set up by the OAU was
not implemented. Thus, the stage was set for a new OAU
initiative: the historic Lagos Accord process was set in
"Chad: Nigerian Troops Withdraw," West Africa
(May 7, 1979), p. 2922. See also African Research Bulletin
16:6 (July 1979), p. 6458.
55John Howe, "Chad At War," Africa 97 (September 1979),
p. 27.
56"OAU and Chad," Africa Research Bulletin 19:2
(March 15, 1980), p. 6335.
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motion. Let us proceed to examine the Lagos Accord.
The Lagos Accord, August 1979
The Lagos Accord was announced at the conclusion of a
two day meeting on August 21, 1979. The main.purpose of
the agreement was to stop the armed fighting between the
various factions and to create the conditions for a lasting
solution to the crisis in Chad. Some of the most important
provisions of the accord include;
-ceasefire and the demilitarization of the
capital;
-establishment of an all African peace
keeping force composed of troops from
countries without a border with Chad
(Congo, Benin, and Guinea) and supervised
by a commission under the Secretary-General
of the OAU:
-the formation of a new government based oh
the parties involved;
-free elections within eighteen months; „
-withdrawal of the remaining French troops.
It is important however, to note that the agreement
specifically called for a peace-keeping force which did not
include Chad's immediate neighbors particularly Nigeria and
Libya. The inclusion of Nigerian and Libyan troops would
have meant the immediate collapse of the agreement because
of the very partisan role that both countries have played
in Chad's civil war. The agreement was significant because
it brought all of the conflicting factions together for the
"Chad: Lagos Peace Conference," West Africa 3450
(December 1980), p. 2936.
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first time and its provisions if implemented properly,
contained the comprehensiveness necessary for a lasting
peace. Also, it should be noted that despite the weakenesses
of the OAU, the Lagos Accord was viewed by all the parties
involved as the vehicle through which a lasting settlement
could be worked out. According to Lagos Accords, the
factions involved in the conflict would set up a Government
of National Unity in Chad, or what has become known as the
GUNT. The set up of the Government of National Unity was as
follows:
1)President:•Goukouni Oueddei representing
the FAP forces at that time;
2)Vice-President: Lt. Col. Wadel Abdelkader
Kamougue repressenting the Southern forces
generally and the FAT in particular;
3)Defense Minister: Hissene Habre represent
ing the FAN forces.?8
The other factions in the conflict were all represented on
the ministerial level.
It would seem at first glance that the OAU had in fact
spearheaded a historic agreement that would end the long and
bloody civil war in Chad. But less than six months after
the signing of the Lagos Accord, new fighting broke out
between FAP and FAN forces. So again, the main question is
what went wrong? If we look at the Lagos Accord more closely,
several major weaknesses become apparent. First of all, the
5 8
"Chad: OAU's Dilemma," Africa Research Bulletin 19:1
(February 1982), p. 6401.
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accord did not provide for the immediate arrival of the OAU's
peace-keeping force. The first units of this force did not
arrive in Chad until January, 1981, almost five months after
the fact. By this time, the long standing tensions were
already in place and ready to errupt again. Secondly, when
the troops did arrive they failed to take decisive action to
separate the combatants and enforce the ceasefire. Most
importantly, although the agreement called for an end to
outside intervention, neither the OAU nor the various forces
in Chad had any practical means to enforce non-intervention.
Also, the various factions themselves have continued to
resort to military struggle to solve conflict over policy
and power.
The Lagos agreements were not well received in the south.
Firstly, southerners refused to allow the participation of
Hissene Habre in the government; also, it was only following
strong pressure exerted by France that they agree to take
part in a provisional Administration Committee set up in
59
Ndjamena. The south was afraid of being marginalized by
the Lagos agreement. It held about seventy percent of
administrative posts as well as the main agricultural (notably
cotton) and industrial resources. In the south, under the
direction of the permanent committee, order had been restored,
economic life had returned to normal, administration was
59
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somehow functioning, and schools had been reopened. In the
north by contrast, and particularly Ndjamena, there reigned
anarchy and insecurity; the GUNT had been unable to set the
administration in motion without the civil servants from the
south who had not returned to the capital. Thus the south
refused what they termed the 'inferior' role assigned to it
and was demanding fair recognition.
The Sierra Leone Summit, July, 1980
The OAU also tried during its 17th Emergency Summit
held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in July, 1980, to resolve
the crisis in Chad. This summit passed a resolution drafted
by the Council of Ministers which states in part:
In the event of failure by the OAU to raise
the necessary funds after a period of two
months, the U.N. Security Council will be
requested for assistance, particularly the
necessary financial means to enable peace to
be restored to Chad.^1
This resolution, of course, reveals the dilemma faced
by the OAU, and exposes one of the main reasons behind the
continued failure of the OAU peace efforts in Chad.
During this summit, there was considerable misunderstand
ing, or even disagreement between Sierra Leone and Nigeria
President Stevens endorsed the Libyan presence in Chad.
President Shagari representing Nigeria wanted an immediate
"Chad: A Divided Land," Africa Guide 104 (September
1979), p. 2667.
"Chad: Summit Failure," Africa Diary 21:31 (July 30-
August 5, 1980), p. 1060A.
181
withdrawal of Libyan troops in Chad.
Some of the terms of the Sierra Leone Summit were the
reaffirmation of the following conditions already - stated in
the Lagos Accord of August 1979:
1) The immediate ceasefire among the
contending factions,
2) Setting up of a mutual peace-keeping
force by the OAU,
3) Inclusion of all the factions into
Chadian integrated Armed Forces, and
4) Withdrawal*of Libyan troops in Chad.6^
Obviously, the OAU 17th Summit was unable to bring
peace to Chad and its people. We can say here that while
the OAU can provide the formal machinery and develop the
plans necessary for the successful settlement of disputes,
it does not have the resources nor the mandate to enforce
its diplomatic initiatives. In the Chadian case, where the
different factions themselves are not willing to negotiate,
this dilemma has meant the continued suffering of the
majority of the Chadian people. The OAU after almost three
years involvement in the search for a diplomatic solution to
the Chadian conflict, is eager to see an outcome in Chad that
would reflect favorably on the organization. Past experience
with Chad has proved a frustrating affair and the presence
of Libyans in Chad was seen by many OAU members as a blow to
ft y
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African countries particularly the reactionary countries
such as Nigeria, Egypt, Sudan and Zaire. The problem during
this summit was no longer the imposition of peace in Chad,
but rather its maintenance - without the presence of Libyan
troops.
Colonel Gaddafy also argued that a precipitate with
drawal from Chad would jeopardize the peace that his soldiers
had brought. Hence'the failure of the Sierra Leone Summit.
The OAU being so eager to see a peaceful settlement to the
conflict, organized another Emergency Summit in Lagos in
December 1980. Let us proceed to examine this summit in
detail.
The Emergency Summit in.Lagos, December 1980
In response to the changing situation in Chad the OAU
held another Emergency Summit on December 23, 1980 in Lagos,
Nigeria. Attending the summit were the Heads of State of
eleven African countries and the Libyan Foreign Minister.
The states represented included Libya, Nigeria, Central
African Republic, Cameroon, Togo, Guinea, Benin, Congo,
64
Sierra Leone, Ghana and Sudan. The Emergency Summit
recognized the redistribution of power among the protagonists
in Chad as a result of the recent fighting. Hissene Habre was
urged to stay away from Lagos because the OAU felt that his
64
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forces no longer represented a military threat in Chad.
OAU initiatives in the civil war therefore had been reduced
to accommodating the strongest faction. The. failure of the
OAU to recognize and include Habre's faction in the summit
resulted in a new phase of fighting between Habre's forces
and Goukouni's GUNT forces.
Shortly after the Lagos Emergency Summit, Libya in
early January announced a proposed merger between Chad and
Libya. Immediately, an informal meeting of African Heads
of State was convened in Lome, Togo to officially condemn
66
the proposed merger.
Most of the African countries saw the proposed Libyan-
Chad merger as an attempt by Colonel Gaddafy to "spread his
Islamic socialism to the Chadian people; some saw it as
Colonel Gaddafy's imperialism and neo-colonialism.
France immediately reacted strongly to the announcement
of the merger agreement. On January 8, 1981 it stressed that
the GUNT could not commit the people of Chad to such a course
indefinitely, and French military personnel in the Central
African Republic was reinforced. The result was an
65"Chad: War Rages On," Africa 107 (December 1980),
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animated series of exchanges with Libya. However, Libya
retained its grip on northern and eastern Chad. President
Goukouni also refused to discuss the possibility of Libyan
withdrawal, while comites populaires established in the
occupied zones reinforced Libyan influence. The refusal of
President Goukouni to discuss the immediate withdrawal of
Libyan troops was because of the fears he maintained that
if Libyan troops arte withdrawn, his regime, GUNT, which was
set up by the OAU would face immediate collapse to Habre's
forces. Of course, Goukouni has already condemned Habre and
his close supporters to death in absentia.
President Goukouni was pressurized by Nigeria, France,
Zaire, and other African states to negotiate the Libyan
withdrawal from Ndjamena in a meeting in Lome, Togo.
The Chad Peace Conference in Lome, Togo, January 1981
In an effort to end the increasingly fierce fighting
engendered by many years of civil war in Chad, an ad hoc
subcommittee composed of Togo, Guinea, Congo and Benin was
formed by the OAU to find a solution to the civil war in
Chad. The committee's work led to a conference in Lome,
Togo, on January 13, 1981. The OAU sponsored meeting became
known as the "Chad Peace Conference" and brought together
the two main factions, Goukouni's GUNT forces and Habre's
FAN forces engaged in the fighting since the breakdown of
"Chad: Habre and His Forces Condemned to Death,"
New Africa 16 (March 8, 1981), p. 6.
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the Lagos Accord. The conference was attended by the OAU
Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, the OAU Chairman, President
Siaka Stevens, President Kerekou of Benin, President Eyadema
of Togo, and a high ranking official from the government of
the Congo. The presence of so many Heads of State at the
peace conference illustrates the role that personal diplomacy
plays in the work of settling disputes among African states.
Personal diplomacy is a frequently used tactic of the OAU,
but it does not always end in success, so to speak.
Most of the provisions of the plan drawn up by the
peace conference were elaborated in the Lagos Accord.
However, at the conclusion of the conference, the two main
protagonists could not reach agreement on the terms of
ceasefire. At this point, the massive intervention of Libyan
troops on the side of GUNT forces was the major area of
contention. Hissene Habre could not agree to, a ceasefire
until Libyan troops were withdrawn. President Goukouni
Oueddei, for his part, charged that the FAN was an illegal
faction and, therefore, could not make demands on the
so-called legal government of Chad.71
On September 17, 1981, President Goukouni met with the
French President, Francois Mitterrand in Paris. France
70M_ .
African Unity and Political Alignments," Africa
Research Bulletin 17:16 (February 15, 1981), pp. 5822-5823.
Ibid, p. 5822.
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affirmed its support for the GUNT, and a French initiative
hastened the departure of the Libyan troops by urging the
President of the OAU to send a peace-keeping force into
Chad, as had been agreed upon during the Lagos Accord.
France and the U.S.A. promised to support such a force
72
militarily and financially.
At the request of the Council of Ministers of the OAU,
Libyan troops began'to evacuate Ndjamena. It was agreed that
the OAU peace-keeping force should be led by a Nigerian
officer, Major-General Geofrey Ejiga, and by mid-December
1981, there were 2,000 Nigerian troops, 2,000 Zairean and
800 Senegalese troops in Chad, Togo and Benin having with
drawn their offer to contribute troops.
Even before the arrival of the OAU peace-keeping force,
controversy was raging as to the role it was to play.
According to Goukouni, it was to help put down the rebellion
of Habre, acting on orders from the GUNT. According to the
OAU, however, the force was simply to maintain order and
73
security without becoming embroiled in the civil war.
Profiting from their enemy's hesitation, the FAN led
by Habre stepped up their offensive as soon as the Libyans
had left. By mid-January 1982, Abeche, Oum-Hadjer and Faya-
"Chad's Battle Captures U.S. Interest," Africa News
21:7 (August 15, 1983), pp. 2-3.
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Largeau were captured by Habre's forces. It looked at this
time as though the OAU peace-keeping force, with outposts at
Ati and Mongo, was all that stood between Habre's forces and
Ndjamena. Hoping to isolate the FAN, Goukouni paid an
official visit to Sudan in effort to establish good relations.
On February 11, 1982, the OAU adopted a resolution calling
for national reconciliation and fixing February 28, 1982 as
a ceasefire date. * Elections were to take place under the
OAU supervision before June 30. This resolution, effectively
a political victory for the FAN, was strongly condemned by
Goukouni, who maintained that the only possible solution to
the conflict was a military solution. Hostilities continued
and the Chad Peace Conference did not bring any diplomatic
solution to the Chadian conflict. The Lome Conference was
not a total failure because it was the first time that the
two protagonists - Goukouni Oueddei and Hissene Habre met
face to face after many years of civil war.
The refusal of GUNT to negotiate with Habre, however,
confirmed the leaders of the OAU peace-keeping force in
their resolution to maintain a position of strict neutrality.
Hissene Habre adroitly avoided confronting them head on,
"Abortive Peace Conference," Africa Research Bulletin
17:10 (April 22, 19820, pp. 3564-3565.
See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Conf1ict
in Chad, p.93.
"Chad: OAU's Dilemma," p. 6303.
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preferring to negotiate for the peaceful advance of his
troops across their lines. Goukouni's forces were greatly-
depleted and after bitter fighting they retreated to bases
in the south. This give Habre a chance to capture the seat
of government.
The OAU Peace-Keeping Force
The setting up of the African peace-keeping force in
Chad was one of the resolutions reached during the Lagos
Accord. The main reason that can be advanced regarding
the setting up of the force was to replace the Libyan
troops which a majority of African countries, France and
the U.S.A. saw as an expansion of Colonel Gaddafy's
empire. Another reason was with the formation of a peace
keeping force, the different factions in the conflict would
be able to agree to a ceasefire and negotiate for a peaceful
settlement of the conflict.
Early in December, 1981, saw the inter-African peace
keeping force in Chad taking shape. Countries that were
willing to contribute troops included Nigeria, Zaire and
Senegal. Troops from these countries arrived in Chad with
assistance from the United States and France who promised
7 8
to support the African peace force.
7"0AU and Chad," p. 6335.
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The question that could be put forward here, why did
many countries who are members of the OAU refuse to contribute
troops to a peace-keeping force in Chad? Many countries in
Africa are not in a strong financial position to finance
troops outside their countries.
The OAU peace-keeping force in Chad was the first time
that the African countries had such a standing force for
the maintenance of peace in any African country since the
formation of the OAU in 1963.
In deployment of the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad,
Nigerian troops were assigned to go to eastern Chad using
Abeche which was controlled by Hissene Habre's rebel forces
as the base; Zairean troops were assigned to the northern
zone, with Faya-Largeau as the headquarters, and the
Senegalese troops were to control the central zone based
79
at Mongo.
Initially, it had been intended that the first contin
gent of 400 Nigerian soldiers would fly directly to Ati, on
the road in central Chad, to Abeche. However, conditions
at the landing strip in Chad precluded a safe landing of
the troops, hence the troops returned to Nigeria while a
smaller contingent was left at Ndjamena. The remaining
Nigerian troops were expected to be fully deployed by
December 20, 1981. The Commanding Office of the force
9"0AU and Chad," pp. 6337-6338.
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addressed a news conference on arrival in Chad, and stated
that: "Nigerian forces were ready to come to Chad and that
Cameroun Republic had granted permission for Nigerian troops
and other vehicles to cross the Camerounian frontier on their
way from Maiduguri to Ndjamena."
However, there was a last minute revision in the
composition of the OAU peace-keeping force. President
Goukouni who was mafie the interim President by the OAU,
said that he would prefer not to have Togolese troops in
Chad, following President Eyadema's publically expressed
sentiment that he would rather prefer a political solution
81
than a military solution in the Chadian conflict.
In keeping with their promise of supporting he peace
keeping force, France did help in the transportation of
Senegalese troops to Ndjamena; Britain offered financial
assistance for logistical use to the Nigerian contingent;
the United States also airlifted fifty-three tons of supplies
to the Zaire contingent. Their aid of course, as we mentioned
earlier, was not aimed at seeing a peaceful settlement of the
Chadian conflict, but was aimed at seeing that Colonel
Gaddafy's troops were replaced by an African peace-keeping
force .
It was decided that the peace-keeping force should not




join in any fighting or try to regain the towns taken by
Hissene Habre in the east. The fact that the peace
keeping force could not call for a ceasefire or prevent the
two factions from fighting raised many questions as to the
usefulness of maintaining such a costly force, estimated at
$150 million a year by the United Nations.83
The view that the OAU forces should help the Chadian
government suppress*dissidence was rejected outright by the
Commanding Officer who acted on the instruction of the
countries that contributed troops for the peace-keeping in
84
Chad. The OAU representatives strongly maintained that
in the event of fighting between factions comprising the
present government there will be no question of 'Intervening
on any side. But the OAU forces were to react if fired upon.
The arrival of the OAU peace-keeping force and the
withdrawal of Libyan troops in Chad made if easier for
Hissene Habre's forces to advance further towards the west
into the central province of Batha . There was little evidence
of the OAU peace-keeping force being adequately deployed to
contain a military problem that was beyond the control of
the numbers of nominally neutral force. President Goukouni
82Ibid., p. 6275.
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continued to threaten that if the peace-keeping force did
not fight the rebels, its presence in Chad was useless.
Four months after the arrival of the peace-keeping
force, compounded with difficulties in its maintenance,
President Goukouni was asked by the OAU to negotiate with
the rebel leader Hissene Habre . If he did not, he would
lose the support of the OAU. In effect, six Heads of State
met in Nairobi and asked the parties concerned to make peace,
and set a schedule which the two factions should follow.
The OAU invited them to stop fighting, adopt a constitution
8 5
and proceed to elections.
Limited Resources
During the OAU's occupation of Chad, more than one
member state that contributed to the peace-keeping force in
Chad encountered serious financial difficulties in maintain
ing the troops. The estimated cost of the OAU force until
the June withdrawal was put at over $150 million which
would mean that for a full year it could be up to $300
•n-i • 86million.
It should be recalled that it was the OAU that formed
the Government of National Unity (GUNT) and made Goukouni
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acknowledge the importance of the rebel leader Hissene Habre's
position in the current phase of Chad's history at the
expense of Goukouni - now seemingly considered little more
than a faction leader, left in its wake a series of attendant
ramifications. The OAU's change of tactic had clearly been
dictated by the impossibilty of maintaining the OAU inter
national peace-keeping force in Chad since no one was willing
to pay for it, and by the mounting evidence of an increas-
ingly tense military situation.
The OAU peace-keeping force could not be maintained
because the international backing and financial support for
the operation was not fulfilled. One of the obstables to
getting any African-based intervention force off" the ground
since the formation of the OAU, was the inability of the OAU
members themselves, and the unwillingness of outside
interested parties, to raise the necessary finance. In
short, the OAU decided to pull out it force in Chad because
of the cost; moreover, the force was not given a mandate to
act militarily in preventing the rebel forces from advancing
towards Ndjamena, the capital of Chad. The low level of
resources available to the OAU has indeed limited its ability
to become independent of the national leaders. In general
the OAU has remained weak in terms of material resources.
The organization controls few material resources, and unlike
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such organizations as the OAS, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact,
it has no member on which it can depend to supply such
financial resources when necessary. The Chadian case has
demonstrated the inability of the OAU to raise the necessary
funds for the operation of its peace-keeping force.
Important resources for an international organization such
as the OAU, include expert knowledge of political and/or
military affairs, and skills in bargaining diplomacy, and
8 8
control of financial resources. The financial situation
of the OAU has been notable for the limitations that is
has imposed on the organization's operations. The OAU's
89
budgets have varied from $2.5 to $4.5 million. Even
these modest budgets are, however, deceptive, as-many
members have remained deliquent in meeting their fiscal
responsibilities and there is no provision to bring strong
pressure upon them to pay their arrears.
Neither appeals by the administrative Secretary-General
no resolutions by the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern
ment have proven effective. As a result of these financial
problems, in a conflict, such as the Chadian conflict the
Q Q
Resources required for intervention in conflicts are
identified and discussed by Oran Young, The Intermediaries;
Third Parties in International Crisis (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967), pp. 80-91.
8 9
The 1973-74 budget was $4.5 million; this was an
increase fo $0.7 million over the budget of the previous
year. For purposes of comparison, the budget of the OAS
is usually about -$20 million.
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OAU has not been able to support its force and find a peace
ful solution to the conflict. Moreover, development planning
has often been postponed, meetings of specialized commissions
cancelled. Many member states do not meet their financial
obligations because they feel that the organization has not
9Q
been serving their interests.
The lack of financial resources always forces the OAU
to appeal to outside help in order to be able to meet the
financial requirements for enforcing its agreements or
decisions. When this happens, it defeats the purpose for
which the organization was formed, for it will always have
to compromise with the imperialist countries in order that
the necessary finance might be granted. In the case of
Chad, the OAU made a repeated appeal to the U.S., France
and the U.N. for financial support for the peace-keeping
force.
Limited Authority
Article XIX of the OAU Charter established the various
commissions and makes explicit that intra-regional conflict
management is considered as a major task for the organization:
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Member States pledge to settle all disputes
among themselves by peaceful means and, to
this end decide to establish a Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the
composition of which and conditions of
service shall be defined by a separate
protocol .
Similarly to the OAU Charter, this protocol demonstrates
the extremely limited authority granted to the institutions
not directly controlled by the Heads of State. Like the
International Court'of Justice, the Commission lacks the
authority to require that conflicting parties or factions
appear before it. It lacks the authority to intrepret the
OAU Charter, and there is no provision for the enforcement
93
of its decisions.
Although various organs have been added to "or removed
from the OAU since its inception, its essential nature,
its authority and responsibilities, has not been greatly
changed. It has remained a collegially governed, inter
governmental organization whose essential task has been to
encourage, coordinate, and harmonize voluntary cooperation
and compliance among its members.
The OAU, however, has suffered since its inception
from the limitations inherent in all international organi
zations not dominated by a strong central power. They can
be effective only when dealing with issues on which there is
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a general consensus. Attempts to impose the will of a
simple majority would threaten the future of the organi
zation, and since the preservation of unity itself is
perceived as being vitally important, it follows that the
OAU's ability and authority to intervene successfully in
finding a peaeful settlement in conflicts among its own
members, or within any one of its member states, is strictly
limited. Members of the OAU are not bound to carry out
decisions taken by its supreme body, the annual summit
meeting of Heads of State. The decisions of this body have
94
the status of recommendations. However, when a particular
recommendation has the support of more than two-thirds of
the OAU members, the dissenting minority finds itself under
severe constraints not to act in open defiance of the great
maj ority.
From the case study, and limitations suffered by the
OAU since its inception, it becomes clear that the OAU has
done tremendously well in trying to seek a peaceful settle
ment to the Chadian conflict. But one is therefore bound
to wonder why it is that the conflict in Chad still continues
in spite of all the efforts by the OAU. Perhaps anybody
analyzing the situation in Chad could give different answers
to this question depending on one's position on a number of
issues. It appears that the inability of the OAU to achieve
94Ibid., pp. 347-348.
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a substantial result in its efforts in Chad is because of
foreign intervention, limited authority and lack of
financial resources.
Although the OAU is firmly opposed to any external
intervention in the continent's internal conflict, it has
not much success in preventing "foreign meddling," For
example, Ethiopia was unsuccessful in getting support to
dissuade a number ofv Arab states as well as Soviet-bloc
countries from openly supporting the Eritrean secessionist
struggle. Since practically all the OAU members are opposed
to secession of any kind, they had every reason for respond-
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ing positively to the Ethiopians' appeal. In the Chadian
case, the OAU showed itself incapable of mobilizing its
members to make a strong demarche against countries such as
the U.S.A., France, Sudan, and Egypt which provided most of
the economic and military aid to Chadian factions in order
to sustain the civil war.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Our main objective at the beginning of this study was:
1) to critically examine the role of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU)*in settlement of intra-regional
conflict - using the Republic of Chad as a case study;
2) to establish that the root cause of the Chadian conflict
is not ethnicity and religion as some social scientists
woulld have us to believe, but French colonialism and neo
colonialism which has continued to impinge upon 'the Chadian
people even after political independence has been achieved.
The study reveals that it is the arbitrary drawing of
territorial boundaries and the implementation of divide and
rule tactics that resulted in the exacerbation of long stand
ing class, ethnic and religious cleavages in the Republic of
Chad. Our conclusion is that because of the historical
subjugation and subordination of Chadian socio-economic
formation by France, the Republic of Chad has been made to
serve the French interests instead of serving the interests
of the Chadian people. As the study reveals, we have seen
that the subjugation and integration of Chadian economy with
that of France allowed the French people to institute their
199
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norms and values to the Chadians, making it even more
difficult for the Chadians to see themselves as people of
one country. Our analysis of the Chadian conflict and the
inability of the OAU to find a diplomatic solution to this
conflict reveals the contradictions resulting from the
continuing process of economic domination and subjugation
by French imperialism.
The civil war in Chad is an unfortunate illustration of
both the strengths and weaknesses of the OAU. On the one
had, the OAU must be commended for its tireless efforts to
bring about a workable solution to the civil war in Chad
which is not its own making. On the other hand, the noble
efforts of the OAU could not possibly bear fruit* for three
interrelated reasons; first of all, although the OAU is
firmly opposed to any external intervention in Africa's
internal conflict, it has not had much success in preventing
"foreign meddling."
Clearly, the OAU has so far not had much success in
implementing its policy of resisting foreign intervention in
essentially African disputes. There is no reason to think
that the OAU will be able to act more effectively in defense
of its principle of non-intervention by foreign powers in
the future. This is because the majority of the members of
the OAU are reactionary states that believe that the present
Colin Legum, et al., "The Role of the OAU IN Dealing
With Violent Conflicts," Africa in the 1980s; A Continent
in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1979), pp. 39-41.
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status quo should be maintained. They believe that Afirca
should continue to rely and lean on the West for economic,
political and cultural development.
Secondly, the OAU lacks the resources and authority
to enforce its diplomatic initiatives among member states;
and lastly, it is our contention that, unless the prota
gonists involved are committed to a peaceful settlement of
the conflict, such, a solution will not be possible. These
three reasons explain fully the continued failure of the
OAU diplomatic initiatives in Chad.
Despite the fact that President Habre who captured the
seat of government a year and a half ago has done everything
to suppress uprisings by other factions in the "conf 1 ic t, the
current state of peace in Chad is only a temporary
phenomenon. It has become clear that some elements are
dissatisfied with the government set up by Hissene Habre.
In other words, we can expect future collaspe of Habre•s
government as fighting is going on between Goukouni's forces
and government forces of Hissene Habre. The various factions
that make up the present government have long standing
divergent interests.
The study reveals that the various factions that are
fighting in Chad are fighting for their selfish ambitions
and not for the welfare of the Chadian people as a whole.
None of these factions is committed to the welfare and a
starvation of the people in Chad. They are all interested in
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controlling the seat of government in order to promote
their personal goals, and to carry on with the pattern of
colonial and neo-colonial exploitation.
The study maintains that the civil war in Chad is a
product of French colonialism or imperialism which has
created internal contradictions not only in Chad but also
in all African countries that went through the process of
colonization. Indeed, there is no doubt that France has
remained one of the major actors in the political scene of
Chad. Through the so-called aid, trade, and military support,
France has kept intact its domination over a large number of
Francophone states, including Chad. French policy vis-a-vis
aims primarily at maintaining the 'dominant-dependent'
relations between the two countries.
The study maintains that the objective determinants of
French intervention in Chad are: economic, strategic, and
diplomatic/psychological. The objective of stabilizing
power in Africa is met through France being the decisive
force in directing and determining the outcome of situations
in Chad.
The study suggests that as long as African countries
cannot mobilize their resources and be able to develop a
monolithic ideology in fighting imperialism and neo-colonial-
ism, Africa will continue to remain an arena of foreign
intervention in its internal conflict, such as the Chadian
conflict. It is not enough to form an organization as the
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OAU, for when action is needed, a majority of its members
take a back seat. A more purposeful and pragmatic approach
to the settlement of intra-regional conflict should be
adopted by all members of the OAU.
Our analysis revealed that the civil war in Chad cannot
be solved by foreign countries but by the Africans themselves,
the Chadians and the OAU. The fight against imperialism and
neo-colonial ism in t?he African countries as a whole, and in
the Republic of Chad in particular, must be conceptualized
and carried out independently of the imperialist countries
and institutions that brought about the conflict in Chad.
This means that the fight must take place within African
countries and must be directed, first and foremost against
the internal class power structure. The fight must also
focus on the liberation of the internal production structure
and the radical transformation of the political, economic
and cultural institutions created by "formal and informal"
colonialism in Chad. This action, of course, will not
automatically lead to the elimination of poverty and
starvation which the Chadian people are going through.
These are the necessary prerequisites needed for initiating
the attack on imperialism which is the cause of underdevelop-
ment and conflict in the Republic of Chad in particular,
and Africa in general.
These actions will allow the shift of power from the
dominant classes in Chad to the class that would shift the
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development emphasis away from the present strategy of
"catching up with the West" to a new development strategy
geared toward the creation of an autonomous technological
base, and to the reduction or elimination of inequality,
absolute poverty, inadequate education, chronic under-
development, starvation and hunger. It will also lead to
the redirection of national cultural values in such a way
that national culture becomes the means of improving and
preserving individual and cultural self-esteem. In other
words, a development is required in Chad that is genuinely
national, self-reliant and geared towards the needs of all
the members of the society, as opposed to development that
is propelled from outside and geared towards the needs of
outside interests and the few dominant classes in the
Republic of Chad.
These are not easy solutions because there are no
magic solutions with which to fight imperialism and neo
colonialism. Imperialism which is the cause of underdevelop
ment and conflict in Chad is a painful and severe burden,
especially for the masses of the Chadians who are victimized
by the ongoing conflict and the present economic and
political system. The way out of the present conflict will
also be painful, involving sacrifice, determination, and
the will to pursue the available alternatives to solving
these conflicts. In the words of Claude Ake, the choice
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for the Chadian people is between socialism and capitalism.
In other words, either the Chadian people pursue a
socialist self-reliant policy that will lead to the sociali
zation and liberation of the production structures, abolition
of the existing class system, and the structural trans
formation of the political and socio-economic institutions;
or it must bring about a capitalist revolution that may
lead to accelerated»economic stagnation and underdevelopment
"by inhibiting the factors which alone can overcome"
conflict which is the result of imperialism.
Unfortunately, the factors that can make capitalist
revolution possible have been lost to imperialism. As
Magdoff correctly pointed out:
The options that had been available to the
successful capitalist countries in past
centuries ... opt ions which helped pull them
out of impending, recurrent periods of
stagnation - are out of the question.
Conquest of territory, providing new
surges of investment, is impossible. Nor
is there, as in the past, the opportunity
to dispose, in new areas of settlement, of
surplus populations generated by the
agricultural and industrial revolutions.
At the same time, the economic and financial
structure shaped by a long and continuing
history of dependence on the more advanced
capitalism, imposes additional limits on
the possibility of bootstrap-lifting via
the route of profit-seeking capital
investment. It is hard to avoid the
Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London:
Zed Press, 1979), p. 107.
3
Harry Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to
the Present (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969),
pp. 76-91.
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conclusion that, more and more, the only
real alternative facing these peoples is
whether to accept their lot of misery and
its accompanying wastage of human lives
or to revolutionize their societies so
that resources can be fully utilized to
begin to meet real needs of the people.
Thus, the real choice beyond continuing conflict,
hunger, and starvation "is not between capitalism and
socialism after all, but between socialism and barbarism."
Ibid., p . 91.




CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN CHAD
1. Chad's Independence 1960
2. Ngarte Tombalbaye's Regime 1960-1975
3. Felix Malloum's Regime 1975-1978
4. Goukouni Oueddei's Regime 1978-1982
5. Hissene Habre ' s* Regime 1982-Present
6. Kano National Reconciliation Conference April 20, 1979
7. The Lagos Accord August 1979
8. The Sierra Leone Summit July 1980
9. The Emergency Summit in Lagos December 1980
10. The Chad Peace Conference in Lome, Togo. . . .'.January 1981




OAU - Organization of African Unity
EC - European Community-
EEC - European Economic Community
AEF - French Equatorial Africa
BET - Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti
OAS - Organization of American States
UN - United Nations
UDT - European-dominated Chadian Democratic Union
RPF - Rasemblement du Peuple Francais
PSIT - Parti Socialiste pour 1'Independance du Tchad
PPT - Parti Progressiste Tchadien
FLT - Front de Liberation Tchadienne
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
UDEAC - Central African Economic and Customs Union
BEAC - Bank of the Central African States
CSM - Supreme Military Council
FROLINAT - Front for the Liberation of Chad
GUNT - Transitional Government of National Unity
FAP - Peoples Armed Forces
FAN - Northern Armed Forces
UND - Union Nationale Democratique
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MNRCS - Mouvement National Pour La Revolution
Culturelle et Sociale
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